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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation consists of three chapters that study issues in 
Development Economics and Entrepreneurship. The first two chapters study the 
long-term consequences of civil conflict in developing countries using data from 
Rwanda; the third chapter examines determinants of science and non-science 
entrepreneurship for immigrants and natives in the United States.  
Chapter 1 investigates the impact of the 1994 Rwandan genocide on the 
probability that women become victims of intimate partner violence using 
detailed data on conflict intensity combined with a household survey collected 
after the genocide. Genocide intensity in the area of residence is associated with a 
higher probability of becoming victim of domestic violence for women who 
married after the genocide, but not for women who married before. Using census 
data collected before and after the conflict, I show that changes in local marriage 
market conditions likely caused by the genocide were a significant factor that 
 vii 
 
contributed to increase domestic violence and reduce decision-making power for 
women who married after the genocide.  
Chapter 2 analyzes the long-term effect of the Rwandan genocide on 
education. Previous work showed that the genocide significantly decreased 
schooling for children who were in early childhood or in school during the 
genocide. I follow these children over time using recent data and I find that they 
eventually catch up to their peers. I also study the effect of the genocide on 
schooling for children born after the genocide. I observe a large, negative effect 
on educational achievement for children who are born up to five years after the 
end of the conflict. I explore potential mechanisms for this finding and I show 
that changes in marriage market conditions did not contribute to decrease 
educational attainment for children born after the genocide. 
In chapter 3, I use data from a large survey of scientists and highly 
educated individuals to show that conditional on standard factors, immigrants 
are significantly more likely to become entrepreneurs even after controlling for 
their relative position on the ability spectrum (measured by wage residuals). I 
find significant differences in the role of ability in science and non-science 
entrepreneurship for all individuals. 
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Chapter 1  
1. ARMED CONFLICT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: EVIDENCE FROM 
RWANDA 
1.1. Introduction 
Domestic violence is a common phenomenon across different societies 
(Garcia-Moreno et al., 2006). It has negative consequences for the health of 
women and children (Campbell, 2002; Aizer, 2011; Morrison and Orlando, 1999) 
and imposes large costs on public health systems.1 In addition, children who 
grow up in families where domestic violence occurs are more likely to enter 
abusive relationships in adulthood (Pollak, 2004). Domestic violence may also 
reflect who holds the balance of power within the household, 2 which may affect 
investment in children’s human capital (Thomas, 1990; Duflo, 2003). 
This paper studies the long-term effect of civil conflicts on intimate 
partner violence.3 Blattman and Miguel (2010) argue that understanding how 
                                                 
1 Each year, 4.1 billion dollars are spent on medical care services for victims of intimate partner 
violence in the United States (National Center for Injury Prevention and Control, 2003). 
2 Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) and Aizer (2010) incorporate domestic violence in a household 
bargaining model. Factors that improve the woman’s threat point, such as increases in the 
woman’s potential earnings outside the household, enhance her bargaining power in the 
marriage and decrease the risk of domestic violence. Aizer (2010) shows that decreases in the 
gender wage gap reduce domestic violence in the US. However, recent studies find that an 
improvement in female employment opportunities increases domestic violence in developing 
countries (Hjort and Villanger, 2011; Heath, 2012).    
3 Specifically, I am looking at violence committed by men against their female partners. 
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persistently civil conflicts affect human capital is crucial to designing effective 
reconstruction policies. Several studies revealed that civil conflicts have negative 
long-term implications for human capital (Akresh et al., 2012; Leon, 2012; Minoiu 
and Shemyakina, 2012). Through domestic violence, the negative consequences 
of civil conflicts on human capital may extend to future generations that are not 
directly affected by them.  
I address this research question using data from Rwanda, where in 1994 
an estimated 800,000 individuals out of a population of 7 million were killed. 
Using a household survey collected after the genocide, I compare the incidence 
of domestic violence for women living in localities that were differentially 
affected by the conflict. I measure genocide intensity using detailed data on local 
participation in the conflict and victimization of the population obtained from 
customary courts’ records. While a cross-sectional analysis of the data provides 
no evidence that the genocide affected domestic violence for the overall 
population, I find heterogeneous effects by marriage cohort: higher genocide 
intensity increased domestic violence for women who married after the 
genocide. The estimated effect is quite large: a one standard deviation increase in 
genocide intensity in the commune of residence increases the probability of 
domestic violence by 6.8 percentage points, which is equivalent to an increase of 
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18 percent with respect to the sample mean.4 The results are consistent across 
several specifications and robustness checks. This finding suggests that the 
genocide may have affected domestic violence through the marriage market. 
I investigate potential mechanisms for this finding. The genocide might 
affect domestic violence through several channels, which can be grouped in two 
categories: an increase in men’s propensity to perpetrate domestic violence 
against their partners and channels related to the marriage market. The genocide 
might have affected men’s propensity to commit domestic violence, for example, 
because of a lack of security and social order or through a trauma-related 
increase in violent behavior. In the marriage market, at least three mechanisms 
may be at work. The sharp decrease in the adult sex ratio5 that followed the 
genocide affected the balance of the sexes in the marriage market, which is an 
important determinant of the relative well-being of men and women within the 
marriage (Becker, 1973 and 1991).6 Selective killings might have affected the 
types of grooms available for marriage in the aftermath of the genocide and thus 
                                                 
4 Women who live in a locality in the 75th percentile of genocide intensity are on average 11-
percentage points more likely to experience domestic violence than women who live in a locality 
in the 25th percentile of genocide intensity, which represents an increase of 30 percent in the 
sample mean. 
5 The sex ratio is defined as the relative number of men to women. 
6 At the national level, the sex ratio for the 18-50 age group decreased from .95 in 1991 to .88 in 
2002. This implies that the "surplus of women" increased by a factor of 2.5. 
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the incidence of domestic violence. Third, the genocide might have increased 
women’s demand for physical protection and economic support. As a result, a 
lower opportunity cost of marriage might lead women to enter marriages with 
lower expected marital output.   
There is no evidence that the genocide affected domestic violence for 
women who married before the genocide, suggesting that the genocide did not 
cause an increase in the propensity to perpetrate domestic violence that affected 
all men, irrespective of their age. I show that the genocide did not increase the 
probability of being victim of violence by other family members or by 
individuals outside the family. I also find that among women who married after 
the genocide, women married to men who were in their teens during the 
genocide – and might have been more vulnerable to trauma – are not more likely 
to be victims of domestic violence. 
The data provide evidence that women who faced higher competition for 
grooms at the time of marriage have a higher probability of facing domestic 
violence and lower decision-making power within the household. The genocide 
did not lead to a decrease in the husband’s education for women who married 
after the genocide, providing evidence against the channel of selection in the 
killings based on education. This evidence suggests that the genocide increased 
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domestic violence for women who married after the genocide, and part of the 
effect was through a change in the relative position of the sexes in the marriage 
market. These findings are consistent with a theory where lower sex ratios 
decrease the relative well-being of women within the household, as measured by 
the incidence of domestic violence and women’s decision-making. To my 
knowledge, this is the first paper that links the sex ratio to domestic violence. 
This paper is related to the economic literature that studies the effects of 
conflicts on gender inequality, which was recently summarized by Buvinic et al. 
(2013). This study is especially similar to two studies that analyze the effect of 
conflict on domestic violence in Latin America. Calderón et al. (2011) find that 
displaced women in Colombia are more likely to work and contribute to 
household income but are also more likely to experience domestic violence, 
likely because of the trauma experienced during the conflict. Gallegos and 
Gutierrez (2011) use data from Peru to show that women who were exposed to 
civil war events when young are more likely to become victims of domestic 
violence and to be tolerant of domestic abuse, suggesting that the conflict 
affected women’s attitudes. My main contribution with respect to these studies is 
to investigate the effect of a high intensity, short duration conflict that 
dramatically affected the demographics of the country. This allows me to explore 
6 
 
 
new mechanisms through which civil conflicts affect domestic violence, and in 
particular, channels related to the marriage market.  
This study is also closely related to projects that studied the impact of the 
Rwandan genocide on age at first marriage and age at first birth (Jayaraman et 
al., 2009), intra-household labor allocation (Schindler, 2010) and fertility 
(Schindler and Brueck, 2011).7 In addition to providing insights on the effect of 
the genocide on new outcomes that have not been investigated in the previous 
literature (with the exception of a recent article by Finnoff, 2012),8 this paper uses 
different and newly matched data to study the effect of the genocide on family 
outcomes. While previous studies used proxies for household victimizations as 
measures of exposure to the conflict, I use detailed data on conflict intensity in 
the geographic areas of residence. This is helpful for this study because the 
                                                 
7 The paper is also related to studies that investigated the impact of civil conflicts on marriage-
related outcomes in different contexts. See for example Shemyakina (forthcoming) and Valente 
(forthcoming). 
8 Finnoff (2012) analyzes the cross-sectional correlates of domestic violence in post-genocide 
Rwanda using the 2005 DHS. She shows that in 2005, women living in provinces where the 
genocide was more intense were more likely to be victims of domestic violence (physical 
violence). She measures genocide intensity using deaths during the genocide as a percentage of 
the province population provided by a census conducted by the Government of the National 
Unity (Finnoff, 2012, p. 22). While her results support the claim that the exposure to the genocide 
increased domestic violence, her empirical analysis does not control for unobserved time-
invariant factors that might be correlated with both genocide intensity and domestic violence at 
the province level. She proposes the experience of sexual violence during the genocide as a 
potential mechanism but she does not analyze empirically the mechanisms through which the 
genocide could affect domestic violence. In a separate analysis, she shows that women who work 
for a wage and whose husband does not work are more likely to be victims of domestic violence 
(sexual violence) in post-genocide Rwanda. 
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genocide might have affected domestic violence through mechanisms that go 
beyond household victimization. I improve on previous research by conducting 
the analysis at the commune level rather than at the province level, which 
significantly increases statistical power. Finally, while previous studies included 
incarcerated men in the population counts used to define the sex ratio, I 
distinguish between measures of sex ratios that include and exclude the prison 
population and find that higher incarceration rates exacerbate the effect of 
gender imbalances.9 
This study adds to the literature on the determinants of domestic violence, 
and in particular, to studies that linked the incidence of domestic violence to the 
functioning of the marriage market.10 Finally, this paper contributes to an 
extensive literature on the effect of sex ratio on various outcomes.11  
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief background 
on the genocide and the institution of marriage and gender roles in Rwanda. 
Section 3 describes the data. In Section 4, I analyze the effect of domestic violence 
on the overall population. In Section 5, I study the effect of the genocide on 
                                                 
9 This result is consistent with studies that demonstrate the negative effect of incarceration on 
women’s outcomes in the United States (Charles and Luoh, 2010; Mechoulan, 2011). 
10 See for example Jacoby and Mansuri (2010) and Bloch et al. (2002). 
11 See for example Abramitzky et al. (2011), Amuedo-Dorantes and Grossbard (2007), Angrist 
(2002), Bergstrom & Lam (1988), Brainerd (2007), Edlund et al. (forthcoming), Francis (2011), 
Kvasnicka, M. and D. Bethmann (2012), Lafortune (2012) and Porter (2010). 
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domestic violence through the marriage market, and Section 6 explores the 
potential mechanisms. Section 7 concludes.  
1.2. Background 
1.2.1. Background to the genocide 
This section briefly summarizes the events leading up to the 1994 
genocide. For a detailed account of Rwandan history, please see Gourevitch 
(1998), Prunier (1995), Des Forges (1999) and Straus (2006). 
Rwandan population is divided into two main ethnic groups: Hutus, who 
are the majority, and Tutsis.12 Traditionally, Hutus were farmers while Tutsis 
were pastoralists, and Tutsis had a higher social status and controlled the 
monarchy (Straus, 2006). Hutus and Tutsi speak the same language, live in the 
same areas, practice the same religion, and intermarry.13 The distinction between 
the two ethnic groups was reinforced during Belgian colonialism. In the 1930s, 
Belgian officers introduced identity cards that reported ethnicity. Race was used 
as a criterion to allocate power during the colonial system, often in favor of 
Tutsis. After World War II, these policies were reversed. Belgium introduced 
                                                 
12 According to the 1991 Census, before the genocide 8 percent of the population was Tutsi. This 
figure is considered an underestimate (Prunier, 1995). 
13 In the 1992 Census 4 percent of Hutus were married to a Tutsi and 30 percent of Tutsis were 
married to a Hutu. In 1991 50 percent of Tutsi households had at least one Hutu member. 
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reforms that increased Hutu political participation and eventually supported the 
overthrow of the Tutsi monarchy and the creation of a Hutu-dominated 
government (Straus, 2006).  
In 1962, Rwanda obtained independence. Between 1962 and 1990, Hutus 
dominated the government and military. In 1963, 1967 and 1973, there were some 
anti-Tutsi massacres, after which many Tutsis left the country and established 
themselves in neighboring countries. In 1990 the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF), a 
rebel group made largely of descendants of Tutsis in exile, attacked Rwanda 
from Southern Uganda. A civil war followed, which lasted until August 1993, 
when the Rwandan government and the RPF signed an agreement. On April 6, 
1994, the plane carrying the Rwandan President Habyarimana and his staff was 
shot down over Kigali. In the next two days, the extremist fringe of the Hutu 
government took control of the Rwandan state and instigated mass violence 
against the Tutsi population. The genocide ended on July 17, 1994. In just 100 
days, an estimated 800,000 people were killed. 
1.2.2. Effect of the genocide on the population 
Between April 6 and July 17 1994 Hutu extremists fomented the 
population to systematically eliminate Tutsis. Moderate Hutu were also killed. In 
10 
 
 
the effort of eliminating Tutsis, men were often targeted in the killings, because 
of the usual custom of assigning children to the group of their fathers.14  
De Walque and Verwimp (2010) analyze the sibling mortality data 
included in the 2000 Rwanda DHS, which are based on surviving women’s 
recalling the date of death of their siblings. The authors find that in the months of 
the genocide there was a spike in the death of adult siblings. Because children are 
more likely to die than adults as a result of diseases and poverty caused by 
conflicts, the authors argue that the excess adult mortality is due to the killings. 
Using the surviving women’s characteristics as a proxy for the deceased siblings’ 
characteristics, they find that adult men with an urban and educated background 
were more likely to be killed.  
As an illustration of the effect of the genocide on the demographics, 
Figure 1.1 plots the male and female population in three age groups before and 
after the genocide. The sex ratio decreased significantly for all age groups, and in 
particular for the age groups 25-34 and 35-44. Because men marry younger 
women,15 the decrease in the sex ratio likely affected the marriage market for 
women who were in the age group 20-39 in 2002 the most.  
                                                 
14 Rwanda is a patrilineal society and children take the ethnic identity of their fathers.  
15 The average age gap between husband and wife in Rwanda is 5 years (Census; DHS). 
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A higher mortality for men during the mass killings is not the only 
channel through which the genocide could have affected the sex ratio. 
Participation in the genocide also differed across gender. Although women 
played important roles during the genocide, most perpetrators were men (Straus, 
2006). This is reflected in the gender composition of the prison population after 
the genocide. According to the Census, 0.11 percent of the population lived in 
prison in 1991. This proportion skyrocketed ten years later: in 2002, 1.3 percent of 
the population was living in prison. More than 95 percent of those living in 
prison in 2002 were male. The graphs in panel C of Figure 1.1 shows that the sex 
ratio declines after I excluded individuals living in prisons. Many perpetrators 
fled the country in order to escape imprisonment after the genocide, which 
further contributed to decrease the sex ratio (Verpoorten, 2005).  
Sexual violence was very common during the genocide. An estimated 
250,000 women were raped and some women were held captives by militia or 
forced into marriage.16 After the genocide, Rwandan rape survivors had to deal 
with social isolation, stigma and lower chances of getting married. The Human 
                                                 
16 Human Rights Watch. 1996. The estimate was calculated in the following way: “According to 
the statistics, one hundred cases of rape give rise to one pregnancy. If this principle is applied to 
the lowest figure (the numbers of pregnancies caused by rape are estimated to be between 2,000-
5,000), it gives at least 250,000 cases of rape and the highest figure would give 500,000, although 
this figure also seems excessive”. 
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Rights Watch report “Shattered lives” (1996) provides a detailed account of 
gender-based violence during the genocide. According to the authors of the 
report: 
“….rape survivors also expressed concern that they would never be 
able to remarry. Many Rwandans seem to assume that rape victims have a 
sexually transmitted disease, most often AIDS, and rape victims fear that 
they will never get a husband if they admit they were raped. In Rwandan 
society, where women are valued primarily for their role as wives and 
mothers, the issue of marriageability is extremely important. Further, for 
many women, marriage is their best option to obtain economic security 
and some protection. "It's always sad to see a girl who survived [the 
genocide]," said Jeanne, herself a rape survivor. "They have no future. 
Some marry without really wanting to, because they are all alone. They 
can't farm their parents' land- they need a husband to help work the 
fields"”. 
The genocide resulted in massive population displacements. About two 
million individuals were displaced in refugee camps at the border with 
neighboring countries. The vast majority of them returned home by December 
1996 (Gourevitch, 1998). After the genocide, about one million “old case” 
13 
 
 
refugees returned home. Many of the returnees were descendants of Tutsis who 
fled Rwanda after the massacres during the 1950s and the 1960s (Gourevitch, 
1998).  
Finally, the genocide affected household income. Justino and Verwimp 
(2013) estimate that 20 percent of the population moved into poverty after the 
genocide. 
1.3. Data and descriptive statistics 
1.3.1. Data  
This paper combines three different data sets. Data on conflict intensity 
are obtained from the records of the gacaca courts, the transitional Rwandan 
justice system charged with judging suspects in the 1994 genocide. Micro data on 
domestic violence and other women’s and household characteristics come from 
the Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). Census data are employed to create 
a measure of marriage market conditions. To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper that combines data from these three sources. Assembling the data was 
difficult because the administrative boundaries of Rwanda changed three times 
during the period in which the data were collected. Until 2002, the country was 
divided into 1,484 sectors (Figure A1), 145 communes (Figure A2) and 11 
14 
 
 
prefectures (Figure A3). In 2002, an administrative reform replaced the 
communes with 104 districts, and the prefectures were transformed into 12 
provinces. In 2006, the boundaries changed again. The country was divided into 
30 districts, which replaced the existing districts created in 2002, and 5 regions, 
which replaced the previous provinces. The data on participation in the genocide 
and victimization are provided at the sector level and at the 2006 district level. 
1991 Census data are available at the commune and prefecture level; 2002 Census 
data are provided at the 2002 district level and the province level;17 the 
Demographic and Health Survey is provided at the 2002 province level, but I 
used information on the geographic location of the DHS clusters to analyze the 
data at the commune level.18 I matched the various data sets and aggregated 
                                                 
17 Census data were obtained from IPUMS. 
18 For the 2005 wave of the DHS survey, I used the GPS locations of the clusters to infer in which 
commune the clusters are located. The geographic location of the clusters is displaced with a 
random error between 0 and 2 km in urban areas and a random error between 0 and 5 km in 
rural areas. Because the communes are quite small (the average area is 153 km2), some errors in 
the assignment of the communes could occur. I perform two different types of sensitivity 
analysis. First, I alternatively measure conflict intensity at the province level. This strategy 
provides very similar results. Second, I compare the results obtained using the 2005 DHS with the 
results using the 2000 DHS. I know precisely in which commune the clusters in the 2000 wave of 
the survey are located. Information on domestic violence is not available in the 2000 DHS, but I 
can compare the results on women’s decision-making power within the household. I obtain very 
similar results when I use the 2000 DHS (where the exact commune of residence is known) and 
the 2005 DHS (where the assignment of the commune of residence might be subject to 
measurement error). This result indicates that the measurement error is not substantial. The 
results are available upon request.  
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them to perform the analysis at the commune level.19 This represented an 
improvement with respect to previous research (Schindler, 2010; Schindler and 
Brueck, 2011) that analyzed the effect of changes in the sex ratio at the province 
or prefecture level.  
1.3.2.  Demographic and Health Survey (DHS) 
The main source of microeconomic data for domestic violence and 
individual and household characteristics is the 2005 wave of the Rwanda 
Demographic and Health survey (DHS). The DHSs are standardized, nationally 
representative (cross-sectional) household surveys that have been conducted in 
over 50 developing countries since 1986. Female respondents aged 15-49 are 
interviewed on their fertility histories, fertility preferences, use of family 
planning, and their socio-economic and marital status. Information on domestic 
violence is collected through a domestic violence module, which was 
administered for the first time in Rwanda in 2005. While approximately 4,000 
households were selected, and all eligible women in the household (women aged 
                                                 
19 The gacaca data on suspected genocide perpetrators had been previously matched with the 
1991 Census aggregated at the commune level by Friedman (2011), who kindly shared her code 
with me. I used her code and a geographic software (ArcGis) to merge the records on genocide 
perpetrators and survivors with the 1991 Census and aggregated them at the commune level. In 
addition, Marijke Verpooten graciously provided me with an extract of the 2002 Census of 
Population at the sector level, which I first aggregated at the commune level using Arcgis and 
then matched with the 1991 communes. 
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15-49) were interviewed for the core questionnaire, only one woman in each 
selected household was randomly selected to be interviewed in the domestic 
violence module to assure privacy and safety for the respondents. This reduces 
the sample to 4,066 women. Among the selected women, 1,195 were never 
married and 157 were widowed. Never married women and widowed women 
did not respond to the survey. In addition, approximately 150 separated women 
did not respond to the survey, leaving 2,544 observations. I finally exclude from 
the empirical analysis 399 women who were married more than once for whom 
information on the date of the current union cannot be recovered with certainty. 
The rationale for this will be clear once I explain the identification strategy. 
Briefly, the identification strategy employed in this paper relies on comparing 
women who married their current or last partner at different points in time 
(recall that information on domestic violence refers to the current or last partner). 
Because information on the year of marriage is available only for the first 
marriage, I can only identify the timing of the marriage with the current or last 
partner for women who married at most once. 
The DHS domestic violence module uses a modified Conflict Tactics Scale 
(CTS) to measure spousal violence. Kishor (2005) describes in detail the CTS 
approach and the modified CTS included in the DHS module. The original CTS 
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developed by Straus (1979 and 1990) consists of a series of individual questions 
regarding specific acts of violence such as slapping, punching, and kicking. If the 
respondent affirms that any one of the specified acts or outcomes has taken 
place, she is considered to have experience violence. The CTS approach presents 
several features that are aimed at minimizing underreporting of violence. First, 
by asking separately about specific acts of violence, the violence measure is not 
affected by different understandings between women of what constitutes 
violence. Second, the CTS approach gives respondents multiple opportunities to 
disclose their experiences of violence. The original scale developed by Straus had 
19 items (Straus, 1979; 1990) and did not include sexual violence. The modified 
list used by DHS includes only about 15 acts of physical and sexual violence.20 
During the interview, the staff followed a strict protocol to assure that no 
one in the house knew or heard the content of the interview. If the husband 
entered the room during the interview, the interview was concluded 
immediately. Women were asked about the details of the relationship with their 
current or former partner. Specifically, they were asked whether they had ever 
been the victim of aggressive behaviors by their current or former partner, such 
                                                 
20 Besides the fact that it did not include sexual violence, the original CTS approach was criticized 
because it situated acts of violence only in situation characterized by conflict. The modified CTS 
approach used in the DHS instead does not assume that violence takes place only in 
circumstances characterized by conflict. See Kishor (2005) for more detail.  
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as pushing, shaking, throwing something, slapping, twisting an arm, striking 
with a fist or with something that could cause injury, kicking or dragging, 
attempting to strangle or burn, threatening with a knife, gun, or other type of 
weapon, and attacking with a knife, gun, or other type of weapon. In addition, 
women were asked if they had ever been victims of sexual violence by their 
current or former partner. Women who reported having been victimized by their 
partners at least once were also asked how many years after the date of the 
marriage the abuse occurred for the first time and how many times it occurred in 
the last 12 months. I define two variables that measure women’s experience of 
domestic violence. Ever victim of domestic violence is a binary indicator that takes 
value one if the woman was ever a victim of any type (less severe physical, 
severe physical or sexual) of domestic violence by her last or current partner and 
zero otherwise. Victim of domestic violence in the past 12 months is a binary variable 
that takes value one if the woman was the victim of any type (less severe 
physical, severe physical or sexual) of domestic violence by her last or current 
partner in the last 12 months and zero otherwise.  
The DHS contains information on decision-making within the household 
and attitudes about domestic violence. Women are asked about which persons in 
the household have the final say in five different situations, such as the woman’s 
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own health care, making large household purchases, making household 
purchases for daily needs, visits to family or relatives, and the food to be cooked 
each day. I construct a variable that is the sum of the number of situations in 
which the woman has the final say. Women are also asked if they agree that 
husbands are justified in beating their wife when she goes out without telling 
him, neglects the children, argues with him, refuses to have sex with him, or 
burns the food. I construct a variable that is the sum of the situations in which 
the woman agrees that husbands are justified in beating their wives. 
The DHS data present some limitations. First, ethnicity is not reported. 
After the genocide, the Rwandan government no longer reported ethnic identity 
in the population statistics. Second, there is no information on the place of birth, 
which makes it difficult to reconstruct a complete migration history. Third, there 
is no information on income. The data provide information on a large number of 
assets, which are used to create a wealth index based on a principal component 
analysis.  
To control for migration, I use information in the DHS on “how many 
years the respondent has lived in the current place of residence”. I consider two 
different definitions of households “that moved” and alternatively drop the 
households that meet these definitions from the sample. First, I retain only 
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households where the woman lived in the current place of residence for more 
than 11 years.21 This dramatically reduces the sample size by more than 50 
percent. This definition of non-migrant households might not be accurate 
because the questionnaire does not precisely define the “current place of 
residence”. I find that over 25 percent of the women seemed to report the year in 
which they moved to the current place of residence in a manner suggesting the 
year in which they moved to the groom’s house after the wedding. Alternatively, 
I only retain households where the woman or the husband lived in the current 
place of residence for more than 11 years.22 This sample includes the previously 
defined sample and represents a more accurate definition of non-migrant 
households. Using information on the husband’s migration history is a good 
approximation because the majority of women married someone from the same 
commune of birth. According to the Census,23 in 1991 59 percent of married 
individuals in the Census were married to someone from the same commune of 
birth. In 2002, 72 percent of married individuals in the sample married someone 
from the same district of birth.24 From the Census, I can also obtain an estimate of 
                                                 
21 I refer to this sample as “sample 2”. 
22 I refer to this sample as “Sample 1”. 
23 Information on the place of birth and the place of residence is available in the 1991 and the 2002 
Census.  
24 The districts are larger than the communes. 104 districts replaced the 145 communes in 2002. 
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the percentage of individuals who migrate and compare it to my definitions of 
migrant and non-migrant households in the DHS. In 1991, 20 percent of the 
population lived in a commune different from their commune of birth; in 2002, 
24 percent of the population lived in a district that was not their district of birth. 
This figure includes individuals who were born abroad and old-case refugees 
that returned to Rwanda after 1994. Using the DHS sample, when I only retain 
households where the woman or the husband lived in the current place of 
residence for more than 11 years (“Sample 1”), the sample size is reduced by 28 
percent. This figure is reassuringly similar to the percentage of individuals who 
migrated in the 2002 Census.25  
1.3.3. Conflict data 
The data on participation in the genocide and victimization are obtained 
from the records of the gacaca courts. For a detailed assessment of the measures 
obtained from the gacaca records, please see Verpoorten (2011). Various 
measures obtained from the data have been used by Yanagizawa-Drott (2010), 
Friedman (2011) and Verpoorten (2011) to study factors related to participation 
                                                 
25 Table 1.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables used in the main analysis and the 
three samples defined above. The average probability of having ever victim of domestic violence 
is higher when I restrict the analysis to women in sample 2. This is due to the fact that women in 
sample 2 have been married for longer, and therefore they have been exposed to domestic 
violence longer.  
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in the Rwandan genocide. To my knowledge, only Serneels and Verpoorten 
(2012) used the data to study the consequences of the genocide at the 
microeconomic level.26 The records contain information on the number of 
accused genocide perpetrators and genocide survivors at the sector level. The 
suspected perpetrators are divided into three categories: 1) those who organized 
the killings, 2) those that killed and 3) those who looted. The survivors are 
divided into three categories 1) widows 2) orphans 3) disabled.27 I matched these 
data with population data from the 1991 Census and aggregated them at the 
commune level. I divided each variable in the gacaca records by the commune 
population in 1991 to create a measure of the proportion of the pre-genocide 
commune population that participated in the genocide or was victimized during 
the genocide.28 The variables are described in graph 2 (box plot). The variables 
are quite skewed with a non-negligible number of outliers. Following 
Verpoorten, (2011), I create an index that aggregates the six variables using 
                                                 
26 Serneels and Verpoorten (2012) matched the data with the 2000/2001 LSMS to study the effect 
of the genocide on household level consumption. They do not use the gacaca data directly but 
use an index of genocide intensity and civil war intensity based on the gacaca data. In their study, 
the sector is used as unit of the analysis.  
27 The numbers of male and female genocide survivors are also provided. These variables are not 
included in the analysis because their use in conjunction with the other categories of genocide 
survivors are likely to over count the number of persons that were victimized. 
28 The estimates are robust to using alternative definitions that account for population growth 
between 1991 and 1994 and/or the number of suspected genocide perpetrators that passed away 
between 1994 and 2005 (the latter information is provided in the gacaca records). 
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principal component analysis. The genocide index is the first component of the 
principal component analysis.  
For descriptive purpose,29 I compare them to two variables that have been 
considered to be correlated with genocide intensity in the literature. Previous 
studies suggest that the killings were more intense where the pre-genocide 
proportion of Tutsis was larger (Verpoorten, 2011) and in provinces that were 
further from the border with Uganda (Akresh and De Walque, 2011; Serneels and 
Verpoorten, 2012). Graph 3 shows that the genocide was more intense in 
communes located in the south and south-west of the country that is further 
from the Ugandan border. The correlation between genocide intensity and the 
pre-genocide proportion of Tutsis at the commune level is approximately 0.7. 
1.4. Effect of ethnic violence on domestic violence 
1.4.1. Empirical strategy 
I first investigate the effect of the genocide on domestic violence using a 
cross-sectional analysis. I estimate the following equation:  
                                                 
29 See Verpoorten (2011) for a careful comparison of the Gacaca data with other measures of 
genocide intensity. 
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 =	 + 	
 +  +  +  +        (1)                                                              
Where  is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if woman i who resides 
in commune c was a victim of domestic violence by her current or former 
partner.30 Genocidec is a continuous variable that measures genocide intensity in 
the commune of residence of the woman and is standardized to have mean zero 
and standard deviation 1. Xi is a vector of variables that contains measurements 
of the woman’s and her husband’s characteristics. Parameter  is a set of 
province dummies, and Xc is a vector of commune-level controls. I estimate 
equation 1 using OLS.31 The standard errors are clustered at the commune level. 
The analysis likely provides biased estimates because of omitted variables 
that are correlated with both domestic violence and genocide intensity. For 
example, weak social ties or the lack of law enforcement at the local level might 
be related to both participation in the killings and domestic violence. I include 
province dummies in the regression () to identify the effect of the genocide on 
domestic violence using within-province variation in genocide intensity while 
holding constant all unobservable factors that are constant at the province level. 
                                                 
30 I alternatively employ Ever victim of domestic violence and Victim of domestic violence in the past 12 
months as dependent variables. 
31 Similar results are obtained when using a probit model. Excluding the observations that 
generate predictions out of the [0, 1] interval does not alter the estimated coefficients. 
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The cross-sectional analysis could still lead to biased estimates if, for example, 
unobservable factors are correlated with both genocide intensity and domestic 
violence at the commune level. Ideally, I would like to analyze the effect of the 
genocide on domestic violence by holding constant all unobservable time-
invariant factors that might be correlated with both genocide and domestic 
violence. This could be possible if we observed the rates of domestic violence 
before and after the genocide for the same women (panel data) or for different 
women living in the same commune (repeated cross-section), but unfortunately 
data on domestic violence were not collected before the genocide.  
I attempt to overcome this issue by exploiting the information contained 
in the data set, which allows me to create a retrospective panel data set using two 
different methods of data imputation. The precise year and month that each 
woman was married are known. In addition, if a woman was ever a victim of 
domestic violence, we know how many years after marriage the first episode of 
domestic violence occurred and how many times various forms of violence 
occurred in the last 12 months. I impute a history of domestic violence using two 
different data imputation methods. Under the first method, I assume that 
domestic violence occurred every year after the year of the first episode. The 
domestic violence variable takes value one in the year of the first episode and it 
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then takes value one in each year after the first episode. When using the second 
imputation method, I assume that domestic violence occurred every year after 
the first episode only if it also occurred in the last 12 months. If domestic violence 
did not occur in the last 12 months, I assume that the first episode was an 
isolated event and domestic violence did not occur again. As a result of the data 
imputation, I obtain an unbalanced panel of women. A woman enters the data 
set when she becomes married and is observed every year until the year of the 
survey (2005). I estimate the effect of the genocide using a difference-in-
differences analysis: I compare women’s domestic violence outcomes before and 
after the genocide (first difference) in communes that differed across genocide 
intensity (second difference). In some specifications, I control for commune fixed 
effects that capture commune-level, unobserved time-invariant variables that 
might be correlated with genocide intensity and domestic violence. I estimate the 
following equation using pooled OLS: 32  
                                                 
32 I also estimated a hazard model for the first episode of domestic violence. While the hazard 
model provides very similar results, I chose to report the pseudo-panel analysis for simplicity of 
exposition. The results of the hazard model are available upon request. 
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 + 					(2) 
Where t is the calendar year and After1994 is an indicator that takes value 
1 for each year after 1994. I restrict the analysis to women who married before the 
genocide. It is important to note that for this analysis to be correct, two 
conditions should be satisfied. First, I am using retrospective data and I assume 
that women recall the date of the first episode of domestic violence correctly. In 
reality, we expect some memory bias to occur (Gibson and Kim, 2005). This could 
be problematic for the estimation strategy if recall bias was correlated with 
conflict exposure. Second, I am assuming that my imputation methods provide a 
good measure for women’s history of domestic violence. However, both methods 
are extreme and likely provide an upper and lower bound to the true, 
unobserved history of domestic violence.  
1.4.2. Results 
Table 1.2a displays the results of the regression model described in 
equation 1, using Ever victim of domestic violence as the dependent variable. 33 In 
column (1), I estimate the model without including any control variables. The 
                                                 
33 Panels A, B and C report the coefficient estimates for all women (including migrants), women 
in households where the woman or the husband did not move (Sample 1) and women who did 
not move (sample 2), respectively.  
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coefficient estimate is negative, very small in magnitude, and statistically 
insignificant. In column (2), I estimate the model controlling for province fixed 
effects cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974, born in 1975-1990), 
which significantly increases the magnitude of the estimate. This suggests that 
the presence of omitted variables biases the effect of the genocide towards zero. 
In column (3), I add individual and household level controls, such as years since 
marriage entered as a cubic, dummies for religion, the woman’s age at first 
marriage, woman’s and partner’s educational attainment, urban status and an 
indicator that takes value one if the household has more assets than the median 
(wealthy). The size of the coefficient estimate on the genocide index increases by 
one third when I add the controls, suggesting that selection on observables 
attenuates the estimated effect of the genocide on domestic violence. 
Other variables affect domestic violence in a reasonable manner. Age at 
first marriage is negatively related to domestic violence, and the effect is 
statistically significant.34 A woman’s education is positively correlated with 
domestic violence, although in most cases the effect is not significant.35 Women 
married to husbands with at least primary education (approximately 20 percent 
                                                 
34 This result is consistent with the literature (Jensen and Thornton, 2003). 
35 This result is consistent with the fact that more educated women are more likely to report 
domestic violence (Malhotra, Pande and Grown, 2003), which makes it difficult to compare 
domestic violence rates for women with different levels of educational attainment. 
29 
 
 
of the sample) are approximately 17 percentage points less likely to be victims of 
domestic violence with respect to women whose husbands have no education. 
The results are robust to using different samples and employing alternative 
definitions of the dependent variable.  
There is a concern that genocide intensity in 1994 could be related to pre-
genocide macroeconomic and social conditions at the commune level that might 
affect domestic violence ten years later. In column (4), I include a set of 
commune-level variables obtained from the 1991 Census. Specifically, I include 
in the regression the literacy rate among the over-15s, the population density, the 
fraction of population that was born outside the commune and the fraction of 
population that is employed among the over15s. These variables capture human 
capital, social tensions generated by high population density and land scarcity, 
economic performance and employment opportunities that might affect 
migration rates. The size of the coefficient estimate on the genocide index 
increases by about one fourth when I add the controls, which indicates that 
omitted variable bias at the commune level attenuates the estimated effect of the 
genocide on domestic violence. The results are similar when I employ Victim of 
domestic violence in the last 12 months as dependent variable (the results are 
reported in Table 1.2b). 
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Moving to the  retrospective panel analysis, Table 1.3 shows the results of 
the regression model described in equation 2. In columns (1) and (2), I define the 
dependent variable using the first  imputation method. In columns (3) and (4), I 
define the dependent variable using the second method of imputation. In 
columns (1) and (3), I estimated the regression for all women (including potential 
migrants), while in columns (2) and (4) I restrict the sample to women living in 
households where the woman or the husband did not migrate. The coefficient 
estimate on the interaction term (β3) is very small and statistically insignificant. 
We cannot reject the hypothesis that the genocide had no effect on domestic 
violence for women who married before the genocide.36 The results are robust to 
using different samples.  
1.5. Effect of the genocide on domestic violence through the marriage 
market 
1.5.1. Empirical strategy 
While the results presented in Section 4 suggest that the genocide did not 
have an effect on the overall population of women, it would be interesting to 
investigate whether the effect of the genocide on domestic violence was 
                                                 
36 The coefficient estimate on the dummy After1994 is positive and statistically significant, when 
we use the second method of imputation. This result could be due to recall bias. 
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heterogeneous across different groups of women. In particular, it would be 
interesting to test whether the changes in the marriage market that followed the 
genocide, which were described in Section 2, affected the probability of domestic 
violence. For this purpose, I estimate the regression model described in equation 
1 separately for women who married before and after the genocide. The results 
are reported in columns (4) and (5) of Tables 2a and 2b. The results show that 
there are large differences across marriage cohorts: the estimated coefficient on 
genocide intensity is large, positive and statistically significant for women who 
married after the genocide, while it is small, negative and not statistically 
significant for women who married before. This result is robust to using different 
samples and alternative specifications of the dependent variable.  
This result suggests that the genocide may have had an effect on domestic 
violence through the marriage market. However, the cross-sectional analysis 
could suffer from omitted variable bias and the bias could go in both directions. 
The effect of genocide intensity for women who married after the genocide is not 
always robust to the inclusion of pre-genocide commune level controls such as 
population density and literacy rate. Because only women who married after the 
genocide are affected by changes in marriage market conditions, I can exploit 
geographic variation in genocide intensity and temporal variation in marriage 
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timing to identify the effect of the genocide on domestic violence through the 
marriage market, while holding constant unobservable, time-invariant 
characteristics at the commune level. I estimate the following regression model:  
 =	 + 	
 + #$	$ +  
 ∗ #$	$ + 
+ 		(3) 
Where  is a binary indicator that takes value 1 if woman i who resides 
in commune c was a victim of domestic violence by her current or former 
partner.37 Genocidec is a continuous variable that measures genocide intensity in 
the woman’s commune of residence and is standardized to have mean zero and 
standard deviation 1. Marr_after is a binary indicator that takes value one if the 
woman became married after the genocide and zero otherwise. Xi is a vector of 
variables that contains measurements of the woman’s and her husband’s 
characteristics. εict is a random, idiosyncratic error term. I estimate equation 3 
using OLS. The interaction of a commune’s conflict intensity with an indicator 
for becoming married after the genocide is the key variable of interest and 
measures a woman’s exposure to the genocide. The estimated coefficient 
represents the effect of a one standard deviation increase in genocide intensity on 
the probability that a woman who became married after the genocide is a victim 
                                                 
37  Ever victim of domestic violence and Victim of domestic violence in the past 12 months are 
alternatively used as dependent variables 
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of domestic violence. The effect is measured with respect to the mean value of 
genocide intensity, which is equal to zero.  
To control for unobserved correlation of observations within communes 
and specific marriage cohorts, in some specifications I include commune and 
year of marriage fixed effects. Including commune specific fixed effects allows 
controlling for all observed and unobserved commune characteristics that are 
constant across women from the same commune, thereby removing any bias that 
is generated by commune characteristics. Year of marriage fixed effects control 
for marriage cohort-specific shocks that may bias our results. All specifications 
control for various woman’s and household characteristics.  
Because the empirical strategy relies on comparing domestic violence 
outcomes for women who are observed in 2005 and who married at different 
points in time, it is particularly important to control for women’s age and years 
since marriage. Women who married before the genocide tend to be older and 
have been married - and exposed to the risk of domestic violence – for a longer 
time than women who married after the genocide. Cohort-level characteristics 
and marriage duration could affect domestic violence. I control for age using 
dummies that measure age using bins of 10 or 15 years (born in 1955-1964, born 
in 1965-1974, born in 1975-1990). I alternatively control for age using dummies 
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that measure age using bins of 5 years (born in 1955-1959, born in 1960-1964, 
born in 1965-1969, born in 1970-1974, born in 1975-1979, born 1980-1984, born 
1985-1990) or year of birth fixed effects. The results are robust to the alternative 
specifications of the age variable.  I also estimated the difference-in-differences 
regression restricting the analysis to women in certain age groups so that there is 
an overlap in the age variable between those who married before and those who 
married after the genocide (common support). Specifically, I excluded women 
who married before the genocide that are older than the oldest woman among 
the women who married after the genocide, and I excluded women who married 
after the genocide who are younger than the youngest woman among the 
women who married before the genocide. This means that I restricted the sample 
to women aged between 24 and 45 years old. The results are robust to restricting 
the sample to women in the common support of the age variable.38  
Women who married before the genocide have been exposed to the risk of 
domestic violence for a longer period than women who married before the 
genocide. In all the regressions, I control for years since marriage entered as a 
cubic. There is a concern that women who married after the genocide have been 
                                                 
38 The results obtained using different specifications of the age variables and the results obtained 
estimating the difference-in-differences equation for women of age 24-45 are available upon 
request. 
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married for a shorter duration and domestic violence could be right-censored for 
them. However, this type of censoring would bias the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide 
downward.  
The standard errors are clustered at the commune level, and all 
regressions are weighted using the survey weights for the domestic violence 
module provided by the DHS. 
1.5.2. Results 
Table 1.4 reports the estimates for the model described above (equation 3). 
Panel A and panel B show the results when Ever victim of domestic violence and 
Victim of domestic violence in the past 12 months are used as dependent variable, 
respectively. Across various specifications, the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide is 
always positive. When I control for migration (Sample 1, columns (2) and (3)), I 
find that a one standard deviation increase in genocide intensity in the commune 
of residence increases the probability of ever being a victim of domestic violence 
by 6.8 percentage points. Very similar results are obtained for the probability of 
being a victim of domestic violence in the last 12 months.  
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Women who live in a locality in the 75th percentile of genocide intensity 
(.7) are on average 11-percentage points more likely to have experienced 
domestic violence at least once in their life than women who live in a locality in 
the 25th percentile of genocide intensity (-.9), which represents an increase of 30 
percent in the sample mean (0.37). Women who live in a locality in the 75th 
percentile of genocide intensity are on average 11-percentage points more likely 
to have experienced domestic violence in the last 12 months than women who 
live in a locality in the 25th percentile of genocide intensity, which represents an 
increase of 48 percent in the sample mean (0.23). These effects are quite 
substantial. 
The estimates are smaller and occasionally statistically insignificant when 
I include potential migrants in the sample, suggesting that the potential error in 
measuring conflict intensity for those who moved biases the estimate towards 
zero. The results are also smaller and occasionally statistically insignificant when 
I control for migration in the most conservative manner, that is, when I include 
only women who lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
The large reduction in sample size and the consequent lack of power might be 
responsible for this result. 
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The estimated coefficient on the “genocide index” variable offers some 
interesting insights into the effect of the genocide for women who married before 
the genocide. The estimated coefficient is consistently negative and statistically 
insignificant across all specifications. This result confirms that no statistical 
relationship is observed between genocide intensity and domestic violence for 
women who married before the genocide. The results are very robust when I use 
Victim of domestic violence in the past 12 months as the dependent variable instead 
of Ever victim of domestic violence.  
1.5.3. Robustness checks 
One possible threat to identification in a difference-in-differences setting is 
the possibility that conflict and non-conflict regions were affected by different 
time-varying macroeconomic and social conditions. To control for differences in 
time-varying variables that might bias the effect of genocide on domestic 
violence, I would like to include a set of time-varying commune level indicators. 
Unfortunately, the change in the administrative boundaries between the time the 
1991 and the 2002 Census were collected makes it hard to create post-genocide 
measures at the commune level. I rely on the restricted 2002 Census data that 
another researcher shared with me to create measures of the literacy rate among 
over15 population and population density at the commune level eight years after 
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the genocide. I control for time-varying differences in human capital and 
population density at the commune level by assigning a woman the measure 
from the 1991 Census if she married before the genocide and the measure from 
the 2002 Census if she married after the genocide. The results are reported in 
Table 1.5. Panel A and panel B, respectively, contain the estimates when Ever 
victim of domestic violence and Victim of domestic violence in the past 12 months are 
used as dependent variables. All results in the table are obtained using the 
sample of households where either the woman or the husband did not move 
(Sample 1).39 Column (1) presents the estimates of the difference-in-differences 
model with the inclusion of the commune-level controls. These estimates can be 
compared with the baseline estimate reported in column (4) of Table 1.4. The 
inclusion of commune-level controls increases the coefficient estimate on the 
interaction term by about 5 percent, suggesting that the presence of time-varying 
omitted characteristics at the commune-level attenuates the effect of the 
genocide. 
Another possible threat to identification in a difference-in-differences 
setting is the possibility that conflict and non-conflict regions experienced 
                                                 
39 Similar results are obtained when not controlling for migration or when controlling for 
migration in a more conservative manner. The results are not reported but are available upon 
request. 
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different trends in domestic violence before the genocide. I include linear 
commune-specific time trends to test whether the empirical results are driven by 
pre-existing trends in domestic violence. Column (2) displays the results of the 
model that includes commune-specific linear time trends. The coefficient 
estimate is almost unchanged but the effect of genocide on domestic violence is 
imprecisely estimated when I include commune-specific time trends. Column (3) 
contains the results of the model estimated including province-specific time 
trends. The results are reassuringly robust when I include province-specific time 
trends. The number of observations (N=1,441) might not provide sufficient 
power to estimate the effect of the genocide precisely when I include commune-
specific time trends.40  
In columns (4)-(7), I include a set of controls that might affect domestic 
violence. Specifically, I include variables that describe a woman’s marital status, 
such as binary indicators for whether a woman is cohabiting, lives in a 
polygamous household, or is separated from her husband. I also include a binary 
indicator that takes value one if domestic violence occurred among the woman’s 
parents. Finally, I include a binary variable that takes value one if the woman’s 
                                                 
40 There are 137 communes in the sample. 
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husband becomes drunk frequently.41 Each of these variables is highly correlated 
with the incidence of domestic violence. However, the results are robust to 
including these variables in the regression.  
In unreported results, I also control for women’s employment status using 
a binary indicator for whether the woman works away from home and an 
indicator for working for pay. The absence of men caused by civil conflicts may 
increase women’s employment opportunities outside the household (Schindler, 
2010; Calderón et al., 2011). Recent work revealed that female labor supply is 
associated with a higher risk of domestic violence in developing countries (Hjort 
and Villanger, 2011; Heath, 2012). I find that the results are not affected by the 
inclusion of variables that measure women’s work outside the household.42 
Marriage timing might be correlated with unobservable characteristics 
that affect both genocide and domestic violence. To account for the potential 
endogeneity of marriage timing, I exploit the fact that the cohort of birth is a 
strong predictor for the cohort of marriage. I estimate a reduced form model that 
exploits temporal variation in year of birth instead of temporal variation in 
marriage timing. In particular, I replace “Married after the genocide” in equation 
                                                 
41 Annan and Brier (2010) show that alcohol consumption is strongly associated with intimate 
partner violence in post-conflict Northern Uganda.  
42 The results are available upon request. 
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3 with a binary variable that takes value 1 if the woman was born after 1975 and 
zero otherwise (“Younger than 19 in 1994”). This variable is a proxy for entering 
marriageable age after the genocide.43 Table 1.6 displays the results. A one 
standard deviation increase in genocide intensity in the region of residence 
increased the probability of being a victim of domestic violence by 5.7 percentage 
points (column (1)). The coefficient increases by one third when I include 
commune fixed effects and year of birth fixed effects (column (2)). I also estimate 
a two-stage-least squares model. Younger than 19 in 1994 is used as an 
instrumental variable for Married after the genocide. The results are displayed in 
column (3) of Table 1.6. The first stage F statistic is well above the rule of thumb 
value of 10, which confirms that the instruments are not weak. The 2SLS 
coefficient is slightly larger, but overall very similar to, the OLS coefficient. In an 
alternative specification, I use 31 year of birth dummies are used as instruments 
for “Married after genocide”. The results, which are reported in column (4) of 
Table 1.6, are very similar.  
I perform a placebo test that investigates whether domestic violence rates 
among the previous generation of women were higher in areas where the 
genocide was more intense. I use information on domestic violence among a 
                                                 
43 Before the genocide, the average age of marriage was 19. 
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woman’s parents as a proxy for domestic violence in the previous generation of 
women. I estimate the regression model described in equation 3 using domestic 
violence among the woman’s parents (Mother was a victim) as the dependent 
variable.44 The mothers of the women interviewed in 2005 likely became married 
about 20 years before their daughters.45 The placebo test is thus equivalent to 
testing whether there was a pre-existing trend in high-genocide localities about 
20 years after the genocide (Calderón et al., 2012). Table 1.7 displays the results of 
the placebo regression. I find no empirical relationship between placebo 
genocide communes and domestic violence for the mothers of women who 
married after the genocide.  
Researchers working with self-reported domestic violence data have to 
deal with the issue of misreporting. Women could either underreport or over 
report domestic violence and we are particularly worried that the misreporting 
might be more common in areas where the genocide was more intense. If 
younger women who live in areas where the genocide was more intense are 
more likely to underreport domestic violence, then the estimated coefficient on 
the interaction term between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide 
                                                 
44 A similar test was conducted by Calderón et al., (2012). 
45 In 1992, the average age at first birth was 21 (1992 DHS).  
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would be biased downward. Over reporting is a bigger concern. For example, 
younger women in areas where the genocide was more intense might have been 
exposed to public health programs targeting women’s awareness of gender-
based violence. I use women’s self-reported attitudes towards domestic violence 
to indirectly test for this possibility.46 Women are asked whether they think that 
husbands are justified in beating their wives in a certain number of situations. I 
construct a count variable that equals the sum of situations in which the woman 
believes that domestic violence is acceptable. If women who married after the 
genocide and live in areas where the genocide was more intense are more aware 
of gender-based violence issues and therefore are more likely to report domestic 
violence, we might also expect them to report less that domestic violence is 
justified (Heath, 2012). I estimate a difference-in-differences regression similar to 
that described in equation 3 using a Poisson model and the number of situations 
in which domestic violence is acceptable as the dependent variable. Table 1.8 
displays the results.47 I find no evidence that women who married after the 
genocide and live in high genocide communes are less likely to believe that 
domestic violence is justified. The interaction terms between genocide intensity 
                                                 
46 A similar test was performed by Heath (2012). 
47 The sample size is larger with respect to the analysis of the effect of genocide on domestic 
violence because I do not have to restrict the analysis to women who responded to the domestic 
violence module. 
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and marrying after the genocide are all small in magnitude and statistically 
insignificant.  
Finally, there is a concern that nonrandom sample selection might bias the 
results. I consider three types of selection that might affect the results: selection 
into widowhood, selection into remarriage and selection into marriage. First, I 
consider one selection into widowhood and/or remarriage. Second, I consider 
selection into marriage together with selection into widowhood and/or 
remarriage. I consider the two problems separately because taking into account 
selection into marriage requires a different empirical specification.  
Regarding selection into widowhood and/or remarriage, women who 
married before the genocide are included in my sample only conditional on their 
first husband still being alive or on not getting married again in case they 
divorced their first husband. If selection into non-widowhood and remarriage is 
non-random, then non-random selection might be bias the results. I estimate a 
two-step Heckman selection model without exclusion restrictions to account for 
this potential source of selection bias, using as second-stage equation the 
specification described in equation (3). The results are very robust to this 
specification and the diagnostics of the two-step estimation procedure provide 
no evidence of selection: the coefficient lambda, which represents the covariance 
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of the error terms of the two equations, is not statistically different from zero, 
and the hypothesis that the two parts of the selection model are independent 
cannot be rejected.48 
 Another type of selection that might exist is selection into marriage. 
Women are included in the sample only conditionally on getting married. To 
account for selection into marriage as well as selection into widowhood and 
remarriage, I use a difference-in-differences specification that exploits variation 
across localities and birth cohort, as the timing of marriage is not observed for 
women who never married.49 I use the number of younger sisters of the woman 
as an instrument for the selection equation. The number of younger sisters affects 
a woman’s probability of marriage and remarriage (Vogl, 2012) but should not be 
correlated with domestic violence. I estimate a two-step Heckman selection 
model with exclusion restriction. The results are robust to this specification, but 
the hypothesis that the two parts of the selection model are independent cannot 
be rejected, suggesting that there is no selection.50  
1.6. Potential mechanisms 
                                                 
48 The results are available upon request. 
49 The OLS results for this specification are reported in columns (1) and (2) of Table 1.6. 
50 The results are available upon request. 
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The results described in the previous section show that the genocide 
increased domestic violence for women who married after the genocide. I 
investigate various potential mechanisms for this finding. Although there are 
many channels through which the genocide might be affecting domestic 
violence, they can be grouped in two macro categories: an increase in men’s 
propensity to commit domestic violence and mechanisms related to the marriage 
market. 
 First, the genocide might have increased men’s propensity to perpetrate 
domestic violence against their partners, for example through a decrease in the 
expected penalties for crime and violence due to a lack of security and social 
order or through a trauma-related increase in violent behavior. A few studies in 
economics have examined how exposure to civil conflict and combat affect 
violent behavior. Miguel and Satyanath (2011) find that the extent of civil conflict 
in a soccer player’s country of origin is associated with more violent behavior on 
the soccer field, as measured by yellow and red cards. Rohlfs (2010) exploits 
variation in exposure to the Vietnam War across cohorts to show that combat 
exposure increased self-reported criminal and violent behavior among black 
men. Gupta et al. (2010) find a positive correlation between married men’s 
experience of human rights violations during the apartheid in South Africa and 
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the perpetration of physical violence against their female partners. If we expect 
the genocide to increase all men’s propensity to commit domestic violence 
irrespective of age, then this mechanism is not likely to explain the results, as I 
find that the genocide increased domestic violence only for women who married 
after 1994, who tended to be younger and marry younger men. In addition, the 
results of the retrospective panel analysis presented in Table 1.3 suggest that the 
genocide did not affect domestic violence rates for women who married before 
the genocide and lived in communes that were exposed to high levels of ethnic 
violence.  
However, it could be the case that younger men are more vulnerable to 
trauma. In this case, a trauma-driven increase in men’s propensity to perpetrate 
domestic violence might be consistent with the findings.  
Second, the genocide might affect domestic violence through the marriage 
market. I identify three potential channels. The first channel is related to the 
sharp decrease in the adult sex ratios that followed the genocide and likely 
affected the balance of the sexes in the marriage market. As explained in 
previous sections of this paper, the genocide likely affected the sex ratio in two 
ways. First, men were more likely to be killed (Verpoorten, 2005; De Walque and 
Verwimp, 2010). Second, the vast majority of perpetrators were men (Straus, 
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2006). Thousands were incarcerated after the genocide (Straus, 2006) and 
thousands fled the country to escape imprisonment (Gourevitch, 1998; 
Verpoorten, 2005). Economists have long been interested in the sex ratio as a 
potential determinant of marriage outcomes. According to Becker’s theories of 
marriage (Becker, 1973 and 1991), the relative well-being of wives and husbands 
within marriage depends on factors influencing the marriage market, such as the 
sex ratio. When the sex ratio is low, men benefit from marriage and obtain a 
larger share of marital output. Moreover, economists have often modeled 
domestic violence as a good that increases the utility of the husband while 
decreasing the utility of the wife (Tauchen et al., 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 
1997). Domestic violence could also be an indicator of the relative well-being of 
husbands and wives within the marriage. A lower sex ratio could thus lead to an 
increase in men’s consumption of domestic violence.   
The second channel is related to the possibility that mortality during the 
genocide might not have been random. Selection into victimization might have 
occurred along both observable and unobservable characteristics that could be 
correlated with domestic violence. For example, De Walque and Verwimp (2010) 
showed that adult men with an urban and educated background were more 
likely to be killed during the genocide. Because in the cross-sectional analysis I 
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find that the husband’s education is negatively correlated with genocide, it may 
be that a decrease in human capital among men available for marriage leads to 
an increase in domestic violence. However, the results are robust to controlling 
for husband’s educational attainment and differences in educational attainment 
between husband and wives, suggesting that this mechanism might not be 
driving the results.51 I also directly test whether the genocide negatively affected 
the education of husbands’ and differences in educational attainment between 
husbands and wives. Selection into victimization along unobservable variables is 
more difficult to test. The direction of the correlation between unobservable 
variables and the propensity to perpetrate domestic violence is also unclear. It is 
nonetheless important to bear in mind that such selection exists and might bias 
the results. 
Third, the genocide may have affected the value that women attach to 
being married relative to being single. The idea behind this argument is quite 
simple, and it is also drawn from Becker’s (1973, 1991) seminal theory of 
marriage. Individuals compare their output when single to their output when 
                                                 
51 All estimates based on equation 3 and afterwards include a control for the husband’s 
educational attainment. In a separate robustness check, I included controls for educational 
differences between husband and wife. I found that the coefficient estimates on the education gap 
were not statistically significant. The estimated effect of genocide intensity for women who 
married after the genocide was not affected.  
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married and they will only marry if their expected output from being married is 
larger than their expected output from being single (the opportunity cost of 
marriage). The genocide could have affected women’s opportunity cost of 
marriage in several ways. For example, as sexual violence was very common 
during the genocide, women might demand more physical protection by men, 
that is, the value of being single and unprotected might decrease after the 
genocide. At the same time, women whose parents or siblings died might be in 
need of economic support in the aftermath of the war. Poverty was exacerbated 
by customary rules preventing women from owning land, which could also 
contribute to decreasing the opportunity cost of marriage. As a consequence, 
after the genocide women might enter marriages with lower expected output 
than they would have before the genocide,52 leading to a decrease in the well-
being of women within the household, which is measured in this paper by the 
incidence of domestic violence and women’s decision-making within the 
household.  
1.6.1. Empirical strategy 
The genocide might increase propensity to commit violence in the society 
as a whole. Although the fact that I observe no effect of the genocide on domestic 
                                                 
52 Anecdotal evidence described in Section 2 of the paper supports this hypothesis. 
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violence does not support this hypothesis, I run an additional test to rule out this 
explanation. If the genocide increased the propensity to commit violence overall, 
then we would expect to observe an increase in all types of violence, not only 
intimate partner violence. Ideally, I would like to observe commune-level rates of 
violent crimes before and after the genocide, but to my knowledge these data are 
not available. However, the DHS data contain information on whether women 
were victims of violence by persons other than their current or last partner. For 
example, women are asked about violence by other family members (parents and 
siblings), in-laws (parents-in-law and siblings-in-law), and persons that are not 
family members, such as teachers, police, friends, acquaintances and strangers. I 
estimate the baseline difference-in-differences regression described in equation 
(3) using as dependent variable a binary variable that takes value one if the 
woman was ever victim of violence by family members other than her partner 
(including in-laws). I also employ as dependent variables a binary variable that 
takes value one if the woman was ever victim of violence by a person outside the 
family and a binary variable that takes value one if the woman was ever victim 
of domestic violence by a family member different from the partner or a person 
outside the family.  
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The genocide could impact men’s propensity to perpetrate intimate 
partner violence against their wives through post-traumatic stress disorder. If 
younger men were more vulnerable to trauma, then we might observe higher 
rates of domestic violence for women who married after the genocide because 
these women are younger and tend to be married to men who were young at the 
time of the genocide. To test this hypothesis, I exploit the fact that women who 
married after the genocide married men of various ages. The age distribution of 
husbands of women who married after the genocide is quite large. I estimate the 
baseline difference-in-differences model described in equation (3) separately for 
women married to older men (men who were 20 or older at the time of the 
genocide) and women married to younger men (men who were younger than 20 
at the time of the genocide).53 If the genocide increased younger men’s 
propensity to commit domestic violence through post-traumatic stress disorder, 
then we expect women married to men who were in their teens at the time of the 
genocide to experience domestic violence at a greater rate than women married 
to men who had reached adulthood by 1994.  
                                                 
53 The average husband’s age for women who married after the genocide is 30 in 2005 (19 in 
1994).  
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I use data from the 1991 and 2002 censuses to create a variable that 
approximates the marriage market conditions that a woman faced when she 
reached marriageable age. I use this variable to estimate the effect of the sex ratio 
on domestic violence and women’s decision-making power within the 
household. As highlighted by Neelakantan and Tertilt (2008), the marriage sex 
ratio tends to be lower than the sex ratio at birth and the population sex ratio for 
two reasons: 1) men marry younger women, and population growth, leads to a 
marriage squeeze (excess supply) of women in the marriage market; 2) higher 
mortality rates for men. We can conceive of the genocide as a shock that 
increased mortality rates of men relatively to mortality rates for women and thus 
contributed to a decrease in the marriage market sex ratio.54  
I construct a measure of the genocide that takes into account that the 
average age gap between husband and wife is 5 years (it is 5.8 for women who 
married before the genocide and 5.2 for women who married after). I define a sex 
ratio in the population that is defined as: (the number of men age 20-54/number 
of women age 15-49) living in commune c. A similar measure of the sex ratio was 
                                                 
54 In fact, high incarceration rates and emigration of genocide perpetrators also contributed to 
decreasing the sex ratio in the short term. Differently from higher mortality rates for men, the 
effect of incarceration and emigration on the sex ratio might be temporary because inmates might 
eventually be released and exiled individuals might return to Rwanda. However, the prison 
population was still very high in 2002. 
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used by Abramitzky et al. (2011). I also attempted to use a more common 
measure of the sex ratio that varies at the cohort level,55 but I found that this 
measure was too noisy. Unlike previous studies, which always included 
incarcerated individuals in the sex ratio, I excluded incarcerated individuals 
from the population count. This could be performed easily for the 1991 Census 
but was more difficult for the 2002 Census. Because the disaggregated version of 
the 2002 data I use contain no information on individuals living in group 
quarters, I had to collect information from various sources to infer in which 
sectors the prisons are located and dropped these sectors when I created the sex 
ratio.  
Figure 1.5 and Figure 1.6 show the distribution of the sex ratio across 
cohorts in 1991 and 2002 including and excluding individuals in prison, 
respectively. We can note that the sex ratio decreased significantly in 2002, and 
excluding the sectors where the prisons are located significantly decreases the 
number of outliers. The sex ratio already seems quite low in 1991. High 
population growth and emigration (Verpoorten, 2005) are potential explanations 
                                                 
55 See, for example, Porter (2010). 
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for this observation.56 How are genocide intensity and changes in the sex ratio 
related? The correlation between genocide intensity and the absolute change in 
the sex ratio between 1991 and 2002 measured at the commune level is 0.01. The 
correlation is significantly larger when I exclude individuals in prison from the 
sex ratio (0.34). It is important to note that the measure of genocide intensity 
used in this paper is not a measure of the death toll. Variation in the index is 
related to variation in the intensity of participation in genocide and variation in 
the number of survivors that are still alive in the commune. 
I assign a woman the sex ratio from 1991 or 2002 based on the probability 
that she became married after the genocide as predicted by her characteristics. I 
estimate a probit regression for marrying after the genocide including controls 
for religion, year of birth, number of siblings and whether she grew up in the 
countryside, in a town or in the capital. For each woman, I predict the probability 
that she married after the genocide ('(_$* ) and then define the sex ratio as: 
57 
Sex ratioc = '(_$* *Sex ratio2002 + (1-'(_$* )* Sex ratio1991 
                                                 
56 Given that men marry younger women, systematic growth in cohort sizes implies that each 
cohort of men is matched with a larger cohort of women, giving rise to a marriage squeeze on 
women, i.e., their excess supply (Bhaskar, 2012). 
57 I obtained similar results when I assign the sex ratio according to the real year of marriage that 
is when I use a sex ratio = I(year of marriage>1994)*Sex ratio2002+[1- I(year of marriage>1994)]*Sex 
ratio1991. The results are available upon request. 
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And c is the commune of residence of the woman. I then estimate the 
following regression model: 
 =	 + 	+,$ +  + - +  +   (4) 
Where Sexratioc is the measure of the sex ratio described above. 
Parameters λt and θc are year of marriage fixed effects and commune fixed 
effects, respectively. To study the relative contributions of genocide intensity and 
changes in the sex ratio, I include the interaction term between genocide 
intensity and marrying after the genocide in equation 4. Equation 4 is estimated 
using an indicator for being a victim of domestic violence, a variable that 
measures women’s decision-making within the household, and variables that 
measure the husband’s educational attainment and differences in educational 
attainment between husband and wife as dependent variables. 
1.6.2. Results 
In this section, I discuss the empirical results of the analysis of the 
potential mechanisms through which the genocide could affect domestic violence 
for women who married after the genocide. I first discuss the results for 
mechanisms related to an increase in the propensity to commit violence, and 
then the results related to mechanisms that operate through the marriage market. 
57 
 
 
The first set of results is displayed in Table 1.9. Panel A of Table 1.9 shows the 
results of the baseline difference-in-differences model using as dependent 
variable the probability that women are victimized by other family members 
different from the partner or by persons outside the family. The data do not 
provide evidence that the genocide increased the probability of being abused by 
individuals different from their partners. 
Panel B of Table 1.9 shows the results of the baseline specification 
estimated separately for women married to younger and older men. Column 1 
and 2 display the results of the baseline difference-in-difference regression 
separately for women married to younger and older men respectively, using Ever 
victim of domestic violence as dependent variable. Columns 3 and 4 contain the 
results of the same regression using Victim of domestic violence in the past year as 
dependent variable. When I restrict the sample to women who are married to 
younger men, the sample size is reduced to about 430 observations and the effect 
of genocide intensity for women who married after the genocide is estimated 
quite imprecisely. The effect of genocide intensity on women who married after 
the genocide is positive and statistically significant when I restrict the sample to 
women who are married to men who were 20 years or older in 1994. The effect of 
genocide intensity on women who married after the genocide and married 
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younger men is not statistically different from the effect of genocide intensity on 
women who married after the genocide and married older men.58 The results do 
not provide evidence that women married to men who were in their teens at the 
time of the genocide were more likely to experience domestic violence than 
women married to older men, suggesting that a higher vulnerability of younger 
men to trauma is not driving the results. 
Table 1.10 displays the estimates for the regression model described in 
equation 4. Panel A and panel B, respectively, show the results using Ever victim 
of domestic violence and Victim of domestic violence in the past 12 months as the 
dependent variable. The estimate of the effect of genocide intensity on domestic 
violence from the baseline model is reported in column (1) for comparison. 
Columns (2) and (3) show the results of the model described in equation 4 
including and excluding incarcerated individuals in the sex ratio variable, 
respectively. In columns (4) and (5), I include an interaction term between 
genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide in the regression. The results 
are quite different according to whether I exclude incarcerated men from the sex 
ratio. When I include incarcerated individuals, the sex ratio is not statistically 
                                                 
58 The results are very similar when I define younger men as men who were younger than 25 in 
1994. 
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significant and the sign of the coefficient is very sensitive to the specification 
adopted. When I exclude men who are incarcerated, the sex ratio has a negative 
and statistically significant effect, which is robust across different specifications. 
A one standard deviation decrease in the sex ratio increases the probability of 
ever being a victim of domestic violence by 8.6 percentage points. Similarly, a 
one standard deviation decrease in the sex ratio increases the probability of being 
a victim of domestic violence in the last 12 months by 7.5 percentage points. The 
sign of the coefficient estimate of the sex ratio is consistent with the theoretical 
argument described in Sub-section 6.1: when the sex ratio is low, the relative 
well-being of women within marriages decreases. When I include both the sex 
ratio and the interaction term between genocide intensity and becoming married 
after the genocide in the regression, the estimated coefficient on the sex ratio 
remains significant, suggesting that at least part of the effect of the genocide on 
domestic violence is through the marriage market. The sex ratio explains about 
25 percent of the effect of genocide intensity of domestic. 
I next investigate the effect of the genocide and sex ratio on women’s 
decision-making power within the household. Table 1.11 displays the results for 
the regression model described in equation 4 using the number of situations in 
which women have the final decision-making authority as the dependent 
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variable.59 The results suggest that women who married after the genocide in 
areas where the genocide was more intense have less decision-making power 
within the household. A one standard deviation increase in genocide intensity is 
associated with a 9 percent decrease in the number of situations in which the 
woman has the final say, which is equivalent to 0.2 fewer situations. It is 
interesting to note that genocide intensity only has a negative effect on women’s 
decision-making for women who married after the genocide. Interestingly, the 
results reported in column 1 of Table 1.11 show that genocide intensity is 
associated with increased decision-making power for women who married 
before the genocide. The results displayed in column 4 of Table 1.11 show that a 
lower sex ratio decreased women’s decision-making power within the household 
for women who married after the genocide. However, the coefficient estimate 
becomes statistically insignificant when I include both the sex ratio and the 
interaction between genocide intensity and marrying after the genocide in the 
regression, suggesting that the effect of the genocide on decision-making power 
goes beyond the effect of the sex ratio.  
                                                 
59 The sample size is larger with respect to the analysis of the effect of genocide on domestic 
violence because I do not have to restrict the analysis to women who responded to the domestic 
violence module. 
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Finally, I investigate the effect of genocide intensity on the husband’s 
quality, as measured by husband’s educational attainment, and assortative 
matching on education, as measured by differences in educational attainment 
between husband and wife. Table 1.12 contains the results. The data provide no 
evidence that higher genocide intensity decreased the probability that a woman 
married a husband with at least primary education or that a woman married a 
husband with more educational attainment than herself. Although the sign of the 
coefficient estimate on genocide intensity is negative as expected, the estimates 
are not significantly different from zero. 
1.7. Conclusions 
This paper documents the effect of civil conflict on domestic violence 
using data from post-genocide Rwanda. While the data provide no evidence that 
the genocide affected domestic violence for the overall population, I find a 
positive, large and robust effect of the genocide on domestic violence for women 
who married after the genocide.  
I carefully examine the potential mechanisms behind this finding. In 
particular, I try to distinguish between an increase in men’s propensity to 
perpetrate intimate partner violence and channels related to the marriage 
62 
 
 
market. The data provide no evidence that the genocide increased domestic 
violence through an increase in the propensity to commit violence for the overall 
population. I show that part of the effect of genocide on domestic violence can be 
explained by the sharp decline in the sex ratio that occurred after the genocide. I 
also show that the genocide led to a decrease in decision-making power within 
the household for the same group of women that faced an increase in domestic 
violence. This result is consistent with the fact that women might enter marriage 
with lower ex-ante bargaining power as a consequence of adverse marriage 
market conditions at the time of marriage.  
Other mechanisms related to the marriage market might explain the 
remaining effect of the genocide on domestic violence. While the data provide no 
evidence that the genocide led to a decrease in husband’s quality as measured by 
education, it could be the case that selection among survivors on the basis on 
unobservable characteristics affected the probability that women become victims 
of domestic violence. Another possible mechanism is through a decrease in 
women’s opportunity cost of marriage, which could be caused by social stigma 
for female genocide survivors as well as the need for physical protection or 
economic security. 
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These results shed new light on the channels through which civil conflicts 
might affect domestic violence and women’s decision-making in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. They could also provide insights on the determinants of women’s well-
being in countries that experience similar gender imbalances for other reasons, 
such as due to the emigration of working age males.60  
Through domestic violence, civil conflicts may affect the well-being of 
future generations who are not directly affected by them. Future research will 
investigate how the decrease in women’s decision-making power within the 
household affects children’s outcomes.  
                                                 
60 In Mexico, where there are large gender differences in the probability to emigrate, the sex ratio 
for the main age group encompassing working age males dropped from 96 in 1970 to 89 in 2000 
(Chiapa and Vlejo, 2012). 
64 
 
 
Tables 
Table 1.1 Descriptive statistics 
Sample (N) All women (2016) Sample 1 (1441) Sample 2 (820) 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Ever victim of domestic violence 0.367 0.482 0.373 0.484 0.424 0.495 
Victim of domestic violence 
 in the last 12 months 0.226 0.418 0.233 0.423 0.234 0.424 
Domestic violence between  0.326 0.469 0.326 0.469 0.313 0.464 
woman's parents       
Age at marriage 20.23 3.38 20.09 3.20 19.99 3.27 
Years since marriage 12.32 8.39 12.99 8.64 16.46 8.51 
Age difference (husband-wife)  4.849 5.940 4.604 5.539 4.381 5.567 
Woman: no education 0.273 0.446 0.284 0.451 0.328 0.470 
Woman: incomplete primary 0.521 0.500 0.526 0.499 0.496 0.500 
Woman: complete primary 0.120 0.325 0.127 0.333 0.116 0.320 
Woman: more than primary 0.086 0.280 0.063 0.243 0.061 0.240 
Husband: no education 0.266 0.442 0.273 0.446 0.300 0.458 
Husband: incomplete primary 0.456 0.498 0.487 0.500 0.473 0.500 
Husband: complete primary 0.153 0.361 0.148 0.355 0.152 0.359 
Husband: more than primary 0.125 0.330 0.092 0.289 0.076 0.265 
Husband has less education 0.321 0.467 0.315 0.465 0.324 0.468 
Husband and wife  0.442 0.497 0.441 0.497 0.435 0.496 
have same education       
Husband has more education 0.238 0.426 0.244 0.430 0.241 0.428 
Married 0.586 0.493 0.614 0.487 0.638 0.481 
Cohabiting 0.323 0.468 0.311 0.463 0.240 0.428 
Divorced or Separated 0.092 0.289 0.076 0.265 0.122 0.327 
Polygamous household 0.100 0.300 0.102 0.303 0.125 0.331 
Urban  0.126 0.332 0.089 0.286 0.093 0.291 
Catholic 0.479 0.499 .517 .499 0.538 0.499 
Protestant 0.49 0.5 .465 .498 0.432 0.496 
Other 0.299 0.170 .027 .163 0.03 0.17 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the 2005 Rwanda DHS.  
All statistics are weighted using survey weights for the domestic violence module.  
“All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for 
women who married more than once. Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman 
or her husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. Sample 2 includes 
only households where the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.2a Cross-sectional analysis. Dependent variable: Ever victim of domestic violence 
PANEL a: All women (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
       Married before 1994 Married after 1994 
         
Genocide index -0.0003 0.0142 0.0222 0.0275 0.0084 0.0160 0.0358* 0.0384* 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.015) (0.018) (0.031) (0.039) (0.019) (0.022) 
Incomplete primary   0.0085 0.0105 0.0385 0.0376 -0.0109 -0.0100 
   (0.030) (0.030) (0.046) (0.046) (0.038) (0.038) 
Complete  primary   -0.0325 -0.0288 0.0126 0.0159 -0.0693 -0.0701 
  (0.038) (0.038) (0.055) (0.055) (0.050) (0.050) 
More than primary   -0.1770*** -0.1737*** -0.1082 -0.1091 -0.2069*** -0.2113*** 
  (0.046) (0.046) (0.091) (0.092) (0.050) (0.050) 
Observations 2,067 2,067 2,016 2,016 832 832 1,184 1,184 
R-squared 0.0000 0.0205 0.0565 0.0583 0.0572 0.0665 0.0816 0.0829 
Mean of Y 0.366 0.366  0.366  0.366  0.416 0.416 0.333 0.333 
Province FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Commune controls NO NO NO YES NO YES NO YES 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are weighted using survey weights from 
the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Regressions in columns (2)-(7) include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-
1990); regressions in columns (3- (7) include years since marriage entered as a cubic, dummies for religion, woman’s age at first marriage, 
woman’s and husband’s educational attainment, urban status and a wealth index. Regressions in columns (4), (6) and (8) include: the 
literacy rate among the over 15 population, the population density, the fraction of population that was born outside the commune and the 
fraction of population that is employed among the over 15 population. 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women who married more than once. 
Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
Sample 2 includes only households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.2a continued 
PANEL b: Sample 1 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
       Married before 1994 Married after 1994 
         
Genocide index -0.0094 0.0042 0.0115 0.0106 -0.0112 -0.0101 0.0431* 0.0343 
(0.015) (0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.035) (0.041) (0.023) (0.024) 
Observations 1,475 1,475 1,441 1,441 647 647 794 794 
R-squared 0.0003 0.0265 0.0605 0.0644 0.0628 0.0715 0.1090 0.1110 
Mean of Y 0.372  0.372 0.372   0.372 0.427 0.427 0.330 0.330 
PANEL C: sample 2              
Genocide index -0.0182 0.0087 0.0114 0.0044 -0.0268 -0.0226 0.1171*** 0.0908** 
(0.024) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034) (0.038) (0.045) (0.040) (0.041) 
Observations 842 842 820 820 538 538 282 282 
R-squared 0.0012 0.0320 0.0658 0.0730 0.0694 0.0830 0.2211 0.2313 
Mean of Y 0.420 0.420  0.420  0.420  0.439 0.439 0.397 0.397 
For all panels: 
Province FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Commune controls NO NO NO YES NO YES NO YES 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are weighted using survey weights from 
the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Regressions in columns (2)-(7) include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-
1990); regressions in columns (3- (7) include years since marriage entered as a cubic, dummies for religion, woman’s age at first marriage, 
woman’s and husband’s educational attainment, urban status and a wealth index. Regressions in columns (4), (6) and (8) include: the 
literacy rate among the over 15 population, the population density, the fraction of population that was born outside the commune and the 
fraction of population that is employed among the over 15 population. 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women who married more than once. 
Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
Sample 2 includes only households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years.  
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Table 1.2b Cross-sectional analysis. Dependent variable: Victim of domestic violence in the last 12 months 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
       Married before 1994 Married after 1994 
Panel A: all women         
Genocide index 0.0092 0.0050 0.0124 0.0191 0.0100 0.0347 0.0179 0.0096 
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.017) (0.026) (0.033) (0.017) (0.020) 
Incomplete primary   0.0353 0.0352 0.0695* 0.0704* 0.0001 -0.0011 
   (0.024) (0.024) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) 
Complete  primary   0.0109 0.0111 0.0380 0.0415 -0.0182 -0.0203 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.046) (0.046) (0.048) (0.048) 
More than primary   -0.0880** -0.0880** -0.0168 -0.0147 -0.1396*** -0.1429*** 
  (0.038) (0.039) (0.083) (0.083) (0.044) (0.045) 
        
Observations 2,039 2,039 1,990 1,990 820 820 1,170 1,170 
R-squared 0.0004 0.0069 0.0274 0.0278 0.0379 0.0414 0.0519 0.0527 
Mean of Y 0.226 0.226  0.226  0.226  0.221 0.221 0.229 0.229 
Province FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Commune controls NO NO NO YES NO YES NO YES 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are weighted using survey weights from 
the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Regressions in columns (2)-(7) include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-
1990); regressions in columns (3- (7) include years since marriage entered as a cubic, dummies for religion, woman’s age at first marriage, 
woman’s and husband’s educational attainment, urban status and a wealth index. Regressions in columns (4), (6) and (8) include the 
literacy rate among the over 15 population, the population density, the fraction of population that was born outside the commune and the 
fraction of population that is employed among the over 15 population. 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women who married more than once. 
Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
Sample 2 includes only households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.2b continued 
Panel B: Sample 1         
Genocide index 0.0121 0.0076 0.0152 0.0175 0.0021 0.0168 0.0357* 0.0223 
(0.012) (0.016) (0.016) (0.019) (0.029) (0.036) (0.021) (0.024) 
Observations 1,456 1,456 1,423 1,423 638 638 785 785 
R-squared 0.0007 0.0103 0.0331 0.0333 0.0461 0.0476 0.0717 0.0743 
Mean of Y 0.233 0.233   0.233  0.233 0.232 0.232 0.233 0.233 
Panel C: sample 2         
Genocide index -0.0034 0.0074 0.0129 0.0215 -0.0039 0.0229 0.0720* 0.0396 
(0.021) (0.024) (0.025) (0.031) (0.032) (0.039) (0.043) (0.047) 
Observations 824 824 803 803 529 529 274 274 
R-squared 0.0001 0.0301 0.0552 0.0565 0.0596 0.0636 0.1896 0.2054 
Mean of Y 0.233 0.233  0.233  0.233  0.223 0.223 0.255 0.255 
For all panels: 
Province FE NO YES YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Individual controls NO NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Commune controls NO NO NO YES NO YES NO YES 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are weighted using survey weights from 
the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. Standard errors in parenthesis 
are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Regressions in columns (2)-(7) include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-
1990); regressions in columns (3- (7) include years since marriage entered as a cubic, dummies for religion, woman’s age at first marriage, 
woman’s and husband’s educational attainment, urban status and a wealth index. Regressions in columns (4), (6) and (8) include the 
literacy rate among the over 15 population, the population density, the fraction of population that was born outside the commune and the 
fraction of population that is employed among the over 15 population. 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women who married more than once. 
Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
Sample 2 includes only households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years.  
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Table 1.3 Retrospective panel analysis 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Domestic violence:  
Imputation method 1 
Domestic violence:  
Imputation method 2 
 All women Sample 1 All women Sample 1 
Genocide index*  
calendar  year after 1994 -0.0146 -0.0202 -0.0151 -0.0164 -0.0054 -0.0096 -0.0057 -0.0086 
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012) 
Genocide index 0.0068  -0.0110  0.0049  -0.0010  
(0.016)  (0.017)  (0.012)  (0.014)  
Calendar year after 1994 0.0066  -0.0095  0.0431**  0.0354*  
(0.025)  (0.025)  (0.018)  (0.020)  
Observations 16,410 16,410 12,968 12,968 16,234 16,234 12,825 12,825 
R-squared 0.0734 0.2140 0.0770 0.2426 0.0224 0.1428 0.0272 0.1741 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.310 0.310 0.320 0.320 0.161 0.161 0.171 0.171 
Commune fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Calendar year fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
− The sample is restricted to women who married before 1994. 
− All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 
1975-1990), years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion.  Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of 
the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− Imputation method 1 uses an imputed measure of domestic violence that takes value one when the first episode of domestic violence occurs 
and in all the following years. Imputation method 2 uses an imputed measure of domestic violence that takes value 1 when the first year of 
domestic violence occurs; it takes value 1 in all the subsequent years only if domestic violence also occurred in the last 12 months before the 
survey. 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women who married more than once. 
Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.4 Difference-in-differences analysis 
            
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Ever victim of domestic violence All women sample Sample 1 Sample 2 
              
Genocide index* 
Married after genocide 0.0360 0.0438 0.0538* 0.0678** 0.0881** 0.0637 
(0.029) (0.030) (0.031) (0.031) (0.039) (0.045) 
Genocide index -0.0126 -0.0335 -0.0461 
(0.020) (0.024) (0.029) 
Married after genocide 0.0129 0.0289 0.0223 
(0.046) (0.060) (0.098) 
Observations 2,016 2,016 1,441 1,441 820 820 
R-squared 0.0453 0.1461 0.0464 0.1844 0.0421 0.2822 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.367 0.367 0.373 0.373 0.424 0.424 
Standard deviation of Y 0.482  0.482 0.484  0.484 0.495  0.495 
Commune FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year of marriage FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
− All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), 
years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, 
educational attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 
2005 DHS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women 
who married more than once. Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her 
husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. Sample 2 includes only 
households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.4 continued 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Victim of domestic violence  in the past 12 months  
 All women sample Sample 1 Sample 2 
            
Genocide index* 
Married after genocide 0.0342 0.0460* 0.0516* 0.0695** 0.0532 0.0148 
(0.023) (0.026) (0.026) (0.028) (0.033) (0.037) 
Genocide index -0.0016 -0.0057 -0.0119 
(0.018) (0.021) (0.024) 
Married after genocide -0.0031 0.0252 0.0110 
(0.039) (0.050) (0.090) 
Observations 1,990 1,990 1,423 1,423 803 803 
R-squared 0.0231 0.1174 0.0248 0.1623 0.0262 0.3104 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.226 0.226 0.233 0.233 0.234 0.234 
Standard deviation of Y 0.418 0.418 0.423 0.423 0.424 0.424 
Commune FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year of marriage FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
− All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), 
years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, 
educational attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 
2005 DHS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women 
who married more than once. Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her 
husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. Sample 2 includes only 
households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.5 Robustness checks (Sample 1) 
Panel A:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Genocide index* Married after genocide 0.0717** 0.0706 0.0770** 0.0576* 
(0.034) (0.084) (0.036) (0.034) 
Separated    0.1806*** 
   (0.065) 
Polygamous    0.1100** 
   (0.055) 
Mother was a victim    0.0793** 
   (0.038) 
Husband often    0.3443*** 
Drunk    (0.051) 
Observations 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,379 
R-squared 0.1853 0.2872 0.2015 0.2859 
Panel B:  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Genocide index* Married after genocide 0.0773** 0.0636 0.0804** 0.0726** 
(0.031) (0.058) (0.032) (0.031) 
separated -0.1969*** 
(0.045) 
polygamous 0.1214** 
(0.049) 
Mother was a victim 0.0893*** 
(0.029) 
Husband often 0.3033*** 
drunk (0.044) 
Observations 1,423 1,423 1,423 1,363 
R-squared 0.1625 0.2738 0.1738 0.2439 
For all panels:     
Commune FE YES YES YES YES 
Year of marriage FE YES YES YES YES 
Time-varying 
commune controls YES YES YES YES 
Commune trends NO YES NO NO 
Province trends NO NO YES YES 
− All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 
1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies 
for religion, woman’s age at marriage, educational attainment for the woman and her partner, 
urban/rural status and a wealth index, literacy rate among over15 population and population density in 
the commune of residence (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1).  Underlying data are from the domestic 
violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the 
domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by 
commune of residence. Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband 
lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years.  
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Table 1.6 
Reduced form estimation using year of birth and Instrumental variable 
estimation (Sample 1) 
Ever victim of domestic violence (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   Reduced form Two-stage Least-square 
 
Genocide index*younger than 19 in 1994 0.0567* 0.0772**  
(0.031) (0.035)  
Genocide index -0.0301 -0.0466  
(0.022) (0.029)  
Younger than 19 in 1994 0.0521  
(0.055)  
Genocide index*Married after genocide 0.0757* 0.0771* 
(0.039) (0.040) 
Married after genocide 0.2069 -0.0896 
(0.212) (0.149) 
Observations 1,441 1,441 1,441 1,441 
R-squared 0.0428 0.1875 0.0350 0.1553 
Commune FE NO YES NO YES 
Year of birth FE NO YES NO YES 
F stat married after genocide  F(2,133) = 42.60 F(33,133) = 9.06 
F stat genocide*married after      F(2,133) = 569.4 F(33,133) = 75.59 
− Regressions in column (1) and (2) are estimated using an OLS model. Regressions in columns (3) and (4) 
are estimated using a two-stage least-square (2SLS) model. In column (3) “Younger than 19 in 1994” is 
used as instrumental variable for “Married after genocide”; the interaction of “Genocide index” and 
“Younger than 19 in 1994” is used as an instrumental variable for the interaction of “Genocide index” 
and “Married after genocide”. In column (4) 31 year of birth dummies are used as instruments for 
“Married after genocide” and the interaction of “Genocide index” and “Younger than 19 in 1994” is 
used as an instrumental variable for the interaction of “Genocide index” and “Married after genocide”. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), 
years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, 
educational attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 
2005 DHS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place 
of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.7 Placebo test 
Dependent variable: Woman’s mother was victim of domestic violence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All women Sample 1 Sample 2 
 
Genocide index*Married after genocide 0.0076 0.0239 0.0035 0.0130 -0.0410 -0.0674 
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.035) (0.044) (0.053) 
Genocide index -0.0063 -0.0287 -0.0326 
(0.029) (0.027) (0.030) 
Married after genocide 0.0403 0.0348 0.1265 
(0.050) (0.063) (0.097) 
Observations 1,939 1,939 1,384 1,384 780 780 
R-squared 0.0219 0.1539 0.0263 0.2155 0.0478 0.3298 
Commune FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year of marriage FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.328 0.321 0.321 
Standard deviation of Y 0.470 0.470 0.470 0.470  0.467  0.467 
− All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. 
− The placebo regression tests whether the mothers of women who married after the genocide and lived 
in communes with high genocide intensity were more likely to be victims of domestic violence. All 
regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), years 
since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, educational 
attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 
2005 DHS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women 
who married more than once. Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her 
husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. Sample 2 includes only 
households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. 
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Table 1.8 Women’s attitudes towards domestic violence 
Dependent variable: Number of situations in which husbands are justified  
for beating their wives, according to the woman. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
All women Sample 1 Sample 2 
Genocide index*married after genocide 0.0044 0.0327 -0.0066 0.0330 -0.0619 -0.0336 
(0.041) (0.043) (0.061) (0.058) (0.084) (0.077) 
Genocide index 0.0378 0.0270 0.0229 
(0.046) (0.051) (0.053) 
Married after genocide 0.0348 -0.0211 -0.1191 
(0.084) (0.119) (0.157) 
Observations 5,253 5,253 2,992 2,992 2,363 2,363 
Commune FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year of marriage FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.942 0.934 0.940 
Standard deviation of Y 1.263   1.264   1.277   
− All regressions are estimated using a Poisson model. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), 
years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, 
educational attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
− Underlying data are from the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the Rwanda 2005 DHS. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− “All women” sample includes all women who replied the domestic violence module except for women 
who married more than once. Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her 
husband lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years. Sample 2 includes only 
households in which the woman lived in the current place of residence for more than 11 years 
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Table 1.9 Mechanisms: Increase in men’s propensity to  
perpetrate domestic violence (Sample 1) 
Panel A (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent  
variable: 
Ever victim of  
violence by 
 other family  
members 
Ever victim of  
violence by  
a person  
outside  
the family 
Ever victim of violence by 
other family or persons 
outside the family 
Genocide index* 
married after genocide 0.0089 0.0050 0.0015 -0.0048 0.0104 0.0003 
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.014) 
Genocide index -0.0038  0.0021  -0.0017  
 (0.005)  (0.007)  (0.009)  
Married after genocide -0.0161  0.0154  -0.0007  
 (0.012)  (0.019)  (0.022)  
Observations 1,596 1,596 1,596 1,596 1,596 1,596 
R-squared 0.0272 0.1304 0.0237 0.1839 0.0237 0.1547 
Commune FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Year of birth FE NO YES NO YES NO YES 
Mean of Y 0.0251 0.0251 0.0238 0.0238 0.0489 0.0489 
St. dev. of Y 0.160 0.160 0.153 0.153 0.224 0.224 
Panel B (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: 
Ever victim of  
domestic violence 
Victim of domestic violence 
 in the last 12 years 
Sample: women married to Younger men Older men Younger men Older men 
Genocide index*married after genocide 0.0953 0.0676 -0.0309 0.0801** 
(0.302) (0.042) (0.177) (0.039) 
Observations 415 937 414 934 
R-squared 0.3987 0.2664 0.4090 0.2407 
Commune FE YES YES YES YES 
Year of birth FE YES YES YES YES 
Mean of Y 0.311 0.377 0.244 0.236 
St. dev. of Y 0.463 0.485 0.430 0.425 
− Younger men are defined as men who were younger than 20 in 1994; older men are defined as men who 
were 20 or older in 1994. All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), 
years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, 
educational attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. All regressions are 
weighted using survey weights from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. Standard 
errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). Sample 1 
includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place of 
residence for more than 11 years.   
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Table 1.10 Mechanisms: Effect of sex ratio on domestic violence (Sample 1) 
Panel A: Dependent variable: Ever victim of domestic violence 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Genocide index*married after genocide 0.0683** 0.0703** 0.0528 
(0.031) (0.032) (0.033) 
Sex ratio 0.0007 0.0012 
(0.004) (0.004) 
Sex ratio (drop prisons) -0.0088*** -0.0071** 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 1,438 1,438 1,438 1,438 1,438 
R-squared 0.1846 0.1790 0.1852 0.1848 0.1872 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.373 
Standard deviation of Y 0.484         
Panel B: Dependent variable: Victim of domestic violence  in the past 12 months 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
            
Genocide index*married after genocide 0.0696** 0.0668** 0.0564* 
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030) 
Sex ratio -0.0025 -0.0017 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Sex ratio (drop prisons) -0.0075** -0.0057* 
(0.003) (0.003) 
Observations 1,420 1,420 1,420 1,420 1,420 
R-squared 0.1628 0.1541 0.1620 0.1632 0.1650 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.233 
Standard deviation of Y 0.423         
− All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), 
years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, 
educational attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status, a wealth index, commune 
fixed effects and year of marriage fixed effects. 
− Underlying data are from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the domestic violence module of the Rwanda 
2005 DHS. Standard errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence  
(*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place 
of residence for more than 11 years.  
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Table 1.11 
Mechanisms: Women’s decision-making power  
within the household (Sample 1) 
Dependent variable: Number of situations in which the woman is an autonomous decision-maker 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
Genocide index*married after genocide -0.0797** -0.0914** -0.0952** -0.0833** 
 
(0.036) (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) 
Genocide index 0.0589*** 
 
(0.021) 
Married after genocide -0.0580 
 
(0.069) 
Sex ratio -0.1908 -0.2670 
 
(0.347) (0.300) 
Sex ratio (drop prison) 0.6751* 0.3960 
 
(0.383) (0.380) 
 
Observations 3,098 3,098 3,146 3,146 3,083 3,083 
Commune FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Year of marriage FE NO YES YES YES YES YES 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 2.175 
Standard deviation of Y 1.803           
− All regressions are estimated using a Poisson model. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-1990), 
years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at marriage, 
educational attainment for the woman and her partner, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
− Underlying data are from the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the Rwanda 2005 DHS. Standard errors in 
parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the current place 
of residence for more than 11 years.  
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Table 1.12 Mechanisms: Evidence of selection in the killings (Sample 1) 
−  
− All regressions are estimated using an OLS model. 
− All regressions include cohort dummies (born in 1955-1964, born in 1965-1974 and born 1975-
1990), years since marriage entered as a cubic and dummies for religion, woman’s age at 
marriage, educational attainment for the woman, urban/rural status and a wealth index. 
− Underlying data are from the Rwanda 2005 DHS. 
− All regressions are weighted using survey weights from the Rwanda 2005 DHS. Standard 
errors in parenthesis are clustered by commune of residence (*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1). 
− Sample 1 includes only households where either the woman or her husband lived in the 
current place of residence for more than 11 years.  
 
  (1) (2) 
Dependent variable: 
 
Husband has at least  
primary education 
Husband is more  
educated than wife 
      
Genocide index* -0.0178 -0.0104 
married after genocide (0.0148) (0.0159) 
   
Observations 3,161 3,161 
R-squared 0.095 0.074 
Mean of dependent variable (Y) 0.247 0.305 
Standard deviation of Y 0.432 0.461 
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Chapter 2  
2. HOW PERSISTENT IS THE EFFECT OF CIVIL CONFLICT ON 
SCHOOLING? EVIDENCE FROM THE RWANDAN GENOCIDE 
2.1. Introduction 
Economists recently paid much attention to the microeconomic effects of 
civil conflicts. As internal wars disproportionately affected developing countries 
in the second half of the 20th century, researchers have sometimes argued that 
analyzing the effects of civil conflicts could help us answer the fundamental 
question of why poor countries remain poor.61  
One channel trough which civil conflicts may hinder economic growth of 
a country is by impoverishing its human capital. Numerous articles established 
that civil conflict has negative effects on education,62 which is an important 
determinant of labor market outcomes and wages (Card, 1999). Researchers have 
not yet reached consensus on how persistent the effect of civil conflict on human 
capital are.63 
                                                 
61 For a review of this literature, see Blattman and Miguel (2010). 
62 For a review of this literature, see Justino (2011). 
63 Leon (2012) finds that individuals who were exposed to civil conflict in utero or in 
early childhood suffer from a long-lasting reduction in years of schooling compared to 
individuals that were not exposed. He finds that individuals who were exposed during 
school age suffer from short-term reductions in educational attainment but they 
completely recover in the long-run. Justino et al. (2013) estimate the short-term and long-
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This article studies the long-term effects of civil conflict on primary 
schooling outcomes using data from Rwanda, where in 1994 10 percent of the 
population was killed during an unprecedented episode of ethnic violence. I 
build on the results established by Akresh and de Walque (2011), who studied 
the medium-term64 effect of the conflict on primary school attainment.  
Using two waves of a household survey collected before and after the 
1994 genocide, Akresh and de Walque (2011) exploit variation in the exposure to 
the genocide across cohorts and geographic variation in genocide intensity across 
11 provinces to show that children in the exposed cohort65 completed a half year 
less education compared to those in the non-exposed cohort. 
I extend the work by Akresh and de Walque (2011) in two ways. First, I 
study the long-term effect of the genocide for children in the exposed cohort. 
Second, I study the effect of the genocide on educational achievement for 
children who were born after the genocide. 
                                                                                                                                                 
term effect of conflict on education using data from Timor Leste. They find that girls 
fully catch up after the conflict while boys’ education is permanently reduced.  
64 Six years after the end of the conflict 
65 Akresh and de Walque refer to the exposed cohort as “young cohort” and the non-
exposed cohort as “old cohort”. Children in the exposed cohort were of primary school 
age or younger at the time of genocide. Children in the non-exposed cohort should have 
achieved their primary education by 1994.  
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Because in 2000 the children in the exposed cohort are still in school, 
Akresh and de Walque (2011) argue that they cannot determine if they “…will 
complete less education or if that education is only being delayed.”(Akresh and 
de Walque, 2011, p. 9). Moreover, Akresh and de Walque (2011) observe that the 
mechanism through which children acquire fewer years of education is through 
grade progression, but they cannot “…determine definitively if this impact of 
genocide on grade progression is due to children repeating grades or dropping 
out of school after the first few grades” (Akresh and de Walque, 2011, p. 14). 
In order to study the long-term effect of the conflict on children in the 
exposed cohort, I follow these children over time using subsequent waves of the 
household survey. To identify the effect of the conflict on educational attainment, 
I use detailed data on genocide intensity obtained from the records of the gacaca 
courts – the customary courts in charge of trying the suspected genocide 
perpetrators. I measure of genocide intensity using a genocide index that varies 
that varies across 145 localities.66 
I find that children in the exposed cohort catch up to their peers and 
eventually complete their primary education. This result holds for children who 
                                                 
66 The data on genocide intensity are different from those used by Akresh and de 
Walque (2011), who used data collected from Davenport and Stam (2007) and measured 
variation in genocide intensity at the province level. 
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were already in school at the time of the conflict as well as for children who were 
already born but not yet in school in 1994. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis formulated by Akresh and de Walque (2011) that children affected by 
the genocide progressed through primary school more slowly because they 
repeated grades. 
I also find that the genocide significantly lowered completed years of 
schooling for children who are born up to five years after the end of the conflict. 
The effect is large and very similar in magnitude to the effect observed for 
children in the exposed cohort that had not yet entered school in 1994. The result 
is robust to the inclusion of province-specific time dummies, which allows ruling 
out confounding factors that varied at the province level and were either 
contemporaneous to the genocide or happened in the subsequent years, such as 
province-specific education policies.  The result does not seem to be driven by 
changes in the ethnic composition of the population, an increase in fertility or a 
change in the characteristics of women who have children. Moreover, I find no 
effect for children who were born more than 5 years after the end of the conflict. 
I explore potential mechanisms for the observed effect on children born 
after the end of the conflict. The genocide could have decreased parental 
investment in children’s education by affecting women’s bargaining position 
87 
 
 
within the household (La Mattina, 2012). I test this hypothesis using a triple 
difference strategy and I find that changes in marriage market did not affect 
children’s schooling.  
In the next section, I describe the data used in the paper and provide some 
descriptive statistics. Section 3 presents the empirical identification. In section 4, I 
discuss the main results. In section 5, I describe the potential channels and test 
them empirically. Section 6 concludes.  
2.2. Data and descriptive statistics 
2.2.1. Data on genocide intensity 
I use detailed data on conflict intensity obtained from the records of the 
gacaca courts.67 I create a measure of genocide intensity using principal 
component analysis over three measures of participation in genocide and three 
measures of victimization.68 The genocide index varies at the pre-genocide 
administrative unit of the commune.69 Figure 2.1 shows variation across 
Rwandan communes. Because the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) entered the 
                                                 
67 For a description of the data, see Verpoorten (2011). 
68 The three measures of participation in the genocide are: the proportion of the 
population accused of organizing the killings, the proportion of the population accused 
of killing and the proportion of the population accused of looting. The three measures of 
victimization are the proportion of widows, orphans and disabled individuals in the 
population. 
69 For more information about the construction of the genocide index, see Verpoorten 
(2011). 
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country from the Ugandan border and fought with the Rwandan army while 
advancing towards Kigali and the Southern regions, localities in the North, 
which are closer to the Ugandan border, were less affected by the genocide.70  
The Rwandan population has been traditionally composed of two ethnic 
groups: a majority of Hutu, and a minority of Tutsi. According to the 1991 
Census, about 700,000 Tutsi lived in Rwanda (9 percent of the total population). 
However, Prunier (1995) argues that the percentage of Tutsi population in the 
1991 Census was underestimated. Communes with a high proportion of Tutsi in 
the 1991 Census were more heavily affected by the genocide (Figure 2.2).71    
2.2.2. Individual data 
I combine data from the 1992, 2000, 2005 and 2010 waves of the Rwanda 
Demographic and Health Survey (DHS). The DHS contains information on 
educational outcomes as well as numerous household characteristics. The main 
analysis uses data from the Household Recode of the DHS, which collects 
information on all individuals in the household. I restrict the sample to 
individuals who were aged 0 to 12 in 1994 and follow them over time, as they 
grow older, to study the long-term effect of the conflict on schooling for children 
                                                 
70 Akresh and de Walque (2011) and Serneels and Verpoorten (2012) use distance to 
Uganda an instrument for genocide intensity. 
71 The correlation between genocide intensity and pre-genocide proportion of Tutsi is 
.74. 
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who were alive at the time of the genocide.72 73 I restrict the sample to children 
aged 8 to 9 in 2005 to study the effect of the genocide on schooling for children 
who were born after the end of the conflict.74 Children of this age group 
interviewed in the 2005 survey were born or conceived after 1994. I compare the 
outcomes of children aged 8 to 9 in 2005 to the outcomes of children aged 8 to 9 
in 2000 and 2010. In addition, I follow children aged 8 to 9 in 2005 over time, as 
they grow older.75  
Following Akresh and de Walque, I measure educational attainment using 
completed years of schooling and the probability of completing a specific grade.76 
                                                 
72 Primary school lasts six years in Rwanda (Nkurunziza, 2012; World Bank, 2004). 
According to the World Bank (2004), children enter school at age 7. However, Akresh 
and de Walque (2011) report that in 2000, children enter school at age six.   One 
possibility is that there was a change in official school starting age between 2000 and 
2004. 
73 Akresh and de Walque defined the exposed age group (“younger cohort” in their 
paper) as individuals aged 6 to 15 in 2000 (aged 0 to 9 in 1994). In this analysis, I also 
include those aged 10 to 12 in 1994 because these cohorts were likely still in primary 
school at the time of the genocide. 
74 Because I am going to measure school in terms of years of school completed, I exclude 
children aged 6 and 7 who should be attending school in the current school year but 
should not have completed any grade yet. However, some children enter school early. In 
1992, 8 percent of children aged 6 and 17 percent of children age 7 completed grade 1. 
The results are very similar when I include children aged 6 and 7.  
75 Table 2.1 contains a definition of the cohorts and age groups included in the empirical 
analysis. 
76 The number of completed years of schooling is the best measure available in all the 
surveys, including the 1992 DHS. The Rwanda DHS asks specifically about the highest 
year of school completed, while information on repeated grades and partial years of 
schooling completed is not available across all years. As argued by Orazem and King 
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2.2.3. Descriptive statistics 
Table 2.2 displays the average number of completed years of schooling for 
children between the ages 6 to 9 across various survey years, as well as the 
probability of completing first and second grade.77 Between 1992 and 2000, there 
was a significant drop in completed years of schooling and in the probability of 
completing first and second grade. Somewhat surprisingly, schooling outcomes 
significantly deteriorated between 2000 and 2005. Children aged 6 to 9 in 2005 
were born after the genocide. Between 2005 and 2010, there was a significant 
improvement in education in the population. This catch up may be attributed to 
the reforms that took place in Rwanda after 2000. 78  
As we learn from Table 2.2., between 1992 and 2005 there was a significant 
drop in educational achievement for young children. To understand whether the 
reduction was different in areas that were differentially affected by the genocide, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(2008), “In countries where grade repetition is very high, highest grade completed 
significantly underestimates the level of investment made by the student, the family, 
and the community. In countries where grade repetition is very high, highest grade 
completed significantly underestimates the level of investment made by the student, the 
family, and the community.” (Orazem and King, 2008, p. 3537).  
77 Similar descriptive statistics were shown in Table 1 of Akresh and de Walque, which 
displayed educational attainment for individuals aged 6 to 35 in 1992 and 2000.  
78 Two policies are worth mentioning. First, in 2002, the UN World Food Program (WFP) 
launched an in-kind transfer program in the southern and eastern provinces. 
(Nkurunziza, 2012). Second, in 2003 primary school became free and mandatory. 
(Nkurunziza, 2012). 
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I divide Rwanda into “High genocide intensity” and “Low genocide intensity” 
communes. I define a commune “High genocide intensity” if the genocide index 
in the commune is higher than the mean genocide intensity. Genocide intensity is 
measured in the commune of residence of the children at the time of the survey.  
Figure 2.3 plots completed years of schooling79 at any given age for 
children aged 6 to 9 in areas that were differentially affected by the genocide 
before and after the mass killings. In 1992, children living in high-genocide areas 
complete on average more years of school than children living in areas with low 
genocide intensity. Between 1992 and 2000, there was a reduction in years of 
completed schooling throughout the country and the reduction was larger in 
high-genocide intensity areas. Average years of completed schooling further 
decreased between 2000 and 2005, and by 2005 children in high genocide areas 
no longer performed better than children in low genocide areas.  
Between 2005 and 2010, children fully recovered in terms of completed 
years of schooling with respect to the pre-genocide levels. The catch-up 
happened faster in high-genocide areas.  
2.3. Empirical strategy 
                                                 
79 The decrease in levels of educational attainment between 2000 and 2005 could be due 
to a change in school starting age (Footnote12). This possibility is not going to affect the 
main results, which are based on a difference-in-differences strategy. 
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I estimate the effect of the genocide on educational attainment using a 
difference-in-differences identification strategy. I exploit geographic variation in 
genocide intensity across communes of residence to identify the effect of the 
genocide, using the pre-genocide survey as baseline.80 Throughout the analysis, I 
estimate regressions of the type: 
. = 	/ + 	
	0, × 23 − +567	7$ + 
	0,
+  23 − +567	7$ +  + . + 																																	(1) 
Yick is a measure of educational attainment for individual i with age k who 
is living in commune c at the time of the survey. Genocide index is a continuous 
measure of genocide intensity with mean zero and standard deviation one. Post – 
Survey yeart is a binary variable that take value one if the observation comes from 
                                                 
80 The main difference between my identification strategy and the one used by Akresh 
and de Walque (2011) is that I use geographic variation in genocide intensity across 145 
communes to identify the effect of the genocide. Their main analysis uses variation in 
exposure to the genocide across cohorts. As a robustness check, they also exploit 
variation in genocide intensity across 11 provinces based on the data collected by 
Davenport and Stam (2007). In results not reported, I replicated Akresh and de Walque 
(2011) results using geographic variation in genocide intensity across communes instead 
of variation in genocide exposure across cohorts to estimate the medium-term effect of 
the genocide on the exposed cohort’s education. I obtain results very similar to those of 
Akresh and de Walque (2011). I also estimated a triple difference model that uses both 
geographic variation across communes and variation in exposure to the genocide across 
communes to identify the effect of the conflict on the exposed cohort. I find that 
individuals who live in a locality in the 95th percentile of genocide intensity complete on 
average 0.5 years less of schooling than individuals who live in a locality in the 5th 
percentile of genocide intensity, which represents a decrease of 19 percent in the sample 
mean. The results are very similar in magnitude to the findings of Akresh and de 
Walque (2011). The results are available upon request.   
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a post-genocide wave of the DHS (the 2000 DHS, the 2005 DHS or the 2010 DHS) 
and zero when the observation comes from the 1992 DHS. β1 is then the 
coefficient of interest – it assesses whether exposure to one standard deviation 
more genocide intensity causes a deviation from a commune’s mean of 
completed years of schooling relative to other communes where the genocide 
intensity is at the mean level. 
Xi is a vector of child and household characteristics such as child’s gender, 
wealth index,81 gender of the household head, highest completed years of 
education by any member of the household, number of children below age 5 in 
the household and rural status.82 I include a vector of child’s age fixed effects (δk) 
to account for the fact that older children mechanically attain more years of 
                                                 
81 The wealth index is the sum of several binary variables indicating asset ownership. For 
the construction of this variable, I followed the approach used by Pellillo (2011), who 
describes that he included the following assets in the wealth index:  
“….whether the individual owns a radio, television, refrigerator, bicycle, 
motorcycle or scooter, car or truck, has electricity, has a cement floor, or has an 
improved water source. An improved water source is defined here as water that 
is piped into a dwelling, yard, or plot, water that is accessible through a public 
tap or standpipe, water that is from a tube well, water that is from a protected 
well in a dwelling, yard, or plot, water that is from a protected public well, and 
water that is from a protected spring. All other sources of water are coded as a 0 
(e.g. unprotected spring water, river water, etc.).” (Pellillo, 2011 p. 10) 
I included all the assets mentioned by Pellillo (2011) except the telephone, because 
information on the telephone was not available in the 1992 DHS. An asset index based 
on principal component analysis, such as the one proposed by Filmer and Pritchett 
(2001) gave similar results. 
82 Table 2.3 contains summary statistics for the control variables across survey years. 
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schooling. Following Bertrand et al. (2004), I cluster the standard errors at the 
commune level.  
In some specifications, I replace the non-interacted genocide index with a 
vector of commune fixed effects. Including the commune fixed effects allows 
controlling for all the unobservable time-invariant variables that could vary 
across communes and be correlated with both genocide intensity and 
educational attainment.  
In other specifications, I include province dummies interacted with the 
years of the survey.83 When I include province dummies interacted with 
indicators for being in a post-genocide survey, I hold constant all factors that 
could have changed after the conflict at the province level. The extent to which I 
can precisely estimate the effect of the genocide on schooling depends on intra-
province variation in genocide intensity across communes.  
I measure educational attainment in two primary ways: the number of 
completed years of schooling and the probability of having completed each 
grade in primary school (grade 1-6). All regressions are estimated using OLS.84  
                                                 
83 Before the genocide, there were 11 prefectures in Rwanda. After the genocide, there 
were 12 provinces.  
84 A probit or logit model would be more appropriate when I estimate the effect of the 
genocide on the probability of completing a given grade, which is a binary variable. The 
results are very similar when I use a probit or logit model and are available upon 
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2.3.1. Parallel trends assumption 
The identifying assumption is that, in the absence of the conflict, trends in 
educational attainment would have been similar in high and low genocide areas. 
To test this assumption, I rely on Census data collected in 1991. While these data 
do not allow comparing the trend in the three years before the genocide, they 
provide the best available comparison for the trends before the conflict.  
Figure 2.5 plots the literacy rate85 at any given age for individuals who are 
aged 6 to 25 in 1991. Both the level of literacy rate and the trend are the same for 
individuals aged 6 to 8 in high and low genocide areas. For individuals aged 8 to 
25, the level of education is higher in high-genocide areas, but the trend across 
different cohorts is very similar in high and low genocide areas. A very similar 
pattern is observed in Figure 10 for the probability of completing grade 1 (not 
reported). Overall, the analysis shows that education trends in high and low 
genocide areas were very similar for more than two decades before 1991. 
2.3.2. Changes in the ethnic composition of the population 
                                                                                                                                                 
request. I chose to report the results of the linear probability model because they are 
easier to interpret.  
85 Literacy rate is defined as the percentage of individuals who are literate in the 
reference population. 
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Figure 2.3 shows that, in 1992, children’s educational attainment was 
higher in localities that were going to be more heavily affected by ethnic violence 
in 1994. Areas with a higher proportion of Tutsi in 1991 were more heavily 
affected by the genocide (Figure 2.2), and the vast majority of victims during the 
genocide were Tutsi. Although it is impossible to reconstruct the exact number of 
deaths that occurred during the genocide, Verpoorten (2005) estimates “…that 
the number of Tutsi killed during the genocide lies between 600,000 and 800,000, 
and that only 25 to 30% of the Tutsi population survived the genocide of 1994.” 
(Verpoorten, 2005 p. 27). 
Tutsi had been traditionally advantaged in the education system during 
Belgian colonialism (Obura, 2003; Hilker, 2011). During the late 1970s, the 
government introduced a school entry system based on ethnic quotas and 
regional quotas that was considered discriminatory against Tutsi (Obura, 2003). 
If Tutsi had higher education levels than Hutu before the genocide and the 
majority of the victims during the genocide were Tutsi, there is a concern that 
changes in the ethnic composition of the population between 1992 and 2000 may 
be driving the observed decrease in educational attainment in high genocide 
intensity areas. This concern is partially addressed by Figure 2.4, which shows 
that education levels are still higher in high genocide intensity communes in 1992 
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even when I restrict the attention to children born to non-Tutsi mothers, as 
shown in Figure 2.4.86 87 
To address this concern further, I compare educational outcomes of 
children born to Tutsi mothers with those of children born to non-Tutsi mothers 
in high and low genocide intensity in 1992. If in 1992 the difference between 
children born to Tutsi mothers and children born to Hutu mothers was a lot 
higher in high genocide intensity areas compared to low genocide intensity 
areas, one could worry that the elimination of Tutsi would mechanically drive 
the results of the difference-in-differences analysis.  
Table 2.4 displays the results. While children born to Tutsi mothers 
performed better than children born to non-Tutsi mothers on average, their 
advantage is actually lower in high genocide intensity communes compared to 
low genocide intensity communes. This suggests that the killing of Tutsi in high 
genocide areas cannot be the only factor that leads to a decrease in the difference 
                                                 
86 Information on ethnicity is available in the 1992 DHS but not in subsequent waves of 
the DHS survey. 
87 This result is consistent with the findings of Friedman (2012) finds a positive 
association between pre-genocide levels of education among Hutu and participation in 
the genocide at the commune level. 
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in education levels between high and low genocide intensity areas after the 
genocide.88  
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Long-term effect for children who were already born in 1994 
To understand how persistent the effect of genocide on schooling is, I 
follow individuals in the exposed cohort in subsequent waves of the DHS 
survey. I divide the exposed cohort in two groups: those who were age 0-5 in 
1994 and those who were aged 6 to 12 in 1994. The former group includes those 
who had not started school yet at the time of the genocide and were exposed to 
the conflict during early childhood. The latter group includes those who should 
have been attending primary school when the conflict started.89 The results of the 
analysis are presented in Table 2.5.90  
I find that both individuals who experienced the conflict during early 
childhood and individuals who were already in school at the time of the 
genocide fully recover 15 years after the genocide. By 2005, children who were 
                                                 
88 As robustness check, I restrict the attention to children born to Hutu mothers in 1992. 
In the extreme case that all the Tutsi were eliminated during the genocide, excluding 
children born to Tutsi mothers would provide a better control group. The results are 
robust to the sample restrictions. 
89 See panel C of Table 1. 
90 In results not reported, I replicated Akresh and de Walque (2011) results using 
geographic variation in genocide intensity across communes and found very similar 
results. The results are available upon request.  
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exposed to the genocide during early childhood have already caught-up in terms 
of completed years of schooling with respect to children of similar age in the pre-
genocide baseline survey. In 2005, children who were already in school in 1996 
are still lagging behind with respect to children in similar age interviewed in 
1992, but they fully catch-up by 2010. 
These results are different from the findings of Leon (2012), who observes 
irreversible effects for individuals who were in early childhood during the 
Peruvian civil war, and full recover for those who experienced the conflict when 
in school. Different from Justino et al. (2013), who find that boys’ human capital 
is permanently damaged by the conflict in Timor Leste while girls fully recover, I 
find no significant difference between boys and girls in the long-term impact of 
the genocide. 
2.4.2. Long-term effect for children born after 1994 
The observed negative effects of conflict on schooling could potentially 
extend to children born after the genocide. I estimate the following regression:  
. = 	/ +8

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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Table 2.6 shows the estimate results of equation 2 using as sample 
children aged 8 to 9 across all the survey years (1992, 2000, 2005 and 2010).91 The 
genocide significantly decreased completed years of education for children who 
were born in 1996 and 1997 (2-3 years after the end of the conflict), but I find no 
effect for children born in 2001 and 2002 (7-8 years after the end of the conflict). 
The estimated effect on completed years of schooling for children born in 1996 
and 1997 is large in magnitude and very similar to the effect that the conflict has 
on children who had not yet entered school at the time of the conflict.92 In 
addition, I find that the genocide significantly decreased the probability of 
completing grade 1 for children born in 1996 and 1997.  
                                                 
91 I choose to focus on such age group because children must be at least 8 or 9 to 
properly measure their educational outcomes; because children commonly start school 
at age 7, in 2005 (2010) I can measure the performance of children born in 1996 or 1997 
(2001 or 2002) in terms of completed years of schooling and the probability of having 
completed grade 1.91 The main coefficient of interest is the interaction term between the 
genocide index and an indicator for being in survey year 2005. The interaction term 
between genocide index and the 2000 DHS tells us the effect of the genocide on children 
who were already born but had not yet entered school at the time of the genocide 
(younger children in the exposed cohort). The effect of the genocide for this particular 
age group – which is included in the exposed cohort - had already been shown by 
Akresh and de Walque (2011) and it is reported here to compare it with the effect of the 
genocide on children who are born after the genocide.  The interaction term between 
genocide index and the 2010 DHS is used to compare the effect of the genocide on 
children who are born in 1996 and 1997 with the effect of the genocide on children who 
are born in 2001 and 2002. The results of equality tests for the equality of the coefficients 
on the various interaction terms are shown in the last rows of Table 6. 
92 I cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on the interaction term genocide 
* year 2000 is equal to the coefficient on the interaction term genocide * year 2005. 
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The effect is very robust. Including commune fixed effects reduces the 
point estimate by about one fourth, but the results are still statistically significant 
at 1 percent level. When using completed years of schooling as dependent 
variable, the results are robust to the inclusion of province dummies interacted 
with survey years. The point estimate is reduced by about one third compared 
with the estimate that includes commune fixed effects but it is still significant at 
the 5 percent level. Including commune specific time trends further reduces the 
estimate, which stays statistically significant at the 10 percent level. The results 
are very similar, albeit slightly less robust, when I use the probability of having 
completed grade 1 as dependent variable.  
To understand how persistent the effect of the conflict is for children who 
are born 2-3 years after the conflict ended, I follow individuals born in 1996 and 
1997 in 2010, when they are 13 and 14 years old. The results are displayed in 
Table 2.7. One more standard deviation in genocide intensity in the area of 
residence is associated with a 5 percentage points decrease in the probability of 
completing grade 6, which represent a decline of 30 percent over the sample 
mean. The effect is very similar to the observed effect for the same age group in 
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2005 (age 13 and 14 in 2005 – 1991 and 1992 cohort).93 Because the individuals 
born in 1991 and 1992 caught up in 2010, it seems reasonable to expect that 
individuals born in 1996 and 1997 will eventually catch up, as they seem to be on 
a very similar trajectory.  
2.4.3. Robustness checks 
There is a concern that the genocide affected fertility. If this was the case, I 
should interpret the results on children born after the genocide with caution, as 
they might be driven by changes in the composition of children born after the 
genocide or an indirect effect of the number of children on parental investment 
in education. For example, an increase in family size could decrease parental 
investment in children’s human capital by worsening the trade-off between child 
quantity and quality (Becker and Lewis, 1974; Hanushek, 1992).  
Previous research on the effect of the genocide on fertility obtained mixed 
results. Schindler and Brueck (2011) analyze the cross-sectional correlates of 
fertility in post-genocide Rwanda and find that having lost at least one child in 
1994 is associated with an increase in fertility in the short-run and in the long-
                                                 
93 For children aged 13 to 14 in 2005, one more standard deviation in genocide intensity 
in the area of residence decreased the probability of completing grade 6 by 5 percentage 
points, which represent a decline of 38 percent over the sample mean (the proportion of 
children who completed grade 6 in the sample is .134). These results are not presented in 
the paper and they are available upon request. 
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run, while having lost a sibling in 1994 is associated with a decrease in fertility in 
the long-run but not in the short-run. They also show, using a difference-in-
differences analysis that a decline in the sex ratio –the relative number of men to 
women – at the province level led to a decline in fertility.  
To understand the total effect of the genocide on fertility for women 
across the board,94  I analyze the effect of the genocide on fertility using the 
measure of genocide intensity from the gacaca records. I use each woman’s 
fertility history to create a retrospective panel data.95 I restrict the sample to 
women interviewed in post-genocide surveys (2000 DHS, 2005 DHS, and 2010 
DHS) and I construct an unbalanced panel data set of women. Women enter the 
panel when they are age 15; therefore, all women in the sample have age 15-49. I 
restrict the attention to calendar years 1980-onward. I study how the genocide 
affects the probability that a woman gives birth in calendar year t using a fixed 
effects model by estimating the following regression using OLS:  
                                                 
94 By looking at the effect of changes in the sex ratio, Schindler and Brueck (2011) focus 
on changes in fertility that happened through the marriage market. The genocide could 
have affected fertility through other channels as well. As explained above, their analysis 
of other channels is based on cross-sectional regressions and provides different results 
for various subcategories of women.  
95 This method has been previously used by La Ferrara et al. (2012) to study the impact 
of soap operas on fertility in Brazil.  
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“High genocide” is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the woman 
resides in c commune where genocide intensity was above the mean. The 
coefficient of interest is the interaction term between residing in a high genocide 
area and calendar year after 1994. It assesses whether living in a high genocide 
intensity area caused an increase in the probability of giving birth. The 
specification includes some time-varying characteristics of the woman such as 
age, age squared, stock of children, stock of children squares, having given birth 
in the previous year, marital status. / are individual dummies and - are 
calendar year fixed effects.  
The results are presented in Table 2.8. Women who live in a high genocide 
intensity commune are less likely to give birth after the genocide compared to 
women who live in a commune with low genocide intensity. The estimate is 
robust to the inclusion of individual fixed effects, to controlling for the stock of 
children and to excluding never married women.96 However, the result is not 
robust to the inclusion of commune-specific time trends, which suggests that the 
observed decline in fertility could be driven by differences in trends between 
                                                 
96 The genocide deeply affected the marriage market by decreasing the sex ratio 
(Schindler, 2010; Schindler and Brueck, 2011; La Mattina, 2012). 
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high and low intensity commune that had already started before the outbreak of 
the genocide. This is confirmed by Figure 2.6, which plots the coefficients on the 
interaction terms between “high genocide” and a set of calendar year dummies. 
We can see in the graph that the decline in fertility in high-genocide communes 
increased before the beginning of the genocide, meaning that the parallel trends 
assumption is not satisfied in this case.  
A natural concern is that the characteristics of women who have children 
changed after the genocide. For example, if educated parents in high genocide 
areas had fewer children in the aftermath of the genocide, we might observe a 
decrease in children’s educational achievement even if there was not a direct 
effect of the genocide. In results not reported, I test this hypothesis using a  
difference-in-differences model like the one described in equation (2) and 
employing the total number of children as dependent variable.97 To limit the 
censoring problem, I restrict the attention to women aged 30 to 39 and women 
aged 40 to 49. I find that the genocide had a negative effect on the stock of 
children and for women aged 30 to 39 this result was driven by those with no 
                                                 
97 I cannot use the regression model described in equation (3) to test if the effect of 
conflict on fertility was heterogeneous across women with different levels of education 
because that model includes individual fixed effects.  
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education. No difference is observed between women with and without 
education for the age group 40 to 49.  
Overall, the results suggest that, if anything, the genocide led to a decline 
in fertility. The results are consistent with Schindler and Brueck (2011) findings 
that a decline in the sex ratio at the province level, likely caused by the genocide, 
led to a decline in fertility. Taken together, the evidence suggests that the 
genocide did not lead to an increase in fertility which could reduce parental 
investment in human capital by worsening the trade-off between quantity and 
quality of children. 
2.5. Mechanisms 
In this section, I describe the channels through which the genocide might 
affect schooling for children who are born after the end of the conflict,98 and then 
test them empirically. The genocide could affect educational attainment through 
(at least) three main channels: changes in women’s bargaining power, changes in 
household wealth and changes in school infrastructure.  
                                                 
98 Akresh and de Walque (2011) explored the mechanisms for the effect of the genocide 
on educational attainment for the exposed cohort that is for children who were in early 
childhood or in primary school at the time of the genocide. They explore the effects of 
selection in the killings during the genocide, orphanhood, changes in household wealth 
and changes in the number of teachers. They rule out these four channels and suggest 
that the effect was through grade repetition.  
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First, the genocide could affect parental investment in children’s human 
capital by shifting bargaining power within the household. La Mattina (2012) 
finds that genocide intensity is associated with higher domestic violence and 
lower decision-making power for women who married after the genocide, but no 
effect is found for women who married before. Previous research in 
development economics shows that who holds the balance of power within the 
household matters for investment in children’s human capital (Thomas, 1990; 
Duflo, 2002). Exposure to domestic violence could also affect educational 
achievement on children. Aizer (2011) estimates a causal negative relationship 
between violence during pregnancy and newborn health, which is a determinant 
of adult outcomes (Black et al., 2007). 
Second, the genocide could affect education by decreasing the economic 
resources available to households. Several studies in development economics 
document that households respond to income shocks by decreasing spending in 
education (Thomas et al., 2004; Shemyakina and Singh, 2013), or increasing child 
labor (Beegle et al., 2006). Justino and Verwimp (2013) estimated that about 20 
percent of the Rwandan population fell into poverty after the conflict. Serneels 
and Verpoorten (2012) study the effect of the genocide on economic performance 
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and find that households living in areas that were heavily affected by the conflict 
have lower consumption levels in 2001.   
Third, the genocide had a devastating impact on the Rwandan education 
system. For example, Leon (2012) shows that the killing of teachers during the 
civil war in Peru is a significant factor that contributed to decrease educational 
attainment for children exposed to the conflict. According to Obura (2003), 65 
percent of the pre-existing schools were damaged during the genocide, and all 
the schools had been looted. Furthermore, the genocide led to a dramatic decline 
in the number of available teachers. According to Obura (2003), “In September 
1994 only 45 per cent of qualified teachers remained in the primary system” 
(Obura, 2003 p. 48).99  
2.5.1. Changes in women’s decision-making power within the household 
                                                 
99 Akresh and de Walque (2011) rule out the hypothesis that a lack of teachers might be 
driving the negative effect of schooling for the exposed cohort because they find that the 
genocide had no effect on the probability of completing grade 1, while it decreased the 
probability of completing grades 3 and 4. They conclude that the findings are not 
consistent with a decrease in the availability of schools and teachers, which would 
prevent children from entering school. However, as we learned in Table 2.6, the 
genocide significantly decreased the probability of completing grade 1 for children who 
were born after the genocide, which suggests that changes in school infrastructure could 
be a channel through which the genocide decreased schooling for those born after the 
genocide. 
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I employ a triple difference strategy to test if changes in women’s 
decision-making power within the household could account for the negative 
effect of genocide on schooling for children who are born after the genocide.  
The intuition behind the identification strategy is simple. La Mattina 
(2012) shows that the genocide increased domestic violence and decreased 
decision-making power for women who married after the genocide, but no effect 
is observed for women who married before. Only maternal decision-making 
power is expected to vary between children born to mothers who married before 
and after the genocide, holding constant children’s age and commune of 
residence, mother’s age at first birth, child’s birth order and number of younger 
siblings.  
A natural concern is that women who married after the genocide tend to 
be younger. Using the pre-genocide 1992 DHS as baseline survey allows 
controlling for differences in observable and unobservable characteristics 
between women who marry earlier or later in their life. Rather than the effect of 
mother’s marrying after the genocide, I measure the effect of mother’s marrying 
recently, so that I can have variation also among women in the 1992 DHS. I 
define a variable “Young marriage cohort” which takes value 1 if the observation 
is taken from a post-genocide wave of the survey and the mother of the child 
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married after the genocide, and zero otherwise. If the observation is taken from 
the 1992 DHS, the variable “Young marriage cohort” takes value 1 if the mother 
married after 1976.  
I estimate the following triple difference specification:  
. = 	/ + 	
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β1 is the coefficient of interest. It estimates the deviation in years of 
schooling for children born to mothers who married after the genocide compared 
to children who are living in the same commune of residence and are born in the 
same year but are born to mothers who married before the genocide. The results 
are reported in Table 2.9. While the estimated coefficient on β1 has the expected 
negative sign, it is not statistically different from zero. I can therefore rule out 
that the genocide decreased educational attainment of children born after the 
genocide through a change in women’s marriage market conditions.  
2.5.2. Changes in household wealth 
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The genocide could have affected education by decreasing family wealth. 
For example, households might cope with income shocks by pulling children out 
of school and into child labor, or by reducing the share of the household budget 
spent on education and school expenses.  
In results not reported, I compare the estimated effect of the genocide on 
wealth with and without controlling for a wealth index based on the assets 
owned by the household. Including the wealth index has no effect on the 
estimated effect of the genocide on education.  
2.5.3. Changes in the number of teachers 
To test whether changes in the supply of education might account for the 
effect of the genocide on schooling, I use information on the number of primary 
school teachers contained in the Census of population.  
The data present two limitations. First, there is not a consistent measure of 
teachers in the two waves of the Census. The 1991 Census provides information 
on the number of individuals who received an education to become general 
teachers, while the 2002 Census contains information on the number of persons 
who are currently working as primary school teachers. I treat the two variables 
as if they were measuring the same thing, which necessarily introduces 
measurement error.  
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Second, the change in the administrative boundaries that occurred in 2002 
introduces further error in the measure of teachers. I compute the number of 
teachers at the district level in the 2002 Census and I transform it into the number 
of teachers at the commune level using a weighted average. I create weights that 
measure, for each commune c, the proportion of the commune that went into 
district d (areacd, where∑ $$FF = 1). The number of teachers in a commune is 
the weighted average of the number of teachers in the district (G$ℎ3 =
∑ $$F × G$ℎ3FF ). The main concern regarding this approximation is that it 
is based on superficies while we would like it to be based on population counts. 
I observe that between 1991 and 2002 there was a dramatic change in the 
number of teachers. The average number of teachers per 1,000 people was 5.2 in 
1991 and 3.3 in 2002. Within a province, higher genocide intensity at the 
commune level is associated with a larger decline in the number of primary 
teachers in the commune. 
In results not reported, I estimate equation (2) controlling for the number 
of teachers per 1,000 people. The point estimate of the effect of the genocide on 
completed years of schooling is not affected by the inclusion of the number of 
teachers. The coefficient estimate on the number of teachers is positive but 
becomes statistically insignificant when I control for commune fixed effects. 
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Overall, the results do not provide support for the hypothesis that a decline in 
the number of teachers is a causal mechanism through which the genocide 
affected schooling. However, measurement error in the measure of teachers 
might affect the precision of the estimates and further research is needed to 
understand better the role of changes in school infrastructure.  
2.6. Conclusion 
While several papers confirmed that there is a negative robust association 
between civil conflict and schooling in the context of other countries, little is 
known about how persistent these effects are.  
This paper contributes to the literature by shedding light on the long-term 
effects of civil conflict on schooling in Rwanda. I extend previous work by 
Akresh and de Walque (2011), who establish that the Rwandan genocide had a 
large medium-term negative effect on primary schooling for children who were 
in school or in early childhood when the ethnic violence happened. 
This paper makes two main contributions. First, I find that the genocide 
only delayed the education of children who were of school age or younger in 
1994 and that this education was eventually completed.100  This result is 
                                                 
100 While completed years of education is often used as a measure of human capital for 
adult individuals, Orazem and King (2008) make the point that a delayed education 
could signal low levels of human capital development. 
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consistent with the hypothesis that children were repeating grades rather than 
“…dropping out of school after the first few grades” (Akresh and de Walque, p. 
14). 
Second, I estimate a large, significant and robust negative effect of the 
genocide on educational outcomes for children born after the end of the conflict. 
I investigate the potential mechanisms behind this result. One possible 
mechanism is related to the changes in marriage market conditions that followed 
the genocide and led to a decrease in women’s decision-making power within 
the household and an increase in domestic violence. Using a triple difference 
strategy, I show that changes in marriage market conditions did not have any 
impact on educational outcomes for children born after the genocide. This result 
sheds new light on the relative effect of women’s decision-making within the 
household on children’s education in post-conflict societies. 
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Tables 
Table 2.1 Definition of cohorts and age groups used in the analysis 
Definition of cohorts 
 and age groups used  
in the analysis 
Age 
in 1994 
Age 
in 
2000 
Age 
in 
2005 
Age 
in 
2010 
Age group used as 
control in 1992  
baseline survey 
Tables 
Younger individuals 
in the exposed cohort 
0-5 6-11 11-16 17-23 
Age 6-11 (column 1) 
Age 11-16 (column 2) 
Age 17-23 (column 3) 
2.5 
Older individuals in 
the exposed cohort 
6-12 12-18 17-23 22-28 
Age 12-18 (column 1) 
Age 17-23 (column 2) 
Age 22--28 (column 3) 
2.5 
Born up to five years 
after the genocide 
  8-9 13-14 
Age 8-9 (Table 2.6) 
Age 13-14  (Table 2.7) 
2.6, 
2.7 
Born more than five 
years 
after the genocide 
  3-4 8-9 Age 8-9 (Table 2.7) 2.6 
 
Table 2.2 Descriptive statistics: Outcome variables 
Outcome  
variables 
Survey year 
1992 2000 2005 2010 
Education in single years 0.53 0.4 0.3 0.66 
 [0.82] [0.70] [0.61] [0.85] 
Completed Grade 1 0.38 0.31 0.25 0.48 
 [0.48] [0.46] [0.43] [0.50] 
Completed Grade 2 0.16 0.1 0.06 0.14 
 [0.37] [0.29] [0.23] [0.35] 
Number of observations 5,625 5,700 5,692 4,768 
The underlying data are from the 1992, 2000, 2005 and 2010 DHS.  
The sample includes individuals aged 6 to 9. 
Standard deviations are reported in brackets. 
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Table 2.3 Descriptive statistics: Control variables 
Control variables 
Survey year 
1992 2000 2005 2010 
Female 0.52 0.52 0.49 0.49 
 
[0.50] [0.50] [0.50] [0.50] 
Wealth index 0.58 1.2 1.39 1.8 
 
[0.89] [1.04] [1.10] [1.12] 
Age of Household Head 45.13 43.84 43.89 43.34 
 
[12.78] [12.55] [12.09] [11.91] 
Highest Education in the HH 5.43 4.95 5.45 6.91 
 
[3.24] [3.06] [3.27] [10.18] 
Number of Children Under 5 1.09 0.91 1.08 0.92 
 
[0.86] [0.86] [0.88] [0.81] 
Rural 0.04 0.13 0.14 0.11 
 
[0.21] [0.33] [0.35] [0.31] 
Age 7.45 7.42 7.54 7.37 
 
[1.11] [1.12] [1.10] [1.06] 
Number of observations 5,625 5,700 5,692 4,768 
The underlying data are from the 1992, 2000, 2005 and 2010 DHS.  
The sample includes individuals aged 6 to 9. 
Standard deviations are reported in brackets. 
 
Table 2.4 
Differences in educational attainment between  
Hutu and Tutsi before the genocide 
Completed years of schooling 
 [mean=0.537] 
Low  
genocide  
High  
genocide  
Difference 
Hutu .489 .579 .090*** [.033] 
Tutsi .722 .643 -.078 [.122] 
Difference -.233*** [.088] -.063 [.081] -.169 [.120] 
Underlying data are from the 1992. Standard errors are reported in brackets. Number of 
observations = 2,689. The sample includes individuals aged 8 to 9. 
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Table 2.5 
Follow the exposed cohort over time 
Completed years of schooling (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Exposed cohort: Children exposed in early childhood Children exposed when already in school 
Sample 
Age 6 to 11 
in 1992 and 
2000 
Age 11 to 
16 in 1992 
and 2005 
Age 17 to 23 
in 1992 and 
2010 
Age 12 to 18 
in 1992 and 
2000 
Age 17 to 
23 in 1992 
and 2005 
Age 22 to 28 
in 1992 and 
2010 
              
Genocide Index *  -0.079*** -0.101 -0.011 -0.115** -0.127** -0.048 
Post-survey year       
[0.024] [0.063] [0.097] [0.054] [0.055] [0.114] 
Post-survey year -0.290*** -0.934*** -0.605*** -0.606*** -0.516*** -0.718*** 
[0.023] [0.060] [0.109] [0.073] [0.070] [0.135] 
Observations 13,265 13,683 11,850 13,871 13,655 12,789 
R-squared 0.512 0.368 0.187 0.346 0.439 0.278 
Notes: Each column represents a different regression of the type: Y= α + β1genocide index * Post-survey year + β2 Post-
survey year + β3genocide index + X'δ + ε. In columns (1) and (4) Post-survey year = DHS 2000; in columns (2) and (5) Post-
survey year = DHS 2005; in columns (3) and (6) Post-survey year = DHS 2010.  Reported standard errors are robust to 
clustering at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Underlying data in column (1) and (4) are from the 1992 and 
2000 waves of the Rwanda DHS; underlying data in column (2) and (5) are from the 1992 and 2005 waves of the Rwanda 
DHS; underlying data in column (3) and (6) are from the 1992 and 2010 waves of the Rwanda DHS. All regressions include 
child's age fixed effects, child’s gender, wealth index, gender of the household head, highest education level among the 
members of the household, the number of children under age 5 living in the household and rural status.  
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Table 2.6 Long-term effects for children born after the genocide 
OLS regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
Children age 8 to 9 Completed years of schooling (N=10,410) Completed grade 1 (N=10,459) 
Genocide index * DHS 2000 -0.113** -0.108*** -0.030 -0.014 -0.013 -0.050** -0.049** -0.017 0.003 -0.009 
(0.044) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.045) (0.025) (0.021) (0.021) (0.021) (0.031) 
Genocide index * DHS 2005 -0.157*** -0.166*** -0.112*** -0.064* -0.077** -0.079*** -0.086*** -0.064*** -0.030 -0.054** 
(0.042) (0.035) (0.026) (0.034) (0.033) (0.026) (0.023) (0.017) (0.022) (0.021) 
Genocide index * DHS 2010 -0.104** -0.092** -0.024 0.046 0.075 -0.059** -0.054** -0.027 0.017 0.027 
(0.050) (0.044) (0.041) (0.056) (0.046) (0.027) (0.024) (0.023) (0.035) (0.026) 
DHS 2000 -0.253*** 0.385*** 0.326*** 0.615*** 0.079 -0.112*** 0.055 0.079 0.197*** -0.087 
(0.056) (0.087) (0.092) (0.085) (0.161) (0.026) (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) (0.088) 
DHS 2005 -0.516*** 0.103 0.095 0.435*** -0.071 -0.253*** -0.049 -0.023 0.122*** -0.118 
(0.036) (0.077) (0.069) (0.073) (0.148) (0.023) (0.046) (0.044) (0.044) (0.086) 
DHS 2010 0.062 1.124*** 1.044*** 1.437*** 0.955*** 0.072*** 0.425*** 0.420*** 0.591*** 0.382*** 
(0.049) (0.096) (0.086) (0.113) (0.195) (0.025) (0.046) (0.046) (0.057) (0.107) 
Genocide index 0.155*** 0.135*** 0.084*** 0.077*** 
(0.036) (0.027) (0.020) (0.017) 
Commune fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes 
Commune specific time trend No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Yes 
Province*time dummies No No No No Yes No No No No Yes 
test Gen*2005=Gen*2000 0.286 0.0692 0.0274 0.193 0.170 0.255 0.0911 0.0674 0.211 0.192 
test Gen*2010=Gen*2000 0.855 0.739 0.890 0.311 0.122 0.763 0.847 0.743 0.722 0.310 
test Gen*2010=Gen*2005 0.178 0.0594 0.0251 0.0164 0.000442 0.416 0.177 0.131 0.111 0.00351 
R-squared 0.076 0.267 0.297 0.327 0.311 0.074 0.183 0.215 0.246 0.231 
Notes: Each column represents a different regression of the type: Y= α + ∑ βk.  genocide index * I(calendar year_k) + ∑ βk.  I(calendar year_k) + 
X'δ + ε. Reported standard errors are robust to clustering at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Underlying data from the 1992, 
2000, 2005 and 2010 waves of the Rwanda DHS. The sample includes children aged 8 to 9. All regressions include child’s gender, wealth index, 
child's age fixed effects, gender of the household head, highest education level among the members of the household, the number of children 
under age 5 living in the household and rural status. 
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Table 2.7 Long-term effects for children born after the genocide.  
Following children born after the genocide over time 
OLS regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Children age 13 to 14 in 
2010 (1996 and 1997 
cohort) 
Completed 
years of 
schooling 
Completed 
grade 1 
Completed 
grade 2 
Completed 
grade 3 
Completed 
grade 4 
Completed 
grade 5 
Completed 
grade 6 
                
Genocide Index * DHS 
2010 -0.227*** -0.015 -0.012 -0.011 -0.021 -0.051*** -0.049*** 
(0.080) (0.011) (0.012) (0.014) (0.018) (0.018) (0.014) 
DHS 2010 -0.721*** 0.114*** 0.088*** 0.010 -0.133*** -0.271*** -0.289*** 
(0.082) (0.012) (0.013) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.014) 
Genocide index 0.203*** 0.013 0.008 0.008 0.024** 0.043*** 0.045*** 
(0.064) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012) (0.013) (0.011) 
Observations 6,410 6,423 6,423 6,423 6,423 6,423 6,423 
R-squared 0.177 0.077 0.061 0.065 0.100 0.153 0.196 
Notes: Each cell represents a different regression of the type: Y= α + β1genocide index * DHS2010 + β2 DHS2010 + 
β3genocide index + X'δ + ε. Reported standard errors are robust to clustering at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * 
p<0.1. Underlying data from the 1992 and 2010 waves of the Rwanda DHS. The sample includes children aged 13 to 14.  
All regressions include child’s gender, wealth index, child's age fixed effects, gender of the household head, highest 
education level among the members of the household, the number of children under age 5 living in the household and 
rural status. 
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Table 2.8 Effect of genocide on fertility. Retrospective panel data. Individual fixed effects model 
OLS regression (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Probability of giving birth in year t Include never married women Exclude never married women 
-0.000 -0.022** -0.023** -0.007 -0.000166 -0.022** -0.024** -0.005 
(0.005) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) (0.00491) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005) 
Calendar year after 1994 0.032*** 0.019*** 0.0329*** 0.017*** 
(0.003) (0.005) (0.00294) (0.004) 
Age 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.061*** 0.059*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Age squared -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Stock of children -0.098*** -0.101*** -0.101*** -0.116*** -0.116*** -0.116*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Stock of children squared 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.003*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Married 0.293*** 0.292*** 0.292*** 0.258*** 0.262*** 0.262*** 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Add controls No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Calendar year FE No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
High genocide * Calendar year trend No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Observations 471,267 471,267 471,267 471,267 391,499 391,499 391,499 391,499 
R-squared 0.001 0.132 0.136 0.136 0.001 0.138 0.142 0.142 
Number of Women 34,790 34,790 34,790 34,790 21,569 21,569 21,569 21,569 
Notes: Each column represents a different regression of the type: Y= β0 + β1genocide index * I(calendar year after 1994) + β2 I(calendar year after 
1994) + X_it'δ + αi + ε. Reported standard errors are robust to clustering at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Retrospective panel 
data constructed using the fertility history in the 2000, 2005 and 2010 waves of the Rwanda DHS. The sample includes children aged 8 to 9. All 
regressions include child's age fixed effects, gender of the household head, highest education level among the members of the household, the 
number of children under age 5 living in the household and rural status.  
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Table 2.9 Effect of changes in marriage market conditions. Triple difference specification 
OLS regression. Dependent variable: completed years of schooling (1) (2) (3) 
        
Genocide index * DHS 2005 * Young Marriage Cohort -0.046 -0.035 -0.039 
(0.070) (0.068) (0.070) 
Genocide index * DHS 2005 -0.164*** -0.169*** -0.186*** 
(0.047) (0.042) (0.048) 
Genocide index * Young Marriage Cohort -0.059 -0.039 -0.038 
(0.054) (0.050) (0.052) 
DHS 2005 * Young Marriage Cohort 0.104* 0.097 0.084 
(0.062) (0.092) (0.094) 
Genocide index 0.196*** 0.173*** 
(0.039) (0.032) 
DHS 2005 -0.524*** -0.704*** -0.674*** 
(0.045) (0.042) (0.047) 
Young Marriage Cohort -0.029 -0.133 -0.198 
(0.053) (0.162) (0.166) 
Household controls No Yes Yes 
Commune fixed effects No Yes Yes 
Observations 3,464 3,463 3,463 
R-squared 0.095 0.292 0.348 
Reported standard errors are robust to clustering at the commune level. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Underlying 
data from the 1992 and 2005 waves of the Rwanda DHS. The sample includes children aged 8 to 9. All 
regressions include child’s gender, wealth index, child's age fixed effects, gender of the household head, highest 
education level among the members of the household, the number of children under age 5 living in the 
household and rural status. 
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Figures 
Figure 2.1 Genocide intensity 
 
 
Figure 2.2 Proportion of Tutsi and Genocide intensity 
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Figure 2.3 Trends in completed years of schooling over time 
 
 
Figure 2.4 Ethnic differences in completed years of schooling 
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Figure 2.5 
 
 
Figure 2.6  
Differential trends in fertility in high  
and low genocide intensity communes 
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Chapter 3  
3. “HOBOS”, “STARS” AND IMMIGRANT ENTREPRENEURSHIP101 
3.1.Introduction 
Prior studies have established that the ability of entrepreneurs appears to 
be drawn from a bimodal distribution, with individuals with very low and very 
high ability levels sometimes denoted as “hobos”102 and “stars” respectively.103 
Other work has shown that immigrants are more likely than natives to become 
entrepreneurs.104 In this paper, we synthesize these two strands of the literature 
to investigate whether immigrants are entrepreneurs because they are found at 
the extreme ends of the ability spectrum.  In addition, we ask whether ability 
translates into entrepreneurship in the same way for immigrants as for natives.  
If immigrant entrepreneurs are disproportionately drawn from the top of the 
ability distribution, loosening immigration policy for the highly skilled should 
help lead to economic growth through innovative start-up companies105. If, by 
contrast, immigrant entrepreneurs are mostly drawn from the low end of the 
ability distribution, arguments for stimulating innovation through immigration 
                                                 
101 Joint with Shulamit Kahn, Megan MacGarvie and Donna K. Ginther. 
102 We believe that Ghiselli (1974) was the first to use this term in this context. 
103 For instance, see Elfenbein , Hamilton and Zenger (2010). 
104 For instance, Fairlie (2008). 
105 Throughout the paper we define immigrants as foreign born. 
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policy may be less convincing. 
Of particular interest for immigration and innovation policy are 
entrepreneurial firms engaged in science or engineering, firms that historically 
have played a key role in developing and commercializing new technologies, 
and consequently in driving economic growth.  The foreign-born are becoming 
larger and larger proportions of the US science, technology, engineering and 
math (STEM) workforce, and therefore are likely to start new firms, especially 
new firms engaged in science or technology, an activity with particularly high 
ability requirements.106 Accordingly, we use a sample of highly educated 
individuals and consider entrepreneurship engaged in science separately from 
non-science entrepreneurship. We investigate whether immigrants are more 
likely to start firms engaged in science than natives with similar scientific 
backgrounds.  We also ask whether the hobo/star phenomenon extends to a 
highly educated sample engaged in science entrepreneurship, and whether this 
is true for both natives and immigrants.   We find significant differences in the 
role of ability in science and non-science entrepreneurship for all individuals. We 
also find that the “immigrant premium” in entrepreneurship exists at different 
levels of ability for these two types of entrepreneurship.   
                                                 
106 See  Bound,Turner and Walsh (2009), National Science Board (2012). 
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3.2. Immigrant entrepreneurs and the determinants of entrepreneurship 
This study is related to the literature that documents the immigrant 
premium in self-employment and entrepreneurship. Previous authors have 
noted the greater likelihood of immigrants than natives to be self-employed, 
particularly in the U.S.  Seminal work by George Borjas (Borjas 1986; Borjas and 
Bronars, 1989) found that the likelihood of self-employment increased the longer 
the immigrant was in the US and the later the cohort.  
Many have noted the relationship between immigrants and 
scientific/technical entrepreneurship. Hart and Acs (2011) survey the high tech 
industry and find that 16% of the companies in their sample reported at least one 
founder who was foreign-born. Wadwha et al. (2007) collected information on 
engineering and technology companies founded between 1995 and 2005 and 
interviewed 144 of them. Among other things, they found that 25% had foreign 
born CEO’s or CTO’s, 53% of whom completed their highest degree in U.S. 
universities, and that the majority of these had come to the US to study. Finally, 
Anderson and Platzer (2006) found that in the period 1990-2005, immigrants 
started 40 percent of U.S. public venture-backed companies operating in high 
technology.  
Although many researchers have documented the immigrant 
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entrepreneurship premium, the literature has not reached a consensus on the 
determinants of this premium.  Here we mention some of the previous literature 
of those explanations for this premium addressed in this paper: field, preferences 
and ability. 
The foreign-born are an increasing proportion of U.S. graduates in science 
at all levels of higher education, particularly at the doctoral level (see Bound, 
Turner and Walsh 2009, National Science Board 2012) and scientific knowledge 
may be an important determinant of science entrepreneurship.  Hunt (2011) 
suggests that academic field of study is an important source of immigrant-native 
differentials in innovation and knowledge creation. Using the National Survey of 
College Graduates data,107  Hunt (2001) shows that the advantage of immigrants 
over natives in patenting and publishing can be largely attributed to the fact that 
immigrants were more likely to choose science and engineering as fields of 
study. Hunt’s results on  entrepreneurship are less conclusive due to a definition 
of entrepreneurship that included relatively few individuals; combined with the 
smaller cross section..  
A relatively large literature argues that entrepreneurship is a utility 
                                                 
107 The National Survey of College Graduates is used to derive the SESTAT panel data 
employed in this paper. 
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maximizing decision that is related to preferences and risk tolerance.  Recently, 
Fairlie and Holleran (2012) investigated the role of preferences and risk tolerance 
in entrepreneurship using a randomized trial of entrepreneurship training. Some 
of the others who have contributed to the literature on the relation between 
entrepreneurship and preferences and/or risk tolerance include Kihlstron and 
Laffont (1979), Blanchflower and Oswald (1998), and Blanchflower, Oswald, and 
Stutzer (2001), Caliendo et al. 2009, Verheul et al.. (2012), Evans and Leighton 
(1989), Sauermann and Cohen (2008), and Cramer et al. (2002).   
A large part of the literature on the determinants of entrepreneurship 
concerns the abilities that lead to entrepreneurship or are correlated with 
entrepreneurship. Thus, those people who are “superstars” may enter 
entrepreneurship in order to capture their entire marginal product or because of 
their high return to entrepreneurship is (e.g. Elfenbein 2009, Murphy, Schleifer 
and Vishny 1991).  People with a high level of a variety of abilities – referred to 
by Lazear (2005) as being a “jack-of-all-trades” – will find their broad skills 
particularly useful in starting one’s own business.  
Empirically, however, entrepreneurship seems common at both ends of 
the ability spectrum. Thus, entrepreneurship rates have been shown to have a U-
shaped relationship to education levels: higher for those with low and high 
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education levels but lower for those with more average education levels. Poschke 
(2008) finds this using data from NLSY but also reports this from calculations he 
did from data used by Borjas and Bronars 1989, Hamilton 2000, and Hipple 
(2004) among others; Astebro et al. has also found a bimodal relationship 
between entrepreneurship and education.  The same U-shaped relationship has 
been identified between and wages in previous paid employment and 
entrepreneurship (Poschke  2008,  Elfenbein et al. 2009, Braguinsky et al. 
forthcoming.108)  
To explain the high rates of entrepreneurship at the bottom of the ability 
scale, some of the literature has suggested determining factors completely 
different from those that dominate at the top. Thus, low-ability entrepreneurs are 
considered to be people who enter self-employment because they cannot find a 
job or believe they are under-employed – the “grass is greener” syndrome. The 
term “hobo” is sometimes applied to these low-end entrepreneurs – borrowed 
from the job mobility literature – or the word “misfit.”109  
Several recent papers have developed equilibrium models that predict the 
observed bimodal relationship between entrepreneurship and ability. These 
                                                 
108 While Braguinsky , Klepper and Ohyama (forthcoming) do not characterize their 
evidence as showing the relationship to be U-shaped, their table shows a clear U-shaped 
relationship for older scientists and a J-shaped relationship for younger ones. 
109 E.g., Astebro et al. (2011) 
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models are all based on some convexity in the relationship between productivity 
as entrepreneurs and wage in paid employment. Thus Poschke (2008) derives U-
shaped entrepreneurship from a search model assuming that expected 
productivity of entrepreneurs is positive and concave110 with respect to ability in 
paid employment  and assuming uncertainty in the productivity of any given 
entrepreneurial project. Ohyama (2007)  derives a U-shaped relationship between 
entrepreneurship and human capital based again on uncertainty of proposed 
projects; he also assumed convexity in the relationship between a person’s cost of 
acquiring entrepreneurship skills and ability.  Ohyama finds that the 
entrepreneurship choice depends on how strongly human capital (in paid 
employment) is positively correlated with entrepreneurial capability.111 Finally, 
Astebro et al. (2011) finds frictions in the paid labor market lead to workers not 
being efficiently assigned, and thus being underpaid at the top and the bottom 
due to the concave relationship between entrepreneurship productivity and firm 
quality (where firm quality directly impacts paid employment wages).112   
Below we consider these potential explanations for the immigrant wage 
                                                 
110 But not too concave. 
111 On the other hand, Braguinsky et al. (forthcoming) has model with a very  similar set-
up leading to entrepreneurship monotonically increasing with wages as well as other 
predictions.  
112 The evidence we show later in this paper that both high and low wage residuals 
increase entrepreneurship seems to be inconsistent with the Astebro  model.  
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premium in turn.  
3.3. Data 
This analysis uses the National Science Foundation’s SESTAT database of 
over 300,000 individuals observed between 1993 and 2006. SESTAT includes 
people in the US with a Bachelor’s degree or higher in some way connected to 
science or engineering – either due to their job or due to one of their degrees – 
and follows them through several waves of surveys. Other studies of 
entrepreneurship using SESTAT include Elfenbein, Hamilton and Zenger 2010, 
Hunt (2011), Braguinsky, Klepper and Ohyama (forthcoming), Ohyama  (2011) 
and Gort and Lee (2007). 
SESTAT is collected by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and it is 
the most comprehensive database on the employment, educational, and 
demographic characteristics of U.S. scientists and engineers available. We select a 
sample which contains observations on over 436,441 respondents that have 
science, engineering, technical, or math (STEM) or related degrees or who work 
STEM occupations. The biennial panel nature of the data allows researchers to 
follow scientists and engineers over time.  
Individuals included in SESTAT reside in the United States during the 
survey reference period, are less than seventy-five years old, and have a 
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bachelors’ degree or higher. These individuals have degrees in, or work in, the 
fields of computer and math sciences, life sciences, physical sciences, social 
sciences, engineering, health, or technology. 
SESTAT consists of three surveys, the National Survey of Recent College 
Graduates (NSRCG), the National Survey of College Graduates (NSCG) and the 
Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR). It creates a new panel of scientists each 
decade. The 1990s panel includes 4 waves, 1993, 1995, 1997, and 1999.  We use 
these as well as two waves of data from the 2000s panel (2003 and 2006).113  Each 
NSCG panel includes a sample of college graduates identified in the 1990 (the 
1993-99 panel) or 2000 (2003-06 panel) decennial census who have degrees in 
science or work in science occupations. Through the decade, subsamples of the 
NSRCG are added to the NSCG.  The NSRCG includes individuals with a 
science, engineering or health bachelor’s or master’s degree in the previous two 
to three academic years.  SESTAT includes these recent college or higher 
graduates as well as science PhD recipients surveyed by the SDR. 
SESTAT collects information on education, employment including labor 
force status, job and employer characteristics, work activities and training, and 
comprehensive demographic information on gender, race/ethnicity, marital 
                                                 
113 The NSCG was not conducted in 2001, although the SDR was. 
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status, children, citizenship and immigration status.114  We include in the sample 
only individuals who are employed full-time. There are some relevant 
differences in the 1990s and 2000s surveys and panel. First, an NSF review 
indicated that the self-employed were being under-reported in the 1990s because 
of the order of the choices given for “employer type.” This was rectified in the 
surveys beginning with the 2003 survey. Second, in the 2000s the target 
population was enlarged to include people with health or other “science and 
engineering-related” education and occupations. Our analysis does not concern 
time trends in entrepreneurship, so these differences should not bias our results. 
We do include survey year dummies in all analysis, and this will pick up any 
difference across surveys due to these compositional factors as well as time-
related factors.115  
Throughout this study, we define immigrants as individuals who were 
born outside the United States and did not migrate during their childhood. Sixty-
three percent of the immigrants in our sample obtained their highest degree 
abroad. Figure 3.1 shows the region of origin of the immigrants in the NSCG and 
the NSRCG (the SDR contains no information on the country of origin for 
                                                 
114 More information about the SESTAT database is available at 
http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/sestat/. 
115 For robustness, we have also done most of the analysis excluding health fields and 
results are qualitatively similar. 
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foreign-born Ph.D. recipients). More than half of the immigrants are from Asia. 
India is the most represented country, being the country of origin of 15 percent of 
the immigrants. About 7 percent are from China, 4 percent are from Taiwan and 
4 percent are from Vietnam. Some immigrants are from Canada (4 percent) and 
Mexico (3 percent). Figure 3.2 shows the most recent citizenship status of the 
immigrants in the sample.116 Information on citizenship status is available in all 
the surveys. Sixty-seven percent of foreign-born are naturalized citizens, 25 
percent are green card holders and 8 percent have a temporary visa. Immigrants 
in the NSRCG and NSCG migrated to the United States on average 18 years 
before the date of their last survey interview. Information on visa at entry is 
available only for few observations from the NSRCG. As we can see in Figure 3.3, 
more than 80 percent of the immigrants entered the country with a temporary 
work visa. Only 8 percent entered with a study visa.  
We define as entrepreneurs people who are self-employed and working for 
an incorporated business, following Lazear (2004).  We prefer this definition to 
“all self-employed” because those who are self-employed and incorporated have 
started or intend to start a new business, which is an important contributor to 
                                                 
116 For individuals who were interviewed more than once, we showed in the graph the 
citizenship status they reported during their last interview.  
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economic growth. In our highly educated sample, the self-employed non-
incorporated may include people such as individual independent health 
providers or consultants working on their own.  We also show later that those 
who are self-employed but not incorporated are rarely working in science-related 
endeavors.117   
Within the set of self-employed, incorporated entrepreneurs, we further 
refine our measure by dividing them into science entrepreneurs and non-science 
entrepreneurs.  While previous literature defined science entrepreneurship based 
on the closeness of the job to the field of highest degree (Braguinsky, Klepper 
and Ohyama, forthcoming), we use detailed information on occupation, primary 
and secondary work activity. Science entrepreneurs include those self-employed 
(incorporated) whose occupation is given as a field within science, or whose 
occupation is “management” but their primary or secondary work activity 
relates to science. Of the possible work activity categories, we consider the 
Design of Equipment, Processes, Development, Computer Applications, 
Programming, Basic research, and Applied Research as related to science.  Science 
entrepreneurship expressly excludes people in professional services, most of 
                                                 
117 Two recent studies of science-related types of entrepreneurship (Hunt, 2011 and 
Braguinsky et al. forthcoming) chose instead to use all self-employment; however, at the 
same time each excluded a different occupations that were not likely to start a business. 
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whom are doctors or health professionals in private practices. We categorize 
these and all others not doing expressly science-related work as “Non-science 
entrepreneurs”.  More information on the specific definition of a science 
entrepreneurship is given in the Appendix. 
Most of our empirical work involves logit regressions of the likelihood of 
entrepreneurship or multinomial logit regressions of the likelihood of science or 
non-science entrepreneurship. These results are reported as logit coefficients 
(thus representing impacts on the log-odd of entrepreneurship). Whenever the 
analysis included more than one observation per person, standard errors were 
clustered by person. The regressions are weighted using sample weights for 
SESTAT.118 
In the next section, we compare self-employed incorporated to those who 
are self-employed non-incorporated, and show that these have very different 
rates of science entrepreneurship and very different immigrant-native 
differences.   
3.4. Findings on immigrants and entrepreneurship 
In 1993-2006 SESTAT, on average 7.6% of workers are classified as 
                                                 
118 NSF recommends using weights when producing population estimates, because 
respondents were sampled at differential rates, both within and across surveys.  
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entrepreneurs according to our definition (self-employed and incorporated) and 
an additional 5.3% are self-employed but not incorporated. While the rate of total 
self-employment is somewhat higher among immigrants than among natives 
(13.9% compared to 12.8%), as Table 3.1 shows, this is very different in 
incorporated compared with non-incorporated self-employment.  Immigrants 
have substantially higher likelihoods of being self-employed incorporated, where 
9.1% of foreign-born were entrepreneurs compared to 7.3% of natives which 
translates into immigrants being 24% more likely than native to be 
entrepreneurs. In contrast, immigrants are .69 percentage points less likely than 
natives to be self-employed and un-incorporated.119  
We are most interested in those entrepreneurs (self-employed 
incorporated) whose new ventures are science-based i.e. science entrepreneurship. 
As Table 3.1 shows, those self-employed in science are about three times more 
likely to be incorporated than not. Seen a different way, those who are self-
employed incorporated are more likely to be in a science-related business than 
those who are self-employed non-incorporated (compare 23.0% v. 13.2%) 
In science entrepreneurship (self-employed incorporated), the difference 
                                                 
119 Due to the large sample size, this difference is significant at the .01% level. The same 
is true for small differences discussed in the following paragraph. 
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between natives and immigrants is far more striking (Table 3.1). Immigrants are 
almost 100% (3.20 v. 1.62 percentage points) more likely than non-immigrants to 
be doing science entrepreneurship, while only 3% (5.91 v. 5.72 percentage points) 
more likely to be doing non-science entrepreneurship. Even among those self-
employed non-incorporated, we are more likely to find immigrants to be science 
entrepreneurs than natives, although these rates our tiny. 
3.4.1. Is the immigrant entrepreneurship premium explained by 
education, field of study, demographics or time period?  
The establishment of an entrepreneurial venture in many cases reflects the 
commercialization of a new idea. One of the most fruitful sources for profitable 
new ideas is recent scientific knowledge (whether discovered by the potential 
entrepreneur or not). It is possible that the immigrant-native differential in 
entrepreneurship and particularly in science entrepreneurship is due mainly to 
educational attainment or field of study.  
In our sample, immigrants are 161% more likely than natives to have a 
PhD (11.3% v. 4.3%), 19% more likely to have a (non-MBA) Master’s degree 
(32.0% v. 26.8%) and 77% more likely to have an MD (4.5% v. 2.5%). Similar 
proportions of natives and immigrants have MBAs (6%).  
Table 3.2 displays the distribution of natives compared to immigrants 
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across the detailed field of highest degree. We find that immigrants are twice as 
likely as natives to be in computer and information science and are almost twice 
as likely as natives to be in engineering. Immigrants are about half as likely to be 
in social sciences, and 50% as likely to be in a field besides science and 
engineering. In a logit estimation of the probability of entrepreneurship (self-
employed and incorporated), field alone can explain 2.1% of the variation in 
entrepreneurship. In results not shown (available upon request), the fields that 
are most likely to lead to science entrepreneurship are computers and IT, 
physical or material sciences, and earth sciences; to a lesser degree, the list would 
civil engineering, electrical engineering, industrial and mechanical engineering, 
and business.  Fields that are least likely to lead to science entrepreneurship are 
biological sciences (including microbiology, biochemistry and others), social 
sciences (including clinical psychology, and health).120 
In the first three columns of each panel of Table 3.3, we investigate 
whether field of study and educational attainment alone explain the immigrant-
native gap in overall entrepreneurship status.  The three panels of Table 3.3 
model total entrepreneurship, science entrepreneurship and non-science 
entrepreneurship respectively. 
                                                 
120 This list of fields is similar when more covariates are added. 
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Panel A column 1 shows that on average, the coefficient on immigrant 
implies that immigrants are approximately 26% more likely121 (1.9 percentage 
points (ppt.)) to be entrepreneurs than natives. When the level of education is 
controlled for, immigrants’ advantage in entrepreneurship increases (although 
not significantly). The increase is primarily due to the fact that immigrants are 
more likely to have a PhD and non-MBA masters, both which can be seen in 
Table 3.3 to decrease the chances of being an entrepreneur.122 With controls for 
both field and education (column 3), immigrants are approximately 31% more 
likely to be entrepreneurs than natives.   
As we learned in Table 3.1, the unconditional immigrant premium is 
present in science entrepreneurship only.  A comparison of immigrant 
coefficients from Table 3.3 column 1 Panels B and C indicate that immigrants are 
twice as likely to be science entrepreneurs as natives but only marginally more 
likely to be non-science entrepreneurs.123  However, a major reason for this is the 
relation between entrepreneurship and field. Controlling for field and education 
                                                 
121 Calculated as exp(.236). 
122 Note that the fact that PhDs decrease entrepreneurship is different from what Poschke 
(2008) found using the NLSY, i.e. that PhDs are more likely to be entrepreneurs than all 
other educational levels. 
123 Note that column 1’s impact of immigrant status are not exactly the same as was seen 
in the averages of Table 3.1, both because science and non-science entrepreneurship here 
are modeled jointly and because of the non-linear nature of logit analysis.  
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substantially reduces the immigrant coefficient while increasing the immigrant 
coefficient in non-science entrepreneurship to a statistically significant 0.15 (16% 
odds ratio). Further, one notes that in both columns 2 and 3 the coefficients on 
educational degree are quite different between science and non-science 
entrepreneurship and the same is true for the coefficients on fields (not shown).  
This again emphasizes the difference in the nature of science and non-science 
entrepreneurship.  
Part of the reason that immigrants and natives have different rates of 
entrepreneurship (particularly the science type) may be due to demographics 
and differences in family structure between these groups.  Column 4 adds 
dummies for gender, age, race and family structure. Most notably, females are 
more than 40% less likely than males to be entrepreneurs of either kind.  Family 
factors affect science and non-science entrepreneurship differently: marriage and 
children increase men’s likelihood to enter non-science entrepreneurship but 
children impede men’s likelihood to be science entrepreneurs and marriage has 
no effect; children significantly impede women’s non-science entrepreneurship 
only; and having a working spouse only increases a person’s likelihood of 
science entrepreneurship. Adding these variables decreases the immigrant 
premium in science entrepreneurship and slightly (but insignificantly) increases 
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it in non-science entrepreneurship.   
Finally, in column 5, survey year dummies are added.124 Science 
entrepreneurship is strongest in the 2000s and weakest in the first survey year 
1993; survey year has smaller effects in non-science entrepreneurship. Survey 
year dummies seem to mitigate immigrant-native differences by only a small and 
insignificant amount.   
In sum, even with all of these controls, immigrants remain 31% (.50 ppt) 
more likely than natives to be science entrepreneurs and 19% (1.1 ppt) more 
likely to be non-science entrepreneurs.  
Because foreign degrees may imply a different kind of education than US 
degrees, may be perceived by employers to be different, and/or may be less 
understood by US employers, we also separately analyze those immigrants 
whose highest degree was awarded in the US compared to abroad in columns 6 
and 7.  Unconditionally (column 1), those who received their highest degree  in 
the US have somewhat lower science entrepreneurship rates than those who 
received their degree abroad in the US and had lower non-science 
entrepreneurship rates than even natives.  However, once all the other factors are 
                                                 
124 Note that we do not include region in any of our entrepreneurship models because 
region is itself endogenous, particularly science entrepreneurship since those interested 
in starting a company are likely to move to a center of innovation such as Silicon Valley.  
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controlled for (column 7), the differences in entrepreneurship rates between 
immigrants with and without US degrees is shown to be small, with those with 
highest degrees in the US having more  science and non-science 
entrepreneurship. 
3.4.2. Is immigrant entrepreneurship explained by preferences for self-
employment? 
In 1997, SESTAT collected data about individuals’ preferences for different 
working arrangements rather than for different job characteristics. Respondents 
were asked whether their preferred type of working arrangement was a 
permanent job, self-employment or some other type of working arrangement. In 
Table 3.4, we model the probability of entrepreneurship (self-employed 
incorporated) as a function of a dummy variable for whether workers preferred 
self-employment as well as all explanatory variables from the previous table. We 
first re-estimate the final model of Table 3.3 on this smaller sample with no 
preference variable but with other explanatory variables. We then add the 
preference variable in the final three columns.  
As expected, a higher preference for self-employment is significantly and 
positively correlated with the probability that an individual is either a science or 
a non-science entrepreneur, although it explains a surprisingly small 
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proportion.125 Of most interest to this paper, adding the preference for self-
employment reduces the immigrant premium by only 9%.  The small size of this 
change is not surprising in light of the fact that there is no significant difference 
in the average preference for self-employment of natives (29.5% prefer) and 
immigrants (30.5% prefer.)  Thus, this further suggests that something other than 
preferences, educational level or field, or family structure is responsible for the 
fact that immigrants are more likely than natives to be entrepreneurs, 
particularly but not exclusively science entrepreneurs.  We therefore turn to 
ability and wage-based explanations. 
3.5. Entrepreneurship and ability in paid employment: Theoretical 
framework 
Given that field, education, demographics and preferences do not fully 
explain the immigrant entrepreneurship, we now consider the empirical and 
theoretical relationship between ability and entrepreneurship.   
Below we illustrate a Roy model of occupational choice that helps to 
describe the relationship between ability in paid employment and 
                                                 
125 This analysis is run on people who presently were or were not entrepreneurs.  It is 
possible, however, that people change their preferences for entrepreneurship after they 
enter it, or at least believe they do because of cognitive dissonance.  We have repeated 
this analysis using preferences for the subset presently in paid employment in 1997 to 
predict whether the person enters entrepreneurship in 1999, with similar qualitative 
conclusions.  
146 
 
 
entrepreneurship. The model we describe is a similar to a stripped-down version 
of the models of Poschke (2012) and Ohyama (2007). In our model, ability in 
entrepreneurship is positively correlated with ability in paid employment, but 
the nature of this correlation determines whether people select into 
entrepreneurship or paid employment.  Rather than specifying a single specific 
motivation that mathematically yields non-convexities in the Roy boundary 
between entrepreneurship and paid employment like those articles, we assume 
non-convexity based on some basic observations about correlation between these 
abilities.  
After laying out our basic model, we speculate about how the distribution 
of these skills, and/or the rewards to these skills, are likely to be different in 
immigrants and natives in ways that affect the likelihood of entrepreneurship.  
Also, we speculate about how these factors may differ between science and non-
science entrepreneurship.  
People enter entrepreneurship if the expected return from 
entrepreneurship is greater than the expected return from paid employment. 
Assume two sectors, paid employment (pe) and entrepreneurship (se). Let H be 
human capital characteristics (such as education and experience) that influence 
productivity in paid employment and self-employment in the same way and 
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be their coefficients (in both sectors).126  In contrast, let M be an index of 
characteristics that increase productivity in paid employment only, while R is an 
index of characteristics that increase productivity in entrepreneurship only.  In 
measurement terms, we think of M as abilities such as teamwork skills and the 
ability to accomplish tasks in a timely fashion.  In contrast, R includes 
characteristics such as resourcefulness, risk-tolerance or optimism particularly 
useful for entrepreneurship.   
Consider the choice facing individual i who is presently employed by an 
established firm and paid an income:  
 Yi,pe = Hi + wpe Mi  
If the individual becomes an entrepreneur, the income would be: 
Yi,se = Hi + wse Ri 
The individual will choose to become an entrepreneur iff: 
 wpe Mi > wse Ri 
 Here, we define the units of M and R such that the returns (wpe) to each 
unit of M and the returns (wse) to each unit of R respectively are constant.  
Whether people with the highest or lowest ability in paid employment 
                                                 
126 The assumption that the return to human capital in paid employment is exactly the 
same as the return to human capital in self-employment is quite strong.  
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(M) enter entrepreneurship depends on the correlation between the individual’s 
endowment of M and R relative to the returns to M and R respectively.  To see 
this, consider Figure 3.4a and Figure 3.4b.  Here, we assume the simplest possible 
model of productivity with no fixed cost of entering entrepreneurship. The solid 
line in each figure represents wpe Mi  = wse Ri  , or Ri = wpe  / wse  Mi.  People with 
endowments above this line will become entrepreneurs, and those with 
endowments below this line will take paid employment. 
For simplicity, we hypothesize that individuals’ actual endowments of M 
and R can be described as limited to the M/R combinations along the dashed 
lines in each Figure. More generally, imagine a distribution of endowments 
centered around these lines.  In Figure 3.4a, people with high M have particularly 
high R. In this case, entrepreneurship attracts only the most able people who 
have high levels of both R and M.   
In contrast, in Figure 3.4b, R is much less positively correlated with M, so 
that endowments of R appear quite similar across all levels of M.  Here, people at 
all levels of Mi have the level of R needed to become good entrepreneurs. 
However, this does not mean that all people are equally likely to become 
entrepreneurs. Instead, it is only those who are paid particularly poorly in paid 
employment with respect to their human capital that enter entrepreneurship.  
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Note that this is the case as long as the line characterizing the relative skill 
endowments (the dashed line in the figure) is flatter than wpe  / wse.  In fact, R and 
M could even be negatively correlated. 
Which of these figures is most likely to capture the true relation between 
skills useful to entrepreneurship and skills useful to paid employment? A priori, 
how do we expect endowments of M and R to be distributed (relative to the 
returns to these endowments)?  
First, the low rates of entrepreneurship suggest that a large proportion of 
people have low levels of R.   
Second, the model of Lazear (2005) suggests that those at high levels of 
ability in paid employment (controlling for education, experience etc.) are likely 
to also have traits valuable in entrepreneurship, to be Jacks-of-All-Trades.  
Together, these two conjectures lead to a convex pattern of endowments 
as pictured in Figure 3.4c.  Here, the level of R is relatively constant at low levels 
of M but rises rapidly at high levels.  In this case, we see two kinds of people 
entering entrepreneurship. Those at low levels of M receive low levels of income 
in paid employment and are therefore likely to choose entrepreneurship (the 
hobos). Those at very high levels of M are the Jacks-of-all-trades who also enter 
entrepreneurship (the stars).  In between are people with typical abilities in paid 
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employment who find it more advantageous to remain there. The model 
therefore predicts a U-shaped relationship between entrepreneurship and ability 
in paid employment.  
How would the model differ for immigrants and natives? We suggest two 
possible ways, one related to the pattern of endowments of M relative to R, and 
one based on the return to skills in paid employment. 
First, immigrants may have a larger endowment of R than natives. In 
other words, Figure 3.4c’s dashed line showing the endowments of R and M is 
shifted up for immigrants. There are a variety of potential reasons for this. 
Yuengert (1995) found that immigrants who became self-employed tended to 
come from countries with more self-employment, and Akee et al. (2007) found 
that self-employed immigrants in the US often had pre-migration self-
employment experience in their home country.  Together, these articles suggest 
that immigrants have had more involvement or exposure to self-employment.  
Jaeger et al. (2010) find that individuals’ who tend to migrate have more risk 
tolerance, while we have already learned that risk tolerance is associated with 
entrepreneurship.127 Indeed, the mere fact that immigrants have left their home 
                                                 
127 Interestingly, we found in the previous section that immigrants and natives have 
similar professed preferences for self-employment. This together with Jaeger et al.’s 
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countries suggests a heightened ability for change and independence.  
How would immigrants’ larger endowment of R change our predictions?  
The endowments distribution would shift up as shown in Figure 3.4d.  As a 
result, immigrants are more likely to enter entrepreneurship at all levels of M.  
Finally, how might the model differ for science entrepreneurship?  First, 
the barriers to entry into science-based entrepreneurship are higher than the 
barriers to entry into non-science entrepreneurship. If one thinks of the typical 
non-science entrepreneur as opening a restaurant, dry-cleaners or doctor’s office, 
it is likely to require less investment than a high-tech or biomedical firm or a firm 
engaged in new product development.  Moreover, science entrepreneurship may 
require the creativity and imagination necessary to develop a marketable 
scientific idea which would require a high level of R.  We model this as a cost of 
entry F into science entrepreneurship: 
Yi,se = Hi + wse(Ri - F) 
Now the condition for entering entrepreneurship is: 
R >= F+ wpe  / wse M 
In this case, the line separating entrepreneurs and paid employees shifts 
                                                                                                                                                 
study imply that risk tolerance increases immigrants’  propensity to become 
entrepreneurs but not their preferences for it.  
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up.   
Moreover, similar reasoning would argue that the return to R, wse, would 
be particularly high in science entrepreneurship, flattening the slope of the 
payoff (wpe  / wse).  
Figure 3.4e illustrates the predictions for science entrepreneurship.  The 
line graphing the division between entrepreneurs and employees has shifted 
upwards and flattened.  As a result, more people enter science entrepreneurship 
at the top of the paid-employment (M) ability spectrum. 
In the following sections, we consider how this model may be tested 
empirically.   
3.6. Entrepreneurship and ability in paid employment: Empirics 
In this section, we investigate some of the implications of the model.  First, 
we ask whether a U-shaped relationship exists between entrepreneurship and 
ability in paid employment.  Second, we ask whether immigrants have more 
entrepreneurship than natives along the whole range of the ability distribution.  
Finally, we ask whether the relationship between ability and entrepreneurship is 
different between science and non-science entrepreneurship, and whether the 
immigrant-native differences are similar in both sectors.  
Previous studies that analyzed the empirical relationship between ability 
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in paid employment and entrepreneurship, summarized earlier, used wages or 
education as a measure of ability. Here,  we measure ability in paid employment 
primarily in terms of wage residuals from a standard wage equation, although 
we do add robustness checks that model entrepreneurship based on  wages 
rather than wage residuals.128  In the model, to the extent that Hi  i.e. human 
capital is measured by the variables in standard wage equations, the wage 
residuals will represent wpe Mi. Note that in addition to being more consistent 
with our model, we show in the section on robustness tests that a model with 
wage residuals fits better than one with wages.129  
To calculate wage residuals, we first estimated a (log) wage equation on 
the sample of natives130 working in full-time paid employment using a median 
regression.131 Control variables included those used earlier plus experience 
(linear, squared and cubic) and region of residence.132  We calculate wage 
residuals by applying this equation to all people in our sample (i.e. including 
                                                 
128 To our knowledge, few prior articles have linked wage residuals to self-employment. 
One example is Carnahan et al., 2012.  
129 For a wage residual approach to discrimination see Oaxaca (1973) and Blinder (1973). 
130 Similar results were obtained using a wage equation including natives and 
immigrants estimated without a control for immigrant. 
131 Using Least Absolute Deviations regression (LAD). An OLS model of ln(wages) gives 
very similar results. 
132 We also tried a different specification that controlled for hours worked in a week and 
weeks worked in a year. The results were very similar. 
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immigrants).  
We then modeled the likelihood of a person presently in paid 
employment entering entrepreneurship (self-employed incorporated work) by the 
time of the subsequent survey, usually occurring two years later,133 as a function 
their paid-employment wage-residual decile dummy variables in addition to the 
Table 3.3 set of covariates. This flexible specification of residual decile dummies 
allows us to study whether nonlinearities and/or asymmetries exist in the 
relationship between wage residuals and self-employment.  
Note that until this point, we have not exploited the longitudinal aspect of 
SESTAT.  Using the longitudinal aspect requires that we include only people 
who were observed (at least) twice, the first while working in paid employment.  
People first seen in the 1999 and 2006 waves of the sample could not be included 
because they were never observed a subsequent survey.  People are included 
only one time, the first time they were observed working.  We excluded people 
from the sample if they were already entrepreneurs the first time we observed 
them. The second row of Table 3.1 gives the size of this 2-period sub-sample and 
average likelihood of becoming an entrepreneur during the next period in this 
                                                 
133 There was a three- year gap between 2003 and 2006.  Also, a few people might have 
not responded in one year of the survey, leading to a larger gap.  There is a very low 
non-response rate in SESTAT. 
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sample.  This sample is approximately half the size of the earlier sample for both 
natives and immigrants.  Not surprisingly, the probabilities of becoming an 
entrepreneur from one period to the next are much smaller than the probabilities 
of being an entrepreneur at any particular time.  However, the average 
relationships were the same: immigrants are much more likely to become 
entrepreneurs than natives, with a much more marked difference in science than 
in non-science entrepreneurship. 
3.6.1. Is the immigrant entrepreneurship premium explained by the 
distribution of immigrants and natives across wage-residual deciles?  
Figure 3.5 shows how immigrant and native workers are distributed 
across the ten deciles of the wage residuals’ distribution.  Figure 3.6 divides 
immigrant by where they earned their highest degree.  These figures 
demonstrate that immigrants are more likely to be in the first and to a lesser 
extent the second decile of the wage residuals distribution, particularly 
immigrants who did not earn their highest degree in the US.    
The mere fact that immigrants are more likely to be in the bottom of the 
wage-residual distribution deciles can contribute to an immigrant-native wage 
differential if entrepreneurship is more common at the lower extremes of the 
ability distribution.  If higher rates of entry into entrepreneurship by low-ability 
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immigrants are what drives the immigrant premium, it would suggest that 
greater rates of immigration will not necessarily lead to more high-tech 
innovation.  
In Table 3.5, we re-estimate the model from Table 3.3 adding dummies for 
wage residual deciles; we report the coefficients on immigrant and wage residual 
deciles only.134.  Because we are using a sub-sample of our previous sample and 
estimating entry into entrepreneurship rather than overall entrepreneurship, in 
columns 1, 3 and 5 we first re-estimate the model with no wage residuals but 
with the explanatory variables from all previous tables, first for all 
entrepreneurship and then for science and non-science entrepreneurship (with 
the latter two estimated jointly using multinomial logit). We then add the wage 
residuals variables in columns 2, 4 and 6.  
Incorporating wage residuals has very little impact on the immigrant 
premium. In non-science entrepreneurship, the point estimates of the coefficients 
fall by 15 %  (from 0.2156 to .1843, a statistically insignificant change).  In science 
entrepreneurship, the coefficient is basically unchanged.  
In results not shown, we repeat the analyses of Table 3.5 with immigrant 
                                                 
134 The entire regressions from Table 3.5 and all other tables are available from the 
authors on request, as are all regressions mentioned but not reported in any table. 
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separated by whether their highest degree was from the US and find very similar 
results. Despite the facts displayed in Figure 3.6, that is, that the mass for the 
lowest deciles occurs only for those obtaining their degree outside the US, 
adding wage residual deciles to the set of predictors of science entrepreneurship 
leaves the two immigrant coefficients  (with or without highest degree in the US) 
virtually unchanged, while in non-science entrepreneurship both coefficients 
drop by 14-15%. 
3.6.2. Is there a different relationship between entrepreneurship and 
wage residuals in science and nonscience?  
The coefficients on the wage residuals from Table 3.5 (columns 4 and 6) 
are illustrated in Figure 3.7.  Note that the coefficient of the first decile is 
normalized to zero. There is a clear J-shaped pattern in entry into non-science 
entrepreneurship as a function of wage residuals. Thus, workers whose wage 
residual falls in any decile between the second and the eighth have a significantly 
lower probability to enter non-science entrepreneurship than workers who are in 
the very bottom (first decile) of the residual distribution. What makes this a J-
shaped relationship rather than a U-shaped one is that workers at the very top 
(10th decile) have a much higher (in magnitude and significance) probability to 
enter entrepreneurship than workers in the 1st decile. Thus, both hobos and stars 
158 
 
 
are overrepresented among entrepreneurs.  However, the rate of entry is higher 
among stars than hobos. 
If we were using wages or education as our measures of ability instead of 
wage residuals, we might expect to observe less of a spike at low wage deciles 
than observed by studies such as Poschke (2008), because the SESTAT sample is 
positively selected with respect to education. In other words, in Figure 3.4c, it 
could mean that the very bottom of the R, M endowments curve is cut off.  The 
fact that we also observe this J-shape in wage residuals in non-science 
entrepreneurship suggests that it is quite possible to have low levels of M 
(characteristics besides education etc. that make a person a good paid employee) 
even with high education and therefore presumably higher wages than most. 
This itself indicates the value of using wage residuals in our models.  
In contrast, for science entrepreneurship, there is no evidence of a J or U-
shaped pattern in entrepreneurship as the wage residual increases.  There is 
however an upward slope, with a highly significant increase at the 10th decile.  
This too is consistent with our model, which suggests that because of a fixed cost 
in entering science entrepreneurship, entrepreneurship occurs towards the top of 
the paid-employment-ability (M) spectrum.   
In results not shown, the analysis was repeated for the subsample of 
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people whose highest degree was in science.  The pattern of wage residuals in 
non-science and science looked very similar to that shown in Figure 3.6.   
3.6.3. Is the relationship between ability in paid employment and 
entrepreneurship different for immigrants and natives?  
In Table 3.5, we observed that immigrants are more likely to become 
entrepreneurs than natives, even holding constant their position in the 
distribution of wage residuals. However, are immigrants uniformly more likely 
to become entrepreneurs, or instead is the immigrant premium concentrated in 
certain parts of the wage residual distribution? If our model is accurate, we 
would expect more immigrants than natives at the bottom and at the top of the 
distribution of the paid-employment-ability (M) spectrum, with the top and 
bottom broadening their range of M values to include more people (see Figure 
3.4d).  
To investigate this, we estimate the model with two sets of residual decile 
dummies, one set for natives and the other for immigrants. Being a native in the 
first decile is the omitted category (and is thus normalized to zero). Table 3.6 
contains the results of a logit regression of entering entrepreneurship in the next 
period on the same controls as in Table 3.3 plus these two sets of interaction 
terms.  As before, the first column models entrepreneurship as a whole and the 
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next two columns estimate science and non-science entrepreneurship estimated 
jointly with multinomial logit. A test of the hypotheses of the existence of a wage 
premium at each residual decile is given in Table 3.6a.  Finally, Figure 3.8 plots 
the coefficients of the interaction terms in the last two columns i.e. for science 
and non-science entrepreneurship. 
As before, the patterns are quite different when we look at science and 
non-science entrepreneurship. In Figure 3.8, immigrants appear to have higher 
levels of science entrepreneurship at all deciles. Table 3.6a indicates that this 
immigrant gap is significant at differing levels (p=.1 or less) for deciles 2-9, with 
the exception of decile 3 where p=.104. It is not significant at figures 1 and 10, 
which runs counter to what the model predicted. 
On the other hand, both immigrants and natives seem to have a pattern of 
increasing science entrepreneurship as wage residuals rise.  We also tested this 
directly by estimating the probability of science entrepreneurship as a function of 
the wage residual decile (1,2,3 etc.) or of actual wage residuals (entered linearly). 
In either version, both natives and immigrants had upward sloping relationships 
between science entrepreneurship and wage residuals with P < .03 (for residuals) 
and P<.001 (for residual decile). 
For non-science entrepreneurship, natives and immigrants each have a J-
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shaped relationship between non-science entrepreneurship and residual decile.  
Individuals who are at the bottom and top of the ability distribution are more 
likely to enter non-science entrepreneurship, with particularly high likelihoods at 
the top decile.   
Again, Table 3.6b tests the immigrant premium at each decile.  In science 
entrepreneurship, the gap is only significant at decile 2.  Thus, while we know 
from Table 3.5 that overall immigrants have a higher probability of entering non-
science entrepreneurship after separately controlling for the residual deciles, we 
see that when the immigrant residual categories are broken into ten different 
coefficients, the difference is only large enough to be significant at decile 2 
(though it remains positive across all deciles except the 10th). 
3.7. Robustness checks and extensions 
Since so much of the previous literature on entrepreneurship and ability is 
based on wages rather than wage residuals, we have also re-estimated the 
relationship between entrepreneurship, with the coefficients on immigrants’ and 
natives’ wages decile given in Table 3.7 and graphed in Figure 3.7.  The pseudo-
R-squared (given) and correspondingly the log likelihood are higher when based 
on wage residuals rather than wages for all three columns, suggesting that if one 
or the other must be chosen, the estimates using wage residuals should be 
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chosen.  On the other hand, if we put wage residual deciles and wage deciles on 
the right-hand-side simultaneously, we can reject the hypothesis that wages 
affect science entrepreneurship controlling for wage residuals, but cannot reject 
this hypothesis for non-science entrepreneurship. We note, however, that the 
patterns in Figure 3.8 are similar to those in Figure 3.9, with the exception of 
some noisy decile coefficients in Figure 3.9.   
A second alternative would be to model those immigrants with their 
highest degree in the US compared to those with their highest degree abroad. We 
saw previously that controlling for field, education, demographics, and year, 
immigrants who obtained their highest degrees in the US and immigrants who 
obtained their highest degree abroad were not very different in their rates of 
either science or non-science entrepreneurship.  Although significantly different, 
translating the difference to percentage points, those with the highest degree 
from an institution in the US had a .05 percentage point higher science 
entrepreneurship rate and a .03 percentage higher non-science entrepreneurship 
rate.   
We have also re-estimated the analysis of Table 3.6 (Figure 3.8) with three 
sets of residual dummies, for natives, immigrants with a US highest degree and 
immigrants with a non-US highest degree. The residuals are graphed in Figure 
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3.10.  For science entrepreneurship, both sets of immigrants have generally 
higher entrepreneurship rates.  The particular shape for immigrants with the 
highest degree abroad mirrors the shape for immigrants from Figure 3.8. Also, 
the great advantage of immigrants from Figure 3.8 is shown in Figure 3.10 to 
only apply to those with the highest degree from the US. 
For non-science entrepreneurship, the figures are very noisy and show no 
systematic differences between the two types of immigrants. 
Finally, in analysis not shown, we have also divided immigrants by 
whether they came from culturally similar backgrounds; by whether they came 
from English-speaking countries; and by whether they went to a US high school.  
None of these were consistently useful in predicting entrepreneurship.   
3.8. Conclusion 
We use data from a large longitudinal survey of US-based scientists to 
study the determinants of science and non-science entrepreneurship for 
immigrants and natives. Individuals at the extremes of the ability distribution – 
sometimes referred to in the literature as “hobos” and “stars” -- have been shown 
to be more likely to become entrepreneurs.  The literature has also uncovered an 
“immigrant premium” in entrepreneurship. Is the immigrant entrepreneurship 
premium thus explained by the greater tendency of immigrants to be located at 
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the extremes of the ability distribution? The answer is no. Using wage residuals 
as a measure of ability, we find that immigrants are significantly more likely to 
become entrepreneurs even after controlling for their relative position on the 
ability spectrum. This result is consistent with the predictions of a Roy model 
under the assumption that immigrants are more endowed with resourcefulness – 
or other characteristics that are related to productivity in the entrepreneurial 
sector. These results also confirm that the hobo/star pattern extends to a highly 
educated sample, but only to non-science entrepreneurship. For science 
entrepreneurship, we find that only high-ability individuals enter 
entrepreneurship, consistent with high fixed costs of entry. Furthermore, the 
immigrant premium in science entrepreneurship is statistically significant at the 
middle and the top of the wage residuals’ distribution, in other words, at higher 
ability levels.  
Methodologically, we also find that wage residuals, rather than wages or 
education, are better predictors of entrepreneurship. Since wage residuals 
capture unobserved productivity characteristics, this is consistent with the 
importance for entrepreneurship of a form of resourcefulness that cannot be 
quantified with conventional measures of human capital.  
The findings from this paper have important implications for immigration 
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policy.  We start from the position that scientific endeavors in general, and 
science entrepreneurship in particular, are important for this country’s long run 
economic growth.  There is widely-known evidence that immigrants to the US 
are more likely to have studied science and engineering than natives, which is 
important for growth.  However, the current paper adds to this literature by 
finding that even controlling for educational field and level, immigrants are 
particularly likely to enter science entrepreneurship compared to natives. In 
terms of entry into science entrepreneurship, there may be a slight advantage for 
immigrants who receive a degree in the US, but the difference is small – a 5% 
increase in entrepreneurship due to a US degree when compared to immigrants 
who receive degrees outside the US.   
From the evidence on wage residuals, on the one hand we learn that 
science entrepreneurship is greatest for people with particularly high ability 
given their education and other measurable characteristics such as experience.  
While this is true for both natives and immigrants, it suggests that the more the 
US can attract stars – even ones not presently engaged in entrepreneurship – the 
better. On the other hand, our evidence shows that the likelihood that 
immigrants whose highest degree is not from a US institution enter science 
entrepreneurship is particularly high at intermediate levels of wage residuals, 
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suggesting the importance of the “medium” talented in this group.   Our 
evidence suggests that while the US should aim to attract highly educated 
immigrants, the ideal level of educational attainment to foster entrepreneurship 
is below the PhD level.  
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Table 3.1 Self-employment and entrepreneurship 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Incorporated: 
Percent of self-
employed  
incorporated 
Percent of self-
employed  
incorporated  
in science 
Percent of self-
employed  
incorporated in  
non-science 
      
Sample: everybody 7.33*** 9.11*** 1.62*** 3.20*** 5.72*** 5.91*** 
Sample size 351,755 84,686     
       
Sample for stage 2 logit 
(entrepreneurship in t+1) 
3.26*** 4.82*** 0.88*** 2.10*** 2.38*** 2.72*** 
Sample siz  174,377 40,450     
       
Not  incorporated: 
Percent of self-
employed not 
incorporated 
Percent of self-
employed not 
incorporated 
in science 
Percent of self-
employed  not 
incorporated in  
non-science 
       
Everybody 5.45*** 4.76*** 0.65*** 0.92*** 4.80*** 3.84*** 
Sample size 351,755 84,686     
       
− Sample: 1993-2006 SESTAT. Only full-time workers are included in the sample.  
− *Native/immigrant difference statistically significant at the 10% level  **5% level   ***1% level 
− All means are weighted by sample weights. 
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Table 3.2 Field of study 
Field of highest degree  
% of 
Natives 
% of 
Immigrants 
Computer and Information science 5.09 10.26 
Mathematics and statistics 3.49 3.45 
Engineering  15.17 28.03 
Biology  6.24 6.31 
Physics, chemistry, earth science and others 7.96 8.1 
Social sciences 24.31 13.68 
Health sciences 7.75 10.57 
SE related 2.53 2.79 
Non-SE 18.9 9.22 
Business 8.56 7.59 
− Sample: 1993-2006 SESTAT. Only full-time workers are included in the sample.  
− Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the individual level.  
− All means are weighted by sample weights. 
− Engineering includes aerospace engineering, chemical engineering, civil engineering, 
electrical and related engineering, industrial engineering, mechanical engineering and other 
engineering. Biology includes biochemistry and biophysics, microbiology and microbiology 
& bacteriology and other biological sciences. Physics, chemistry, earth science and others 
includes environmental sciences, physics, astronomy, other physical sciences, meteorology 
and atmospheric sciences, other physical & earth sciences, chemistry, geology, zoology, 
agricultural and food sciences. Social sciences include economics, psychology, other social 
sciences, political sciences, clinical psychology, sociology and anthropology. 
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Table 3.3a: Immigrant premium and education level and field. All entrepreneurship 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Immigrant 0.2363*** 0.2526*** 0.2666*** 0.2356*** 0.2144***   
 -0.0289 -0.0306 -0.0311 -0.039 -0.0389   
Immigrant highest degree in US     0.0669* 0.2446*** 
      -0.0347 -0.0422 
Immigrant highest degree NOT in US     0.4837*** 0.1748*** 
      -0.0425 -0.0543 
Master's degree  -0.5639*** -0.6740*** -0.7292*** -0.7581***  -0.7612*** 
  -0.0359 -0.0386 -0.0383 -0.0387  -0.0388 
Doctorate  -0.9512*** -0.9220*** -1.1436*** -1.1464***  -1.1498*** 
  -0.055 -0.0569 -0.0573 -0.058  -0.0582 
M.B.A.  0.4506*** 0.7892*** 0.7927*** 0.8961***  0.8958*** 
  -0.0632 -0.1088 -0.1095 -0.11  -0.11 
M.D.  1.6888*** 1.5995*** 1.3000*** 1.2619***  1.2618*** 
  -0.0471 -0.0752 -0.0778 -0.0777  -0.0777 
Black    -0.6128*** -0.6351***  -0.6375*** 
    -0.0633 -0.0634  -0.0634 
Asian    0.1393*** 0.1061**  0.1084** 
    -0.0452 -0.0452  -0.0453 
Hispanic    -0.2115*** -0.2841***  -0.2844*** 
    -0.0579 -0.0575  -0.0575 
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Table 3.3a continued 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
Married    0.1078** 0.1503***  0.1507*** 
    -0.0499 -0.05  -0.05 
Has child    0.0523 0.0211  0.0219 
    -0.0346 -0.0347  -0.0347 
Female*married    0.0746 0.0482  0.0488 
    -0.0741 -0.0742  -0.0742 
Female*child    -0.2326*** -0.2180***  -0.2176*** 
    -0.0655 -0.0657  -0.0657 
Spouse works    0.0137 -0.0012  -0.0011 
    -0.0315 -0.0317  -0.0317 
Includes field of highest degree? no no yes yes yes no yes 
Includes survey year fixed effects? no no no no yes no yes 
Observations 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 
Pseudo R-squared 0.000937 0.0364 0.0462 0.0713 0.0889 0.00182 0.089 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Excluded categories are BA only, computer/information 
science, 1993.  All regressions are weighted using sample weights. The 29 dummies for field of highest degrees are: mathematics 
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Table 3.3b: Immigrant premium and education level and field. Science entrepreneurship 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Immigrant 0.7019*** 0.7566*** 0.4834*** 0.3217*** 0.2671***   
 -0.0422 -0.0427 -0.0437 -0.0548 -0.0557   
Immigrant highest degree in US     0.6329**
* 
0.2874*** 
      -0.0492 -0.0616 
Immigrant highest degree NOT in US     0.8152**
* 
0.2409*** 
      -0.062 -0.0736 
Master's degree  -0.1797*** -0.1593*** -0.2087*** -0.2324***  -0.2357*** 
  -0.0497 -0.0528 -0.0527 -0.0539  -0.0545 
Doctorate  -0.8078*** -0.6050*** -0.7544*** -0.7656***  -0.7692*** 
  -0.0721 -0.0762 -0.0765 -0.0778  -0.0783 
M.B.A.  0.0443 -0.6490*** -0.6296*** -0.4932***  -0.4925*** 
  -0.1 -0.1418 -0.1427 -0.1442  -0.1442 
M.D.  0.0224 0.4861*** 0.2367 0.183  0.1826 
  -0.1308 -0.1752 -0.1782 -0.1779  -0.1779 
Black    -0.3519*** -0.4083***  -0.4104*** 
    -0.1086 -0.1092  -0.109 
Asian    0.3626*** 0.2811***  0.2794*** 
    -0.0605 -0.0616  -0.0615 
Hispanic    -0.0708 -0.2117**  -0.2124** 
    -0.0959 -0.0955  -0.0956 
Female    -0.3411*** -0.4132***  -0.4128*** 
    -0.0982 -0.0983  -0.0983 
Age    0.2272*** 0.3233***  0.3242*** 
    -0.0637 -0.0651  -0.065 
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Table 3.3b continued  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Married    0.0349 0.0796  0.0802 
    -0.076 -0.0761  -0.076 
Has child    -0.1247** -0.1681***  -0.1675*** 
    -0.0539 -0.0544  -0.0544 
Female*married    -0.0353 -0.0834  -0.083 
    -0.1208 -0.1211  -0.1211 
Female*child    -0.1133 -0.0979  -0.0981 
    -0.1102 -0.1107  -0.1108 
Spouse works    0.1294** 0.1333***  0.1333*** 
    -0.0503 -0.0508  -0.0508 
Includes field of highest degree? no no yes yes yes no yes 
Includes survey year fixed effects no no no no yes no yes 
Observations 436,44
1 
436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 
Pseudo R-squared     0.0681 0.091 0.111   0.111 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Excluded categories are BA only, computer/information 
science, 1993.  All regressions are weighted using sample weights. The 29 dummies for field of highest degrees are:  
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Table 3.3c: Immigrant premium and education level and field. Non-science entrepreneurship 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Immigrant 0.0527 0.0449 0.1500*** 0.1852*** 0.1725***   
 -0.0367 -0.0391 -0.0401 -0.0494 -0.0492   
Immigrant highest degree in US     -0.1755*** 0.1865*** 
      -0.0454 -0.0538 
Immigrant highest degree NOT in US     0.3657*** 0.1546** 
      -0.0527 -0.0692 
Master's degree  -0.7391*** -0.9079*** -0.9651*** -0.9882***  -0.9893*** 
  -0.0471 -0.0506 -0.0503 -0.0505  -0.0506 
Doctorate  -1.0129*** -1.0502*** -1.2976*** -1.2947***  -1.2959*** 
  -0.0698 -0.0722 -0.0729 -0.0732  -0.0734 
M.B.A.  0.6323*** 1.6983*** 1.6983*** 1.7766***  1.7763*** 
  -0.0766 -0.1615 -0.1616 -0.1622  -0.1622 
M.D.  1.9415*** 1.6977*** 1.3921*** 1.3670***  1.3671*** 
  -0.049 -0.0803 -0.0836 -0.0836  -0.0836 
Black    -0.6904*** -0.7043***  -0.7052*** 
    -0.0743 -0.0742  -0.0743 
Asian    0.0002 -0.0204  -0.0185 
    -0.0592 -0.0591  -0.0596 
Hispanic    -0.2490*** -0.2999***  -0.2999*** 
    -0.0693 -0.069  -0.069 
Female    -0.3270*** -0.3685***  -0.3684*** 
    -0.0736 -0.0738  -0.0738 
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Table 3.3c continued   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Married    0.1325** 0.1681***  0.1682*** 
    -0.061 -0.0609  -0.0609 
Has child    0.1175*** 0.0915**  0.0918** 
    -0.0418 -0.0418  -0.0418 
Female*married    0.0958 0.0764  0.0767 
    -0.0875 -0.0875  -0.0875 
Female*child    -0.2813*** -0.2694***  -0.2692*** 
    -0.0764 -0.0765  -0.0765 
Spouse works    -0.0216 -0.0369  -0.0369 
    -0.0375 -0.0375  -0.0375 
Includes field of highest degree? no no yes yes yes no yes 
Includes survey year fixed effects no no no no yes no yes 
Observations 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 436,441 
Pseudo R-squared     0.0681 0.091 0.111   0.111 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Excluded categories are BA only, computer/information science, 
1993.  All regressions are weighted using sample weights. The 29 dummies for field of highest degrees are: mathematics and statistics,  
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Table 3.4: Entrepreneurship and preferences for self-employment 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
All  
entrepreneurship 
Science  
entrepre- 
neurship 
Non-science  
entrepre- 
neurship 
Immigrant 0.381*** 0.345*** 0.447*** 0.295*** 
(0.0846) (0.0887) (0.172) (0.0985) 
Prefer self-employment 2.278*** 2.234*** 2.283*** 
(0.0845) (0.170) (0.0953) 
Constant -13.14*** -14.17*** -12.93*** -15.69*** 
(1.556) (1.646) (2.689) (1.916) 
Observations 46,213 46,213 46,215 46,215 
Mean of dependent 
variable 0.0110 0.0110 0.0614 0.0614 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0749 0.188 0.190 0.190 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Science 
and Non-science Entrepreneurship estimated together using multinomial 
logit. Logit coefficients estimating exp(Dummy=1/Dummy=0). All 
regressions include education level, field, race, age, gender, family 
structure. All regressions are weighted using sample weights.  
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Table 3.5 Immigrant premium and wage residuals 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Entrepreneurship           
(t+1) 
Science 
entrepreneurship 
(t+1) 
Non-science 
entrepreneurship (t+1) 
       Immigrant 0.3265*** 0.3044*** 0.4861*** 0.4930*** 0.2156** 0.1843** 
(0.0677) (0.0679) (0.0987) (0.0998) (0.0900) (0.0900) 
Residuals 2nd -0.4612*** -0.1639 -0.5651*** 
(0.1096) (0.1895) (0.1339) 
Residuals 3rd -0.5001*** -0.0382 -0.6973*** 
(0.1083) (0.1832) (0.1381) 
Residuals 4th -0.4610*** -0.0377 -0.6455*** 
(0.1082) (0.1882) (0.1354) 
Residuals 5th -0.3417*** 0.0251 -0.5030*** 
(0.1111) (0.1782) (0.1449) 
Residuals 6th -0.2993*** 0.2355 -0.5772*** 
(0.1097) (0.1814) (0.1457) 
Residuals 7th -0.2851*** 0.1012 -0.4724*** 
(0.1090) (0.1887) (0.1341) 
Residuals 8th -0.1387 0.1109 -0.2434* 
(0.1059) (0.1744) (0.1336) 
Residuals 9th -0.0075 0.2327 -0.1131 
(0.1017) (0.1831) (0.1221) 
Residuals 10th 
decile 
0.7484*** 0.5924*** 0.7265*** 
(0.0905) (0.1929) (0.1017) 
Observations 214,827 214,827 214,827 214,827 214,827 214,827 
Pseudo R square 0.091 0.108 0.109 0.126 0.109 0.126 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Science and Non-science 
Entrepreneurship estimated together using multinomial logit. All regressions are weighted 
using sample weights. Logit coefficients estimating exp(Dummy=1/Dummy=0). All regressions 
include education level, field, gender, race, age, family structure, survey year. Sample: 1997 
NSCG and NSRCG respondents who were interviewed again in 1999. 
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Table 3.6a: Entrepreneurship and wage residuals for natives and immigrants 
(1) (2) (3) 
Entrepre-
neurship          
(t+1) 
Science entrepre-
neurship (t+1) 
Non-science 
entrepre- 
neurship (t+1) 
Residuals 2nd decile*native -0.5553*** -0.2619 -0.6449*** 
 
(0.1307) (0.2358) (0.1585) 
Residuals 3rd decile*native -0.5372*** -0.1216 -0.6870*** 
 
(0.1242) (0.2259) (0.1537) 
Residuals 4th decile*native -0.5639*** -0.2543 -0.6654*** 
 
(0.1271) (0.2385) (0.1529) 
Residuals 5th decile*native -0.4299*** -0.1616 -0.5164*** 
 
(0.1301) (0.2241) (0.1628) 
Residuals 6th decile*native -0.3753*** 0.1014 -0.5812*** 
 
(0.1257) (0.2216) (0.1623) 
Residuals 7th decile*native -0.3402*** -0.0026 -0.4717*** 
 
(0.1265) (0.2374) (0.1501) 
Residuals 8th decile*native -0.1855 0.0199 -0.2502* 
 
(0.1217) (0.2159) (0.1495) 
Residuals 9th decile*native -0.0594 0.1314 -0.1229 
 
(0.1162) (0.2222) (0.1372) 
Residuals 10th decile*native 0.7509*** 0.5211** 0.7577*** 
 
(0.1030) (0.2340) (0.1146) 
Residuals 1st decile*immigrant 0.1383 0.1568 0.1892 
 
(0.1536) (0.2671) (0.1853) 
Residuals 2nd decile*immigrant 0.0133 0.2070 0.0000 
 
(0.1623) (0.2807) (0.1985) 
Residuals 3rd decile*immigrant -0.2548 0.2758 -0.5767** 
 
(0.1843) (0.2697) (0.2780) 
Residuals 4th decile*immigrant 0.0824 0.6551** -0.3253 
 
(0.1692) (0.2684) (0.2399) 
Residuals 5th decile*immigrant 0.1468 0.6407** -0.2179 
 
(0.1695) (0.2548) (0.2623) 
Residuals 6th decile*immigrant 0.1397 0.7128** -0.3576 
 
(0.1944) (0.2798) (0.2945) 
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Table 3.6a continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Entrepre- 
neurship 
(t+1) 
Science 
entrepre- 
neurship 
(t+1)  
Non-science 
entrepre- 
neurship 
(t+1) 
Residuals 7th decile*immigrant 0.0551 0.4841* -0.2864 
 
(0.1752) (0.2862) (0.2253) 
Residuals 8th decile*immigrant 0.1573 0.4475* -0.0044 
 
(0.1702) (0.2389) (0.2526) 
Residuals 9th decile*immigrant 0.3151* 0.6048** 0.1483 
 
(0.1711) (0.2978) (0.2073) 
Residuals 10th decile*immigrant 0.6618*** 0.8142*** 0.6204*** 
 
(0.1433) (0.2977) (0.1619) 
Observations 214,827 214,827 214,827 
Pseudo R square 0.109 0.127 0.127 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Science and 
Non-science Entrepreneurship estimated together using multinomial logit. Logit 
coefficients estimating exp(Dummy=1/Dummy=0) All regressions are weighted 
using sample weights. All regressions include education level, field, gender, race, 
age, family structure, survey year. 
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Table 3.6b Test for the existence of the immigrant premium at each decile 
(test of β(residual i*native) = β(residual i*immigrant) 
Test β(Residual 
i*native 
= Residual 
i*immigrant) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Entrepre- 
neurship 
(t+1) 
Science 
entrepre- 
neurship (t+1) 
Non-science 
entrepre-
neurship (t+1) 
i=1 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
i=2 *** * *** 
i=3 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
i=4 *** *** n.s. 
i=5 *** *** n.s. 
i=6 ***. *** n.s. 
i=7 ** * n.s. 
i=8 ** ** n.s. 
i=9 ** * n.s. 
i=10 n.s. n.s. n.s. 
Observations 149,754 149,754 149,754 
Pseudo R square 0.116 0.116 0.140 
n.s. not significant.  *Statistically significant at the 10% level, ** 5% level, 
*** 1% level. All regressions are weighted using sample weights 
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Table 3.7 Robustness check Entrepreneurship and wages in paid job 
 (1) (2) (3) 
  
Entrepre- 
neurship (t+1) 
Science  
entrepre- 
neurship (t+1) 
Non-science  
entrepre- 
neurship (t+1) 
Wages 2nd decile*native -0.5282*** -0.5408* -0.5113*** 
 
(0.1370) (0.3146) (0.1522) 
Wages 3rd decile*native -0.4901*** -0.2765 -0.5300*** 
 
(0.1379) (0.2822) (0.1599) 
Wages 4th decile*native -0.6357*** -0.4137 -0.6923*** 
 
(0.1409) (0.2659) (0.1710) 
Wages 5th decile*native -0.5119*** 0.0200 -0.7318*** 
 
(0.1385) (0.2681) (0.1735) 
Wages 6th decile*native -0.3706*** -0.1985 -0.4168** 
 
(0.1392) (0.2793) (0.1662) 
Wages 7th decile*native -0.2006 -0.0175 -0.2502 
 
(0.1422) (0.2580) (0.1778) 
Wages 8th decile*native -0.1502 0.0558 -0.2234 
 
(0.1320) (0.2653) (0.1584) 
Wages 9th decile*native 0.0839 0.2301 0.0304 
 
(0.1427) (0.2672) (0.1766) 
Wages 10th decile*native 0.6626*** 0.3020 0.7337*** 
 
(0.1238) (0.2848) (0.1392) 
Wages 1st decile*immigrant 0.2749 -0.2236 0.4498** 
 
(0.1942) (0.4155) (0.2167) 
Wages 2nd decile*immigrant 0.0840 0.3540 0.0354 
 
(0.2113) (0.3717) (0.2659) 
Wages 3rd decile*immigrant -0.1832 0.4639 -0.5107* 
 
(0.2121) (0.3438) (0.2823) 
Wages 4th decile*immigrant 0.1179 0.5959* -0.1086 
 
(0.1764) (0.3132) (0.2234) 
Wages 5th decile*immigrant -0.1766 -0.0736 -0.1653 
 
(0.2008) (0.3203) (0.2634) 
Wages 6th decile*immigrant 0.2337 0.7169** -0.1401 
 
(0.1885) (0.2983) (0.2912) 
Wages 7th decile*immigrant 0.0421 0.5494* -0.5213** 
 
(0.1969) (0.3172) (0.2394) 
Wages 8th decile*immigrant 0.3254* 0.6174** 0.0226 
 
(0.1725) (0.3020) (0.2418) 
Wages 9th decile*immigrant 0.2698 0.6577** -0.1868 
 
(0.1692) (0.2946) (0.2480) 
Wages 10th decile*immigrant 0.6985*** 0.5212* 0.7818*** 
  (0.1493) (0.3049) (0.1722) 
Observations 214,827 214,827 214,827 
Pseudo R square 0.106 0.124 0.124 
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Table 3.8 
Entrepreneurship and wage residuals for natives, immigrant by  
whether they obtained their highest degree in US 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Entrepre- 
neurship 
Science 
entrepre- 
neurship 
Non-
science 
entrepre- 
neurship 
Residuals 2nd decile*native -0.5554*** -0.2624 -0.6450*** 
(0.1307) (0.2358) (0.1585) 
Residuals 3rd decile*native -0.5376*** -0.1228 -0.6871*** 
(0.1242) (0.2259) (0.1537) 
Residuals 4th decile*native -0.5642*** -0.2555 -0.6655*** 
(0.1270) (0.2385) (0.1529) 
Residuals 5th decile*native -0.4303*** -0.1631 -0.5165*** 
(0.1301) (0.2241) (0.1628) 
Residuals 6th decile*native -0.3757*** 0.1001 -0.5813*** 
(0.1257) (0.2216) (0.1623) 
Residuals 7th decile*native -0.3406*** -0.0043 -0.4718*** 
(0.1265) (0.2373) (0.1502) 
Residuals 8th decile*native -0.1858 0.0186 -0.2502* 
(0.1217) (0.2159) (0.1496) 
Residuals 9th decile*native -0.0597 0.1302 -0.1230 
(0.1162) (0.2222) (0.1372) 
Residuals 10th decile*native 0.7511*** 0.5209** 0.7579*** 
(0.1030) (0.2340) (0.1146) 
Residuals 1st decile*highest degree US 0.1976 0.0530 0.3152 
(0.2059) (0.3158) (0.2476) 
Residuals 2nd decile*highest degree US 0.0254 0.1529 0.0448 
(0.2017) (0.3475) (0.2456) 
Residuals 3rd decile*highest degree US -0.2266 0.2027 -0.4609 
(0.2180) (0.3214) (0.3161) 
Residuals 4th decile*highest degree US -0.0688 0.4273 -0.3959 
(0.1990) (0.2959) (0.2896) 
Residuals 5th decile*highest degree US -0.0777 0.4510 -0.5616* 
(0.1944) (0.2851) (0.3181) 
Residuals 6th decile*highest degree US 0.1063 0.4360* -0.0909 
(0.2068) (0.2629) (0.3326) 
Residuals 7th decile*highest degree US 0.0046 0.4458 -0.3906 
(0.2113) (0.3219) (0.2931) 
Residuals 8th decile*highest degree US 0.1848 0.5116** -0.0307 
(0.1899) (0.2508) (0.2983) 
Residuals 9th decile*highest degree US 0.2510 0.6819** -0.0671 
(0.2092) (0.3453) (0.2542) 
Residuals 10th decile*highest degree US 0.8217*** 1.0659*** 0.7418*** 
(0.1610) (0.3002) (0.1863) 
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Table 3.8 continued 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 
Entrepre- 
neurship 
Science  
entrepre- 
neurship 
Non-science 
entrepre- 
neurship 
Residuals 1st decile*highest degree abroad 0.1126 0.2032 0.1305 
(0.1835) (0.3109) (0.2236) 
Residuals 2nd decile*highest degree abroad 0.0003 0.2644 -0.0501 
(0.2219) (0.3558) (0.2775) 
Residuals 3rd decile*highest degree abroad -0.2985 0.3856 -0.7607 
(0.2828) (0.3465) (0.4837) 
Residuals 4th decile*highest degree abroad 0.2998 0.9804*** -0.2232 
(0.2519) (0.3632) (0.3727) 
Residuals 5th decile*highest degree abroad 0.4416* 0.9400*** 0.1346 
(0.2513) (0.3363) (0.3749) 
Residuals 6th decile*highest degree abroad 0.1971 1.1021** -1.0521** 
(0.3589) (0.4323) (0.4933) 
Residuals 7th decile*highest degree abroad 0.1558 0.5632 -0.1106 
(0.2512) (0.4097) (0.2976) 
Residuals 8th decile*highest degree abroad 0.0903 0.2519 0.0420 
(0.2867) (0.3718) (0.4014) 
Residuals 9th decile*highest degree abroad 0.4282* 0.4250 0.4665 
(0.2486) (0.4030) (0.3082) 
Residuals 10th decile*highest degree abroad 0.3632 0.2728 0.4001* 
(0.2232) (0.5055) (0.2378) 
Observations 214,827 214,827 214,827 
Pseudo R square 0.109 0.127 0.127 
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Figure 3.1 Immigrant’s region of origin 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Immigrants’ citizenship status 
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Figure 3.3 Immigrants’ visa at entry in the United States 
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Figure 3.4a Individual endowments of M and R and entrepreneurship.  
High positive correlation between M and R 
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Figure 3.4b Individual endowments of M and R and entrepreneurship.  
Low positive correlation between M and R 
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Figure 3.4c Individual endowments of M and R and entrepreneurship. U-shaped 
relationship between ability in paid employment and entrepreneurship 
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Figure 3.4d Individual endowments of M and R and entrepreneurship.  
Immigrants have larger endowments of R 
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Figure 3.4e Individual endowments of M and R and entrepreneurship.  
Science entrepreneurship and non-science entrepreneurship 
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Figure 3.5: Distribution by wage residual deciles and immigrant status 
(2-year sample) 
 
   
 
  
Figure 3.6: Distribution by wage residual deciles and  
immigrant education location (2-year sample) 
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Figure 3.7 Entrepreneurship and wage residuals  
(Multinomial logit coefficients) 
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Figure 3.8a Science entrepreneurship and wage residuals 
(Multinomial logit coefficients) 
 
 
Figure 3.8b Non-science entrepreneurship and wage residuals 
(Multinomial logit coefficients)
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Figure 3.9a Science entrepreneurship and wages  
(Multinomial logit coefficients) 
 
Figure 3.9b Non-science entrepreneurship and wages  
(Multinomial logit coefficients) 
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Figure 3.10a Science entrepreneurship and wage residuals  
(Multinomial logit coefficients) 
 
Figure 3.10b Science entrepreneurship and wage residuals  
(Multinomial logit coefficients) 
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Appendices 
Appendix to chapter 1 
Figure A1: Sectors of Rwanda 
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Figure A2: Communes of Rwanda before 2002
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Figure A3: Prefectures of Rwanda before 2002 
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
  
Definition of “science entrepreneur” 
We define an indicator for being an entrepreneur (self-employed incorporated) in 
science. The indicator takes the value 1 if one of the following criteria is met: 
• The individual has a job in bio/med science, chemistry, chemical 
engineering, computer/math sciences, civil engineering, electrical 
engineering, mechanical engineering, other engineering, other physical 
sciences, physics or other life sciences and his primary work activity is not 
professional services. 
• The individual has a job as a manager and his primary work activity is 
research (Design of Equipment, Processes, Development, Computer 
Applications, Programming, Basic research, Applied Research); the 
individual is a manager and his primary work activity is management but 
his secondary work activity is research. 
Definition of “non-science entrepreneur” 
We define an indicator for being an entrepreneur (self-employed incorporated) 
but not in science. The indicator takes the value 1 if one of the following criteria 
is met: 
• The individual has a job in non-science or has a job as a teacher.  
• The individual has a job as a manager and his primary work activity is not 
research. 
• The individual has a job in bio/med science, chemistry, chemical 
engineering, computer/math sciences, civil engineering, electrical 
engineering, mechanical engineering, other engineering, other physical 
sciences, physics or other life sciences and his primary work activity is 
professional service. 
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